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Abstract 
 
Resistance is No Longer Futile: Women’s Rights in Lebanon 
 
Laura Paige Partain, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Karin Wilkins 
 
 
 This thesis focuses on the current state of women's rights in Lebanon. Due to 
gender inequality, wider systems of violence, and institutionalized methods of 
disenfranchisement such as Lebanese personal status laws and the Kafala system, a 
sponsorship system for migrant domestic labor, women and children are most vulnerable 
to violence. Despite these pervasive systems of patriarchal dominance,  it has thus far 
been difficult to fight gender-based violence in Lebanon because the country promotes a 
superficial appearance of equality. This thesis discusses how the women's rights 
organization KAFA, meaning “Enough” in Arabic, could ignite a women’s movement in 
a country, like Lebanon, that has experienced limited progress for women and prolonged 
national violence. 
 
 vii 
My thesis begins with an interview with the Communication Director of KAFA, 
followed by a discussion of KAFA’s different campaign strategies to engage the state 
apparatus, the public sphere, and the migrant and refugee community. I then illustrate 
how KAFA implements its campaigns through mass media and other visual culture, 
incorporating audience responses to these strategies into my discussion. Finally, I analyze 
these campaigns strategies in relation to each other, focusing on the implications of the 
audiences’ responses. 
 I argue in this thesis that in order for KAFA to launch a women’s rights 
movement under current social and political conditions in KAFA, it must first employ 
strategic campaigns to confront forms of gender-based violence at the state and 
community levels, appealing to a wide audience and building support across campaigns. 
Constructing webs of activist support across campaigns is crucial for combatting 
patriarchal oppression regarding socioeconomic and nationalist differences that a part of 
KAFA’s audience reproduces in their responses to campaigns. These issues are 
particularly evident in responses regarding those working under the Kafala system, a 
form of modern day slavery. KAFA uses these contentious responses, however, as an 
opportunity to educate and raise awareness, educate, and prevent gender-based violence. 
KAFA’s campaign strategies have led to an increase in volunteers and activists 
participating in KAFA, which I argue places the organization in a unique place to build a 
women's rights movement in Lebanon.  
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 1 
Introduction: A Progression of Violence 
 
Women in Lebanon are vulnerable to conflict and violence. Though women’s 
susceptibility to these threatening conditions is hardly location specific given worldwide 
patriarchal prominence, it is important not to conflate all women’s experiences. Women 
living in Lebanon experience vulnerability stemming from a tumultuous Lebanese history 
and unique societal structures. As a result, these women reside in a very precarious 
position when facing violence that is condoned, often passively, by the state. I explore in 
this thesis Lebanese women’s rights organizations strategically raising national 
awareness for gender-based violence while building a women’s movement in order to 
confront these crucial issues.  
Lebanon is a country born from violence. From the formation of the modern 
Middle East in 1919 following World War 1, resulting in the French mandate and the 
French formation of the Lebanese Republic in 1926, to the ever-present sectarian 
violence, Lebanon has experienced a constant undercurrent of bloody warfare or 
foreboding negative peace.1 A product of the nation’s mixed identity, or rather, lack of a 
cohesive national identity, its sectarian identity differences resulted in the explosion of 
armed conflict and regional violence repeatedly throughout Lebanon’s young history.  
                                                
1Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” The term “negative peace” is taken from Johan 
Galtung’s research paper “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”. The term comes from his discussion of 
personal and structural violence. Personal violence describes a situation where one actor commits violence 
against another person. Structural violence, however, describes the presence of widespread violence as a 
result of power differences or widespread inequality. Negative peace describes a situation where structural 
violence is present. 
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This violence is a result of different religious and tribal communities forced under the 
banner of one nation and one government, with every group vying for political control 
and primacy. After the formation of the modern Middle East, the 18 recognized religious 
denominations came together to form a confessional government within a Parliamentary 
Democracy. According to the Constitution, a Maronite Christian always holds the 
Presidency, a Shi’ite Muslim always holds the position of the Speaker of the House, and 
a Sunni Muslim always holds the position of the Prime Minister, with the Parliament 
proportionally divided between all 18 religious groups.2 While the Lebanese often boast 
about their democratic form of governing, there is constant contention regarding the 
power allotted to each confessional group, often resulting in sectarian conflict and 
disputes.  
These sectarian rifts and communal disputes led to a 15-year Lebanese Civil War 
from 1975-1990, destroying lives, history, and the economic and architectural 
infrastructure of most of the country. While much of this violence was directed inward, 
other regional neighbors became involved in the conflict at times. During the Lebanese 
Civil War, Israel invaded and occupied Lebanon in 1982 after numerous incidents with 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Syria also went into Lebanon 1976 and did not 
truly leave until 2005. The end of the Lebanese Civil War with the Ta’if Agreement in 
1989 brought the formal end of the war, with the ground fighting ceasing in 1990. The 
end of the war did not bring a lasting peace, however, and many of the Lebanese groups 
would continue engaging in violence and fighting with various groups over the next two 
                                                
2 JOSEPH, “Political Familism in Lebanon.” pg. 158 
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decades. During this time, the rest of the country found itself in a situation of negative 
peace, carefully navigating around those of other sectarian backgrounds to avoid 
instigating local skirmishes. 3 
 Violence against women, primarily committed by males, is intimately connected 
to the national and political violence permeating Lebanese history. Though political 
violence is not the only cause of domestic violence, there exists a correlation between 
political violence and violence committed in the home. Lebanon does not now, nor has it 
ever, kept statistical analysis on domestic violence. The lack of statistics makes it 
difficult to surmise the full extent of violence women experienced during the Lebanese 
Civil War. Although these statistics do not exist, it is reasonable to surmise several 
general ideas regarding violence from other sources: 1. Women experience a variety of 
violence during wartime, from displacement to rape, 2. Violence during times of warfare 
increases domestic violence in the home, and 3. Exposure to domestic violence in the 
home increases the likelihood of witnesses reproducing the violence in the future.4 
Though Lebanon does not keep statistical evidence regarding the levels of 
domestic violence in the country, the few existing studies regarding these issues illustrate 
the connection between wartime violence and violence in the home. In “Women, War, 
and Violence-Surviving the Experience,” Jinan Usta, Jo Ann M. Farver, and Lama Zein 
interviewed 310 women at the Ministry of Local Affairs to assess their exposure to 
various forms of violence during the 2006 War between Hezbollah and Israel. In addition 
                                                
3 Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, “Domestic Violence.” pg. 209, taken from the following study: Kessler RC, 
Molnar BE, Feurer ID, Appelbaum M. Patterns and  mental health predictors of domestic violence in the 
United States: results from the National Comorbidity Survey. Int J Law Psychiatry 2001;24:487–508. 
4 Ibid. pg. 209 
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to bodily violence, this study states that women were six times as likely as men to 
develop posttraumatic stress symptoms regardless of the comparative level of exposure.5 
Additionally, the study notes the possible evidence for increased violence within the 
home as a result of violence outside of the home during and following the war.  
Though this article cannot directly correlate the instances of violence women 
experienced during the 2006 War to violence after the war, it does illustrate a large 
number of women who experienced domestic abuse from this sample. Of this sample of 
women in regards to violence during the 2006 War, a high percentage of women 
experienced bodily violence through displacement, violence associated with armed 
conflict, and several types of physical abuse including hitting, pushing, kicking, being 
threatened with a weapon, and sexual abused.6 Significantly, 33% of the women being 
interviewed experienced violence following the war, with 92% of these women coming 
from the group that had also experienced violence during the war.7 Though the women 
were not asked about their experiences with violence prior to the Lebanese war, they did 
note that during the war, “their husbands were highly irritable and edgy, under much 
psychological stress because they felt they had ‘lost everything,’ and that they tended to 
let out their stress on their wives.”8 These statements share similarities with women in 
other conflict zones, on which Nadera Shalhoub Kevorkian reflects, “Furthermore, 
                                                
5Usta, Farver, and Zein, “Women, War, and Violence.” 794 
6 Ibid. pg. 797-798 
7 Ibid. pg. 798 
8 Ibid. pg. 798 
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militarization constructs Palestinian women as boundary markers, often becoming the 
punch bag for the men outside and the punch bag for the men inside.”9 
 During times of war, women are exposed to violence through both their enemies 
or invaders and their situations at home. Women’s bodies demarcate the division between 
outer and inner identities. Outside, the men from their clan attempt to protect the women 
from the opposing forces; the impregnation of a women’s womb symbolically represents 
the dominance of the other group and literally represents the infiltration of the invaders. 
Inside, men act out aggression towards the women in the household. Whether because of 
the stress of outside conflict, or because the men are reproducing the patriarchal 
dominance in their own home that they are facing in the warzone, women experience the 
brunt of masculine anger.  
 Unfortunately, issues of violence create a self-perpetuating cycle that is difficult 
to break. As noted, Lebanon has experienced conflict and violence since before its 
creation as a modern nation state. There was intensified violence between Christians and 
Muslims during the 1950’s, followed by the extremely violent and bloody 15 year 
Lebanese Civil War, the war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, and a continuous 
situation of negative peace between and after these major wars. All aforementioned 
situations resulted in the trauma of Lebanese citizens and a normalization of violence. In 
Domestic Violence, the Lebanese Experience, the authors discuss how though the 
underlying problem of gender inequality leads to violence, the long history of Lebanese 
violence led to a normalization of violence, an increase in domestic violence and rape, 
                                                
9 Lentin, “Palestinian Women from Femina Sacra to Agents of Active Resistance.” pg. 168 
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and how, “not only have women become targets of men’s aggression but that children 
have been ‘socialized’ into it.”10 Conversations regarding domestic violence in Lebanon 
often leave out children, but they play an intricate role in several ways. Children raised 
around violence may have difficulties recognizing that it is an inappropriate part of a 
relationship. Becoming normalized to violence also results in the children perpetuating 
the violence as adults. “The childhood experience of witnessing minor violence in the 
home was as important as witnessing severe violence in predicting subsequent 
intergenerational continuity of domestic violence.”11 In addition to children carrying 
violence into the next generation, husbands often use them as bargaining tools to gain 
control over their wives. The majority of the time, women are unable to gain custody, or 
permanent custody, of their children, and sometimes must decide if they will remain in an 
abusive situation to protect their children, or if they will leave an abusive situation and 
also have their children taken away from them.  
 Domestic violence of women and children is but one manifestation of patriarchal 
violence; rape and abuse of migrant domestic workers are also prevalent problems in 
Lebanese society. Violence against migrant domestic workers results from the Lebanese 
Kafala system, which gives the employer unmitigated control over the lives of his or her 
employees. The migrants coming to Lebanon, usually from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, 
and Ethiopia, provide cheap labor without having any rights. Because the migrant worker 
is often seeking work in Lebanon in order to provide monetary funds for their family, the 
                                                
10 Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, “Domestic Violence.” Pg. 210 
11 Ibid. pg. 209 
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employer pays for the worker to come to Lebanon. The employee then signs a contract in 
Arabic, a language often unknown to the employee, and is required to hand over their 
visa as collateral for the employer paying initial travel fees. Without a visa, the employee 
cannot go outside the home without fear of being caught and taken to prison, where they 
will possibly be sexually and physically assaulted.12 The Kafala system results in 
employers having complete power over their employee, including the ability to abuse the 
migrant worker, withhold pay and visa, overwork and underfeed them, and give them no 
time off. The women within this system are economically in danger and vulnerable, both 
at home and abroad, which insures continued subjection to what many describe as 
contract slavery.13  
There is also a gendered aspect to these cases, as the migrant domestic workers 
consistently name the “Madame,” the female head of the household, as the abuser. The 
abuse from one woman to the other often stems from feelings of resentment or jealousy 
on the part of the employer and is her attempt to firmly establish class differences 
between herself and the ‘other’ employee. These problems also highlight a distinctly 
racialized aspect of the Kafala system: Lebanese society tends to discuss Sri Lankan 
women in particular in a pejorative way, treating them as racially or inherently dirty. 
They are fed leftovers from the main meal, expected to wash the bathroom after they 
wash themselves, or are given distinguishably inferior products to use.14 The women are 
often beaten at home by the Madame, or on a less likely, or less reported, occurrence, 
                                                
12 Jureidini and Moukarbel, “Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon.” pg. 598 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. pg. 586 
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sexually assaulted by the mister in the household. If the maid attempts to run away, they 
often would be leaving their legal papers behind. Because the Madame or the employing 
household locks up the visa as collateral, the worker might not attain it before escaping. 
Thus, this situation places them at risk for capture by the General Security, a policing 
force known for beating and sexually abusing the majority of women that pass through 
their detention centers. If the employers believe the worker is misbehaving and do not 
want to discipline her themselves, they may take these workers to the recruitment office, 
where many officials themselves may beat migrant domestic workers.  
A women’s organization called KAFA, meaning “enough” in Arabic, and other 
women’s rights organizations have taken special interest in migrant domestic worker 
abuses because of the increasing rate of suicide among these workers, such as the video 
showing Barcotan Dupree, an Ethiopian domestic worker, jumping from a window on 
November 10, 2014. Desperate to find a way out, these women take their own lives 
instead of continually submitting themselves to lives of contract slavery. Similar to cases 
of domestic violence against Lebanese women, statistics regarding the abuse of migrant 
domestic workers are difficult to find. According to Human Rights Watch, one worker 
died every week in 2008 from “unnatural causes, including suicide and falls from tall 
buildings.”15 To date, little has been done to remedy these conditions, and as a result, the 
Philippines has barred their citizens from taking new contracts in Lebanon. Despite the 
historical lack of attention paid to these issues with the Kafala system, KAFA, a women’s 
                                                
15 “Lebanon.” 
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rights NGO, and other migrant domestic workers groups are currently undertaking steps 
to gain rights for migrant domestic workers.  
In addition to rape as a form of violence committed against migrant domestic 
workers, rape is a widespread phenomenon permeating every corner of society. Rape is 
underreported generally and lacks attention in Lebanon particularly. Yet it would be 
woefully ignorant to claim that rape does not exist. Though the lack of statistical 
evidence makes it difficult to conduct scholarship on rape in Lebanon, the widespread 
knowledge of occurrences of rape provide a basis for critical discussions of the topic. 
Marital rape is the most widely discussed form of rape in Lebanon, and currently exists at 
the forefront in the proposed law to protect women from domestic violence. Additionally, 
several studies conducted on the perception of rape and sexual violence in Lebanon 
indicates that, 1. It exists as an issue, 2. People are aware that it is occurring, and 3. 
People have an opinion regarding rape in Lebanon.16 One study at the American 
University of Beirut conducted with 300 University Students analyzed the participants’ 
views towards the victims of rape in Lebanon. The students were given a hypothetical 
situation where a woman is raped, with varying scenarios involving a change of the 
woman’s relationship status and level of promiscuity. The woman’s relationship status 
was categorized as married, dating, neighbors, or single, and the woman’s level of 
promiscuity ranged from devout, divorced, married, promiscuous, to chaste. The study 
found that students considered the situation in which the woman, here the victim, is 
                                                
16 Women, War, and Violence: Surviving the Experience, Lebanon Launches New Campaign to Combat 
Violence Against Refugee Women and Children, Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon: A Case 
of ‘Contract Slavery’?, Dimensions of gender-based violence against Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 
Perceptions of Rape and Attitudes Toward Women in a Sample of Lebanese Students 
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married to the perpetrator of rape, as least likely to fall under the definition of rape. 
Additionally, the students considered the scenario in which the victim is dating the 
perpetrator of rape as less likely a situation of rape than if the woman and the rapist were 
neighbors or if the women was single and had no relationship with the perpetrator of 
rape. This indicates that the woman’s relationship status or familiarity with the person 
that rapes her tended to determine the students’ categorization of rape as distinctly rape.17 
Additionally, though the study states that the students tended to believe that the woman 
was raped regardless of her level of sexuality, the students were less likely to categorize 
the situation in which the woman who was raped was also promiscuous as a rape.18 These 
views are particularly significant in Lebanon because there is not a law against marital 
rape. Women have little recourse in an environment where their relationship and level of 
sexuality determine whether or not rape will be considered rape to those they report the 
incident.  
The persistent threat of violence against all women in Lebanon has resulted in 
numerous women’s rights and domestic worker’s rights organizations forming. Often 
these groups collaborate to champion each other’s message for equality, supporting the 
idea that there is not equality for one group without equality for everyone. These groups 
work to garner wider public attention for their mission to protect women, families and 
migrant domestic workers. Two of the most prominent women’s rights organizations, 
                                                
17 I would like to emphasize that this thesis is in no way indicating that there are degrees of rape. Rape is 
rape. Rather, this paragraph in particular focuses on the correlation between a women’s relationship status 
and level of sexual activity and the students’ perception of her as a victim of rape.  
18 Rebeiz and Harb, “Perceptions of Rape and Attitudes Toward Women in a Sample of Lebanese 
Students.” Pg. 748 
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Nasawiya and KAFA, were founded fairly recently in 2010 and 2005 respectively. Each 
group fights for freedom from gender-based violence and oppression, though KAFA is a 
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) and Nasawiya is a member-driven collective, 
meaning that boards, staff, and volunteers do not form Nasawiya but that it considers its 
members all of equal standing. The Migrant Community Center in Beirut and Catharsis-
the Lebanese Center for Drama Therapy tend to focus more on the rights and abuses of 
migrant domestic workers through organizing, networking, and language and other forms 
of learning. Each group works to dismantle the violent patriarchal system in Lebanon 
persistently abusing these disenfranchised groups.  
Although war and various forms of violence twice impeded the progression of a 
women’s movement in Lebanon, it also at times facilitated progress through disrupting 
social norms. Not solely a Lebanese phenomenon, war may disrupt traditional values in 
several ways such as: forcing women to take on the duties of absent males, necessitating 
women to work outside the home, as well as creating diversified interactions between 
non-related men and women. Lebanon’s unique sectarian government and its long-
standing interactions with French culture and international trade allowed for women’s 
progress during these periods of conflict to remain intact in certain respects. As a result, 
Lebanon is often considered one of the most progressive countries in the Middle East, 
touting its history of women’s rights providing women with access to education, the 
workplace, and liberties in public spaces. Yet these obvious liberties act as a smokescreen 
for the rampant inequalities lying just beneath the surface of this facade. The 
institutionalization of gender-based discrimination at times hides inequality and violence 
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against women, additionally making it a low priority compared with wider national 
concerns. Lebanon continuously struggles with keeping its borders secure and its lands 
free from proxy-wars, a problem it is currently facing in 2015 in its fight against the 
group Da’esh (The Islamic State). The Lebanese economy is also struggling to maintain 
nearly 4 million refugees now living in its small country, including Palestinians, 
Armenians, and Syrians.  Nevertheless, these political and humanitarian crises all the 
more necessitate the protection of all women in Lebanon against gender-based violence 
and rampant inequalities. 
            This thesis utilizes the organization KAFA as a case study of how women in a 
country like Lebanon, with a history of a disrupted women’s movement and the continual 
presence of political violence, begin the process of launching a national women’s rights 
movement.  My thesis argues that in order to initiate reform, KAFA must first raise 
awareness for gender-based inequalities and violence using accessible and impactful 
campaign strategies, then through simultaneously implementing campaigns while rotating 
emphasis on each campaign, build public support across campaigns to create webs of 
social activism while addressing socio-economic, nationalist, and religious divides. 
Finally, KAFA must utilize this momentum to place women’s equality on the forefront of 
national concerns, linking its cause to the imperative issues of human rights abuses and 
the dismantling of larger systems of violence. 
This project will focus on the women’s rights organization KAFA and the 
strategies the group utilizes to disseminate its message effectively to the Lebanese 
people. The first section will engage KAFA’s campaigns, which they implement via the 
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Internet and social media through understanding each campaign’s goals and outlooks. 
The second section will look at what actually happens in these campaigns, illustrating 
Lebanese public participation and feedback, as well as mediated responses to the 
campaigns. The third section will consist of my analysis of the above campaigns and 
outreach techniques. I will evaluate the campaigns and their outcomes within a historical 
and sociological context, taking into consideration the implementation of each campaign 
at a particular historical moment. The analysis section also additionally illustrates how 
specific campaigns relate to KAFA’s structure, methods, and goals. My project will make 
the claim that KAFA implements certain strategies that target specific forms of violence, 
each appropriately considering the audience, victim, and state structure that KAFA must 
navigate as a women’s group in Lebanon.  
KAFA’s visual material, specifically photographs, documents, and videos, will be 
key to this thesis. I will also incorporate videos from other sources, including key 
YouTube videos that document specific cases that my analysis references. These, as well 
as journalistic and blog accounts, help determine wider feedback from the Lebanese 
public. Other outlets, such as television stations, have shown KAFA’s videos. I will look 
at the different responses to these videos depending on the source of their exposure. I will 
also utilize specific cases of violence that sparked a remarkable response within Lebanon 
(as well as internationally). These cases, in addition to bearing witness, will ground the 
research in real instances of violence to give these women back their subjectivity and 
illustrate the progression of KAFA’s creation, campaigns, and outlook.   
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This thesis centers on the KAFA organization, highlighting the pervasive system 
of gender-based violence in Lebanon. KAFA specifically targets family and domestic 
violence within the Lebanese household, as well as the Kafala system, a sponsorship 
system that allows Lebanese employers to engage in employment practices described as 
modern-day slavery. Regardless of religion, nationality, ethnicity, sexual preference or 
political affiliation, KAFA seeks to create equality for women and provide tools for a life 
free from violence. In order to embody this vision through textual analysis, this thesis 
will focus on KAFA’s campaign strategies that target multiple points of patriarchal 
violence in Lebanon.  
The first chapter describes KAFA’s campaigns in great detail, placing each into 
its own spatial and temporal complex. I break down KAFA’s campaigns into three 
separate strategies, illustrating the wider intention for each campaign. The first strategy is 
called “Engaging the State Apparatus.” This Strategy illustrates KAFA’s attempts to 
initiate change through approaching the judiciary system. Falling under this category, 
KAFA’s Name and Shame campaign confronts the political system. Additionally its 16 
Days of Activism Campaign discusses several sub-campaigns within this category, 
including the White Ribbon Campaign that implores men to get involved in fighting 
against gender-based violence and its Campaign with the Internal Security Forces that 
challenges the policing force in Lebanon. The second strategy is “Engaging the Public.” 
In this strategy, KAFA attempts to engage the public through informational campaigns 
that also encourage audience feedback. The first campaign is called A Very Disturbing 
Taxi Ride, asking women to place themselves in the position of a witness of domestic 
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violence while also challenging them to intervene. The second campaign within this 
strategy is called Zalfa, a female avatar that poses questions and answers of questions that 
women have asked KAFA regarding gender-based violence. Zalfa also includes space for 
women to ask further questions and access to further information. The last campaign 
strategy is “Engaging the Kafala System.” KAFA has conducted numerous research 
papers and panels since its founding in 2005, some of which are highlighted in this thesis. 
Additionally, the organization’s most recent campaign is titled, “Raise Shawwa’s Voice” 
and it confronts the dangerous Kafala system head-on, forcing its viewers and 
participants in the campaign to question their own biases and question the system that 
ends in so many migrant domestic worker suicides and abuses.  
The second chapter discusses the on-the-ground results of KAFA’s campaigns 
discussed in the previous chapter. The chapter opens up, however, with a brief 
description of the state of personal status laws in Lebanon. Understanding the nature of 
these laws is essential to placing each of KAFA’s campaign strategies in a regional and 
political context. Following this description, the chapter breaks down each of the three 
strategies, Engaging the State Apparatus, Engaging the Public, and Engaging the Kafala 
System, into discussions of: 1. How the news media, bloggers, and the mobilized public 
reacted and interacted with the campaign, and 2. How KAFA’s Facebook page followers 
and YouTube subscribers reacted and interacted with the campaign. Whereas I garner 
information for the first question regarding the media, bloggers, and mobilized public 
from the sources themselves and give estimates as to the results, I utilize the specific 
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numbers of likes and/or dislikes, comments, and shares on YouTube and Facebook to 
provide tentative analysis for the audience’s reactions.  
The third chapter interprets the results from the previous chapter on reactions to 
KAFA’s campaigns, while conducting cross-content analysis placing each campaign 
within a larger system of inquiry. Stating the significance of my work and the necessity 
for future work needing to be done on gender-based violence in Lebanon, this final 
chapter contemplates the current state of women’s rights and the possibility for its future. 
Perhaps most significantly, I utilize the last chapter of my thesis to critique women’s 
rights participants who not only reproduce the patriarchal structures they advocate 
against, but actively promote gender-based violence through extreme racist positions. 
Despite these obstacles for KAFA to overcome, the organization occupies a unique place 
in Lebanese culture to advance equality for all women and facilitate the beginnings of a 
robust women’s movement in Lebanon.  
 In conclusion, my thesis will illustrate how KAFA utilizes the campaign strategies 
of Engaging the State Apparatus, Engaging the Public Sphere, and Engaging the Kafala 
System to raise awareness regarding gender based violence in an accessible way while 
building support across sectarian, socio-economic, and nationalist lines. Through offering 
its services to all women and children in Lebanon and encouraging the support base of 
each campaign strategy to mobilize also for all of KAFA’s campaigns, KAFA will 
continue to grow national momentum. This momentum will be critical in KAFA’s appeal 
to the government and the Lebanese people to prioritize reforming gender-based rights to 
protect both women and children while also acting as a tool to destabilize larger systems 
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of violence. In addition to this discussion, this thesis presents the multitude of reactions to 
KAFA’s strategies, illustrating how KAFA’s work influences the public while the 
public’s responses simultaneously influence how KAFA appeals for activist support. 
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Chapter 1: Methods, Literature Review, and Theory 
METHODS: 
In order to address this topic adequately, I will utilize a single, embedded case-study 
methodology to analyze the organization KAFA. I will use KAFA’s website and social 
media use to investigate their outreach strategies, evaluating their primary documentary 
and video materials in Arabic and English. This analysis will lead to obtaining sample 
responses from social media users reacting to KAFA’s campaigns. Televised media, 
online media resources, and blogs inform and guide this research. Additionally, this 
project utilizes an interview with a key informant, the Communication Director of KAFA 
since 2009, Maya Ammar, in order to shape and constrain the analysis. This interview 
grounds the study in a realistic and accurate context.  
KAFA’s visual material, specifically photographs, documents, and videos, will be 
key to this thesis. I will also incorporate videos from other sources, including key 
YouTube videos that document specific cases that my analysis references. These, as well 
as journalistic and blog accounts, will be helpful in garnering wider feedback from the 
Lebanese public. Other outlets, such as television stations, have shown KAFA’s videos. I 
will look at the different responses to these videos depending on the source of their 
exposure. I will also utilize specific cases of violence that sparked a remarkable response 
within Lebanon (as well as internationally). These cases, in addition to bearing witness, 
will ground the research in real instances of violence to give these women back their 
subjectivity and illustrate the progression of KAFA’s creation, campaigns, and outlook.   
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 This thesis utilizes an interview with an informant from KAFA to guide the thesis 
while serving as a point of comparison for assertions. The interview helps to 
contextualize the aforementioned visual material and explains intention and internal 
decision-making progress within the organization for several of KAFA’s campaigns. The 
following discussion summarizes my conversation with Maya Ammar, the 
Communications Director for the women’s rights organization KAFA, conducted on 
January 7, 2015 that I will use to inform all aspects of this thesis: 
Maya is a Lebanese citizen, holding a Master’s Degree in Communication from 
St. Joseph University. Though Maya is from Lebanon, she preferred not to state her 
confessional group. This appeared to be an active attempt to promote the secular identity 
of the KAFA organization. Our interview covered a wide range of topics, focusing on 
KAFA’s campaigns in particular as well as the identity of KAFA members. Beginning 
our discussion with the personal status laws in Lebanon, Maya noted that, “As long as 
personal status laws are confessional and religious, discrimination against women will 
not stop.” In addition to patriarchal messages embedded in the religious themselves, the 
differing laws between confessional groups also discriminate against and among women, 
keeping women perpetually in a subordinate state to men. In 2014, Parliament passed 
Law 293 protecting women and children from domestic violence. Yet this Law was 
heavily amended, prompting protests against the changes. Maya said that for the priorities 
for the year 2015, she would like to see an increased implementation of the good clauses 
within the law, as well as continued advocacy to introduce the necessary Amendments to 
the Law. When I asked her why she thinks it is that these laws have yet to be changed in 
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Lebanon she said that, “No one ever really tried to address the issue in a big campaign 
with a very clear plan.” According to her, it is extremely difficult to even know where to 
begin to address the problem. She noted that attempting to address the problem could 
make a person “feel paralyzed [because} who are you addressing? Who are you talking 
to? The State? Where is the State?” Here, Maya introduces one of the fundamental 
problems with political change in Lebanon: the government is itself precariously 
balanced between secular and religious pulls, confessional groups vying for power, and 
outside state influences. As of March 25, 2015, Lebanon has been without a President 
since May 25, 2014, a fact that continually makes political progress in Lebanon difficult 
to pursue.  
Additionally, one of the biggest problems KAFA faces is inspiring people to care 
about women’s rights issues. Violence against women has never been a priority in 
Lebanon, but KAFA increasingly makes it difficult to ignore. Maya says the organization 
does this through showing the parents and names of those killed by domestic violence in 
the news. Media has been an incredible help to spreading information regarding gender-
based violence in addition to KAFA’s use of social media and campaigning outreach. 
Maya, who conducts all communication outreach with the help of others, believes the 
organization’s campaign strategies and outreach tactics are indeed effective. If nothing 
else, the posts on social media and news media open the door for debate. She noted that 
most comments on KAFA’s various media mediums are left to inspire such debate and 
discussion, although KAFA does remove comments from media such as Facebook if the 
comments are deemed threatening or use bad language. Maya indicated that though 
 21 
KAFA does not have the resources to conduct extensive media research, the group 
notices significant increases in calls to the helpline following a commercial campaign. 
Interestingly, Maya would say that currently there is not a women’s movement in 
Lebanon, or that it is very, very weak.19 Despite no formal women’s movement, KAFA 
does work in collaboration with other women’s groups in Lebanon. For example, when 
trying to pass Law 293, a law protecting women and children from domestic violence, 
there was a national coalition of 64 groups, with many of them representing women’s 
groups. She said that though some of these groups do a lot of work for women’s rights, 
many exist in name only. KAFA’s organization is growing, however, with 600 
predominantly young people wanting to volunteer in 2014. This was particularly 
interesting to note that 53% of KAFA’s Facebook followers were between the ages of 18-
25. Though KAFA recognizes the need to grow its organization, it currently does not 
have the resources to do so.  
 I was able to discuss a few of KAFA’s campaigns with Maya, including the Name 
and Shame Campaign, the Very Disturbing Taxi Ride, as well as efforts directed at men 
and KAFA’s work with migrant domestic workers’ abuses. In regards to the Very 
Disturbing Taxi Ride, a video showing women directly confronted with verbal abuse, I 
asked Maya if the group intentionally used spectacle in its campaigns. Maya said that 
overall, the group attempts to avoid pictures of battered women in order to challenge the 
preconception that abuse is always physical or visible. Additionally, she stated that they 
                                                
19 Here, the phrase women’s movement indicates the widespread organizing of a group of people with set 
goals for reforming current policies pertaining to the treatment and protection of women in order to 
institute systems that will rectify unequal social conditions.   
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didn’t want to show graphic images of women, partially because many viewers don’t 
want to see disturbing imagery. Instead, KAFA attempts to send quick messages that will 
stick in viewers’ minds. A great example illustrating KAFA’s emphasis on awareness for 
multiple forms of abuse in an impactful message is its “Words Hurt” Campaign:20  
 
Figure: 1.1 
 
 In the case of the taxi ride, it was a social experiment to challenge women to react to 
witnessing domestic violence. She noted that in some cases, people say, “Oh my God, 
they hear her scream, but they did nothing.” KAFA wanted to find out whether women 
would react if confronted with verbal abuse.  
In regards to the Name and Shame Campaign, a campaign aimed at publicly 
shaming Ministers of Parliament who were amending Law 293, Maya confirmed that 
                                                
20 Green, “Here’s What Domestic Violence Ads Look Like In The Middle East.” 
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according to an inside source the organization had at one of the TV stations, a Minister of 
Parliament did indeed call the station to have the name and Shame advertisement 
removed. The same MP’s supporters also went to one of the buses where the ad was 
posted and tore the ad down. The point of this campaign was to get people to ask, who is 
this Committee that is making the changes to Law 293? The organization wanted to 
reinforce a culture of accountability where the people monitor their elected officials.  
Maya also discussed KAFA’s attempts to include men in its organization, a 
process that really began in 2009. The belief for including males is that they not only 
should care about equality for everyone, but that when equality comes for women, the 
relationships between males and females will change. KAFA’s attempts to involve men, 
including several male-led forums in 2 or 3 towns, had limited affects. Most men would 
say they support women’s rights in theory, but then they leave the discussion when 
questions are asked regarding ideas of consent, personal status laws, the definition of 
domestic violence, etc.  
My discussion with Maya detailed KAFA’s religious, socio-economic and 
organizational structure. First and foremost, KAFA identifies as a secular organization in 
order to provide a common meeting ground for women of all confessional backgrounds. 
KAFA believes in being part of the civil state, where all referents for equality come not 
from religious texts but from human rights charters. 
 Although KAFA realizes the necessity for including women of all classes and 
forbids classism within the organization, Maya notes that the unfortunate reality that 
women from lower socio-economic classes often are not afforded the chance to 
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participate in this group. The majority of the participants are from middle-class 
backgrounds, with fewer participants from a wealthier socio-economic level. Historically, 
many women from wealthier backgrounds were the most likely to re-produce patriarchal 
structures on poorer or migrant women, something that Maya says KAFA will not allow 
for presently. Maya stated that those who are bourgeoisie and only want rights for 
Lebanese women and not everyone could not be part of KAFA. Additionally, women 
who view work in a national government organization or an organization advocating for 
human rights as only a job would not be able to persevere in this line of work. Those 
working for KAFA must act out their beliefs for equality both inside and outside the 
workplace. 
 KAFA possesses a semi-horizontal group structure with a board and heads of 
units in charge over other women. There are no elections, and the director of KAFA only 
makes sure that each unit is effectively working toward the larger group goal. As noted, 
many of KAFA’s employees tend to be from the middle class and tend to have some 
degree of higher education. Maya believes that in addition to poorer women not having 
time to work or volunteer in an organization for women’s rights, these same women are 
less likely to be able to participate because of the increased specialization of human rights 
organizations. As these movements begin to build and grow, groups within each 
organization, and even whole organizations, begin to take on more specialized tasks to be 
most effective. Whereas some of the groups handle legal issues, other groups handle 
research or communication aspects of human rights or women’s rights. Despite this 
 25 
different backgrounds, including working with other women’s rights and migrant 
domestic worker’s rights organizations on commonly agreed upon issues.  
Discussing the sponsorship system, Maya advocated for complete dismantling of 
the Kafala System. In this foreseeable situation, the employers would still pay for a 
migrant domestic worker to travel to Lebanon, but the employee would have the 
opportunity to leave the employer at any point. This would make it easier for the worker 
to break a contract and escape a poor situation, something that could be achieved through 
migrant domestic workers gaining protection under Lebanese Labor Laws. Additionally, 
Maya said the government must increase its monitoring of the recruitment agencies, as 
most are human traffickers. Removing the Kafala system from Lebanon would also 
remove the possibility for apologists to make any excuses for it. Those that assert the 
system equally hurts the employer and employee would no longer be able to make this 
claim if migrant domestic workers had basic and equal employment rights in Lebanon. 
As Maya said in our interview, hiring a migrant domestic worker is not a basic right; 
human rights, however, certainly is.  
It cannot be overstated how helpful was my interview, and follow-up questions, 
with Maya Ammar, for this thesis. Her answers grounded the research, providing a 
stricter methodology for research questions and analysis. The interview and questions 
both informed my own research, while providing a trustworthy source with which to 
measure all other primary and secondary sources. Additionally, the interview partially 
filled in for the nearly non-existent literature on women’s organizations in Lebanon. 
Despite this noticeable gap, I utilized a wide breadth of other literature to provide 
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background information and theoretical depth to my thesis. The current literature 
reviewed here mainly addresses topics of gender, resistance, and nationalism, but 
neglects to recognize the importance of women’s rights and the organizations that are 
pushing for equality and freedom from violence for all women in Lebanon.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research on the field of women’s rights in the Middle East is growing, taking shape 
through a variety of methods and topics of interest. Much of the current literature focuses 
on countries that have experienced uprisings and protests in recent years, what some 
referred to as the “Arab Spring,” or their “Arab Uprisings.” In particular, many 
academics are still uncertain of the extent of development of women’s rights and civil 
involvement before, during, and after these events. This literature review will instead 
focus on particular conditions and campaigns that set the foundation for a women’s 
movement. I will draw comparisons between women’s movements and experiences 
during the aforementioned “Arab Uprisings” and the current situation in Lebanon, while 
also placing the growing organizing of Lebanese women into a longer historical Lebanese 
context. The goal of the review is to ground a proposal around the group KAFA, which I 
will do through discussions of gender, nationalism, and resistance. In order to complete a 
thorough summary of the current literature on these topics, I have broken them down 
further into sub-categories. I describe gender in terms of class, structure, and motherhood, 
nationalism in terms of citizenship and conflict/violence/war, and resistance in terms of 
resistance in Lebanon and resistance outside Lebanon. By breaking the topic of 
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performance of women’s rights and ideas of bodily subjectivity down into these themes, I 
will be constructing a full framework of ideas and broadly contextualizing the 
interactions between women’s groups and the public sphere, illustrating the 
dissemination of information and the corresponding mobilization of these women’s 
movements. I hope to use this format in order to deconstruct barriers between this 
women’s resistance group and the normative societal interactions and beliefs that 
surround it.  
 
Gender-based problems for Females:  
Addressing the topic of gender is of utmost importance in a study of a female-led group 
primarily seeking to support women across Lebanon. In order to address this particular 
topic as it pertains to KAFA and performances of agency, this section will expound upon 
conceptions of gender through three sub-categories: class, motherhood, and state 
structures. My intention is to illustrate conversations on constricting gender rights by 
outside forces, constricting gender rights by inside forces, and the internalization of 
control mechanisms.  
 Class conflict between women in the Middle East reflects the internalization and 
reproduction of patriarchal controls. Elite Middle Eastern women often benefit from 
patriarchal structures of society in their political or social control over lower classes of 
women through male kinship ties. While this does not imply that women have individual 
authority or subjectivity in their actions, it does indicate that certain classes of women 
suffer more than others. In Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon, Jureidini 
 28 
and Moukarbel note that the primary abuser of domestic workers in Lebanon is the 
“Madame.”21 Far from these elite women uniting with migrant labor workers to gain 
rights and protection for women, they instead mentally and physically abuse and entrap 
the workers from leaving their home. Though these relationships are very much tied up 
with forms of racism and Lebanese nationalism, class control representing patriarchal 
domination also prevails in politics.  
Patriarchy is also acted out through women’s participation in political roles, 
whether it is their entrance into politics through a male kinship tie or representing the 
male leaders of sectarian groups in women’s group discussions. As Suad Joseph notes in 
her article “Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East,” women’s right groups are 
circumscribed by conflicting narratives within the state that reflect the group’s own 
variance of views and needs depending on social status. Though women are seen as a 
monolithic group by the state, they are embedded in multiple social structures, with 
particular allegiances to different kin and familial circles. Again in Suad’s article, 
Women’s NGOs are frequently tied to political parties, thus catering to particular sects or 
social classes. Loyalties to a particular tribe or sectarian group have led women’s groups 
to shy away from the political as Lina Khatib notes in Gender, Citizenship, and Political 
Agency in Lebanon. They view women’s issues as relegated to private space, thereby 
constructing a strict boundary between indoor discussions and outside representations. 
Additionally, women working within the political system are often bound to patriarchal 
loyalties that secured them their position in government following either the death of a 
                                                
21 Jureidini and Moukarbel, “Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon.” pg. 585 
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husband or father (Hariri), or functioning as a temporary stand in for a husband in prison 
(Geagea). As a result, their first consideration is how to further party goals and maintain 
conditions for elite class prosperity.  
While these conflicts continue to keep the elite women in a place of hierarchy 
over other women, they also disrupt resistance structures. Evelyn Accad brings up in her 
chapter Sexuality and Sexual Politics the history of these Lebanese Political loyalties 
when discussing women’s groups in 1975 in her discussion on Yolla Polity-Charara’s 
analysis. In an attempt by leftist groups to come together to move forward a united 
feminist ideology, women from, “the Phalangist party, the national bloc, the Progressive 
Socialist party, the Ba’ath party, an the Communist party, as well as others from smaller 
groups” gathered together to discuss ideology (243). Yet instead of forming a united 
front, these women instead became suspicious of the goals of women from other groups, 
allowing their political loyalties to trump feminist goals and preventing them from having 
honest conversation on issues within each group. In Between Resistance and Compliance, 
Feminism and Nationalism: Women in Black in Israel, Erella Shami discusses the elite 
nature and unintended hierarchal structure of an Israeli women’s resistance group 
working for an end to the Israeli Occupation of Palestinian Territories. The structure of 
this group resulted in the elevation of more educated and higher social class women, with 
the simultaneous silencing and exclusion of lower classes of women. Similar to the 
stagnation of Lebanese women’s rights in 1975, the Israeli women’s group ultimately 
disbanded in part due to its elitist structure.  
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There is the danger in every women’s group of falling prey to elitist and classist 
exercises of power over the already disenfranchised. In particular, women’s political 
involvement often indicates a wider influence, usually related to kinship, of the group 
that put the woman or women in power. These political influences are replicated in 
private situations as well, with madams abusing migrant workers. Issues of political ties 
and hierarchal structures must be taken into account in discussion of any women’s group 
in order to avoid falling prey to the class issues experienced by the Women in Black. 
Current literature on the involvement of women in women’s rights focuses on the few 
women in politics and the a-political nature of some women’s groups. My research will 
focus on KAFA in large part because of its claim to be a non-confessional22 and non-
political group, thus partially releasing possible political and elitist influence over the 
group’s ideology and activist aims. 
In order to understand gender performance within a given system, it is necessary 
to situate it within the particular structures that control its limitations. In the Middle East 
in general, and Lebanon in particular, women’s rights sit at the intersection of economic, 
legal, and religious structures that dictate the extent to which these rights may be 
publically or privately acted out. Current literature on the topic presents the dominant 
problem within women’s rights and safety to be constricted by personal status laws in 
Lebanon. Women face limitations in regards to citizenship, divorce proceedings, and 
child custody laws. Suad Joseph illustrates the consequences of personal status laws 
                                                
22 KAFA’s description as a non-confessional group reflects their desire to represent all women in a secular 
manner, without loyalty to a particular sectarian identity.  
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being under the control of each confessional division instead of the government, with 
decisions that determine a women’s welfare depending on religious constraints. Lebanon 
does not have secular laws to protect women from abuse and assist them in economic 
hardships, thereby increasing the reliance of women upon their social community, and 
especially the men within that community. There is a close relation between the legal 
structures that do not exist and the religious politics within the state. Because the 
confessional nature of the political system depends on kinship relations, political actors 
are very hesitant to challenge religious authority.  
Often entering into this conversation on women in resistance is the topic of 
motherhood as relates to familial and religious structures within a state. Zeina Zataari in 
The Culture of Motherhood centers her conversation on motherhood as a form of 
resistance in Southern Lebanon utilizing Josephs’ writings to place family at the center of 
resistance. While it is necessary to read religion into all discussion in Lebanon in light of 
the confessional nature of the state, these discussions must acknowledge the limitations 
of religion and motherhood for feminism but still maintain an understanding of local 
observances. The focus of religious restrictions for women’s movements is first and 
foremost the division between secular laws and religious laws. Moving forward a 
religiously influenced ideology for women’s rights polarizes women of other religious 
sects. This, however, does not mean that secular and religious feminists movements 
cannot move forward together. As illustrated in both Zataari’s article as well as in Tami 
Amanda Jacob’s article Feminism, nationalism, and difference - Reflections on the 
Palestinian Women's Movement, it is often essential to the religious participant to 
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alleviate religious prohibitions on women’s movements to legitimize the movement in the 
eyes of the local community. These discussions bring up the question of how women can 
implement their rights without the support of the community. There are possibilities 
within religious literature, primarily focusing on Islamic literature due to the close 
connection between government and religion, for women to utilize for attaining rights. 
Yet even though there is the possibility for gender freedom, secular feminism finds its 
departure from Islamic feminism in the understanding that equality for women does not 
mean men and women have access to the same societal roles, but that they have 
complementary roles.  
The culture of motherhood in the Middle East is relevant to all studies on gender, 
and of particular importance to a study on KAFA, a women’s resistance group. The 
conversation on motherhood either presents the topic as a redemptive format for women 
in Lebanon, or as a symbol of purity and nationality. This research is illuminating yet it 
lacks commentary on the destructive ramifications of inherently connecting motherhood 
and purity to communal value. To connect these topics implies that the woman who is not 
a mother or who does not fit into normative sexual practices has less value than a woman 
bearing traditional nationalist markers. My research will reframe this argument through 
positing the woman as subject, not an object that gains value through performing social 
norms. I will also bring in issues of religion and secularism as relates to motherhood, 
continuing Zaatari’s discussion but departing from it to break apart the binary structure 
that she uses in her research. Lastly, it will be important to analyze the confrontation 
between KAFA and conceptions of nationalism, especially in regards to who is able to 
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perform nationalism and what happens when woman from different nationalist 
communities challenge one state.  
 Though the literature on state structures paints secular and religious feminism as a 
distinct binary system, I would argue that it is necessary to put these two movements in 
conversation with each other. There exists the possibility for the two to mutually 
construct the other through realizing the necessity of achieving success in the religious 
realm to have success in the secular realm, and vice versa. Especially within the state of 
Lebanon where religion and secularism are different actors in one system, these two 
avenues must cohabitate. KAFA is a non-confessional movement, yet it is necessarily 
made up of women from confessions. These confessions are part of the identity of the 
women who make up the women’s group and cannot be wholly set aside.  
 
Nationalism: 
Many Western feminists disregard the possibility of nationalism aiding women’s rights in 
the Middle East, as well as its role in restricting or aiding gender equality. Middle Eastern 
and subaltern feminists challenge western feminism and advocate for research that 
incorporates nationalist struggles into feminist resistance. In order to adequately account 
for nationalism, this section will focus on ideas of citizenship, conflicts and violence, and 
motherhood. The final category, motherhood, could also fit into the section on gender, 
yet it is integrally tied to nationalism within the Middle Eastern context.  
Research on citizenship in the Middle East focuses on the institutionalization of 
gender inequalities, while also raising the question of what it means to belong to a state. 
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In Lebanon, citizenship is considered to be gender neutral and promoting equality 
between men and women. Despite these idealistic perceptions, women do not have access 
to identical claims to citizenship as men, partly due to the inherently masculine and 
western concept of a citizen. The idea of citizen is bound up with the creation of the 
nation state, and is defined as one who is able to enter into a contract as a result of land-
ownership. During the rise of the nation state, the people who owned land were primarily 
white elite males. Suad Joseph has written a considerable amount on the topic of gender 
and citizenship, especially in Lebanon, and she discusses how the inherently gendered 
nature of the word citizenship reflects the institutionalized sexism of the state’s practices. 
In Joseph’s article on Civic Myths, Citizenship, and Gender in Lebanon she notes that 
feminist critique of the Lebanese state must move past the westernized construction of 
citizenship to reveal the underlying kinship structure that further institutionalizes notions 
of the citizen. Disregarding current conceptions of its failure being due to Christian and 
Muslim rivalries throughout history, she instead claims it is a result of the family being 
the primary unit in Lebanon, and the reliance on familial connections for social welfare 
needs. Joseph discusses the primacy of kinships and political familialism in regards to 
social life and policies. 
 Mounira Charrad works on similar topics in Becoming a Citizen: Lineage versus 
Individual in Tunisia and Morocco, comparing citizenship and gender in Morocco and 
Tunisia while also focusing on the relation of kinship to women’s rights. The level that 
kinship influences the political spheres in these two countries directly correlates to the 
extent of women’s freedoms and rights. This is evident as well in Lina Khatib’s work on 
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citizenship in Lebanon when she explores women’s access to certain civil freedoms, but 
discrimination becoming evident in personal status law and the low level of participation 
of women in government. Tying back to kinship and familial relationships, women are 
less likely to participate in government because of the patriarchal and patrilineal 
traditions within the state that trades favors with other political and religious leadership. 
Women often enter the political sphere as a replacement for their brothers, husbands, or 
fathers, as was the case with Solange Gamayel and Samir Geagea.  
 Research on Middle Eastern citizenship focuses on its relationship to the powerful 
structure of kinship. Mounira Charrad’s research is particularly useful when she 
constructs a method for comparing women’s rights in Tunisia and Morocco through 
analyzing the impact of kinship in each state. Through pairing this research with the work 
of Suad Joseph and Lina Khatib, I hope to implement Charrad’s method into my work on 
Lebanon and KAFA, moving the research from general citizenship restrictions to 
understanding issues of religion, language, and spatial placement in conferring 
citizenship rights. Additionally, political power is intimately tied to kinship relations and 
it would be useful to explore the relationship between KAFA and politicians, as well as 
the ways in which these relationships have affected KAFA’s outreach.   
Subaltern feminists challenge western feminists’ critique of nationalism, stating 
that nationalism can be a tool for women’s rights. It is necessary to account for the ways 
in which feminism takes shape through nationalism in Lebanon and the wider Middle 
Eastern region, yet the restrictions that nationalist aims place upon the development of 
women’s movements cannot be ignored. In The Case for Lebanon Hala Maksoud 
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discusses previous literature by Frantz Fanon stating that women find liberation during 
wartime, liberating themselves, males from chauvinism, as well as their oppressors from 
oppressing. Contrary to this point, Maksoud illustrates that more often than not, women’s 
rights might be furthered for a time during liberation wars and immediately following, yet 
they tend to regress to previous norms soon after the war ends. Fanon’s claims are likely 
based upon the perception that women’s entrance into the workforce or public sphere is a 
women’s rights victory that will lead to women gaining more freedom. Contrary to this 
point, these suppositions do not fit with the data and realities in Middle Eastern countries 
following periods of conflict. Maksoud expands upon this idea when she discusses the 
return to traditions in Lebanese homes and communities during the 15-year long civil 
war. Women may expand their responsibilities into masculine spheres during periods of 
conflict, but this growth is not lasting and it may upset traditional spheres of masculinity. 
As Maksoud notes, there is the problem of understanding these wartime activities as 
benefiting women’s rights, but there is also the question of whether the women’s actions 
intend to promote feminism in the first place.   
Both Lina Khatib in Gender, Citizenship and Political Agency and Evelyn Accad 
in Sexuality and Sexual Politics note that during times of war or negative peace, women’s 
concerns become subservient to the notion of survival. Women focus on working or 
obtaining provisions not for women’s rights, but in order to keep their family alive. For 
women to focus on their rights during times of conflict could is at times conceived of a 
betrayal of the larger nationalist cause. Jacoby reflects on this point in her article on 
Palestinian nationalism when she considers the necessity of community unity when the 
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community stands in opposition to a threat. Especially in the Palestinian context, personal 
sacrifice for the existential promise of the larger group is a paramount concern. 
Palestinian women do resist against gendered limitations, as well as take on traditionally 
masculine forms of resistance, but outright resistance and condemnation against 
Palestinian norms could be seen as divisive and subversive to the larger cause. 
Unfortunately, Jacoby also notes that Palestinian women’s ultimate dedication to the 
Palestinian nationalist cause at times results in domestic abuse going unreported. Loyalty 
to dominant men in a woman’s community or nationalist group is not limited to Palestine, 
as Accad’s reveals in her research on Lebanon. During the Lebanese Civil War, women 
came together from varying confessions to move forward an idea of feminism. What 
resulted was intense separation between the political enemies and a refusal to criticize 
men from their own political group. The women were hesitant to discuss personal issues 
with women of other groups, likely coming from a fear of weakening their own sectarian 
position or reprisal from the dominant men in their lives.  
 The research on women’s rights within nationalist frameworks illustrates the 
problems women face in remaining loyal to their community while not compromising 
feminist goals. The majority of research on this topic focuses on women’s rights during 
times of active war and ongoing political violence, neglecting analysis on times of 
negative peace. Through situating KAFA within the current situation of negative peace in 
Lebanon, I will emphasize the unique barriers the group must overcome in order to 
convince the wider public of the urgency of women’s rights. Additionally, Accad’s 
research opens up the possibility to circumvent accusations of divisiveness. Her 
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redemptive narrative of self-love and the primacy of sexuality even during times of 
conflict aspires to ultimately deter war and violence, and could form an interesting 
framework to analyze KAFA’s public appeals.  
Though not limited to the Middle East, Middle Eastern motherhood is intimately 
tied to ideas of state boundaries and nationalist identities. Motherhood is universal by its 
very nature, but also serves as a very distinct cultural marker dependent on local customs 
and performance. Women bodies are objectified as sites of reproduction, bringing forth 
the warriors that defend the nation and the citizens that populate it. Women are the 
boundaries between their nation and the other, leading to an emphasis placed upon female 
purity, both to protect the endurance of a nation and to bring honor to the community. 
Middle Eastern communities often elevate the role of the mother, an idea that Zeina 
Zaatari utilizes as a redemptive framework for women’s resistance in South Lebanon. In 
The Culture of Motherhood: An Avenue for Women’s Civil Participation in South 
Lebanon, she invokes Suad’s work on citizenship to glorify women in their making of the 
state and its citizens. She breaks down the participation of women and motherhood to a 
binary structure of religious women and secular women, making space for the religious 
mother in civil participation. Glorifying the role of the mother within a nation may bring 
high respect to a woman, but this concept is problematized when women are only valued 
for their role as reproducers. The objectification of women as wombs or reproductive 
sites places a high value on purity. Consequently, when the woman is no longer pure, she 
no longer has the same worth. These ideas are surely not limited to the Middle Eastern 
context, but prevail around the world.  
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Ideas of purity and female honor are brought to attention when they are linked to 
systems of violence, especially rape culture. In the study Beliefs about Wife Beating: An 
Exploratory Study with Lebanese Students, the views of the students in Lebanon were 
actually less traditional toward the roles of women than in other Arab communities, but 
ideas of honor and family cohesion remained extremely important in informing their 
ideas of community and purity standards. More specifically, when the students were 
confronted with questions regarding whether a women who was sexually unfaithful to her 
husband deserved to be beaten, a significant number of students justified the beatings. In 
other parts of the study, students were less sympathetic to women who were considered 
promiscuous and toward divorced women when they were the victims in hypothetical 
situations of rape. Societies’ less sympathetic views towards victims of sexual violence 
turns into hostile reactions when women’s bodies are used to challenge systems of 
oppression. In the article on Women in Black, Israeli women who confronted the Israeli 
occupation were often harassed, threatened with violence and sexist comments. These 
women were perceived as betraying their state and nationalism, using their bodies that 
bore the nation in their wombs as subjects of resistance.  
 
Resistance: 
There is very little scholarship on Lebanese Women’s Resistance, with much focus 
remaining on philosophizing the current state women’s rights in the state. This review 
will also focus on these issues as well, primarily in the sections addressing issues of 
structure and citizenship, yet it is important to move beyond the structure to understand 
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the current situation of resistance on the ground. Currently, many academics choose to 
address women’s rights through focusing on women’s issues, such as domestic violence 
and sex worker abuse. Forms of resistance are referred to in discussion of these issues, 
but they rarely exist as the focus. The lack of discussion on women’s resistance in 
Lebanon is not entirely due to the lack of interest, but instead is a result of women’s 
groups acting as an arm of the state. They consistently fail to set aside confessional 
politics while also reinforcing patriarchal structures through elitism. Female resistance 
exists in alternative forms, with education being an important part of the movement. 
Cheryl Toman notes in The Link Between Women’s Studies Programs and Grassroots 
Organizations in Lebanon, the Balkans, and the Palestinian Territories: A Comparative 
Study that the women’s studies program at Lebanese American University was founded 
right before the outbreak of the Civil War in 1973 and influenced the formation of other 
women’s rights groups. Most notably, The Lebanese Council to Resist Violence Against 
Women (LECORVAW) was founded in 1997 as a response to the increase in domestic 
violence incidents. Breaking with many women’s groups’ strict division between political 
and private issues, LECORVAW pushed forward a political agenda while also educating 
the high school generation.  
On the other side of female resistance, female domestic workers participate in 
what Amrita Pande calls “meso-level” resistance through balcony talk in From “Balcony 
Talk” and “Practical Prayers” to Illegal Collectives Migrant Domestic Workers and 
Meso-Level Resistances in Lebanon. Perhaps the best example of female resistance in 
Lebanon, these women engage in behavior that undermines the current oppressive system 
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while still maintaining a structure that advocates female-led legal and community 
protection. This particular structure stands as a unique example of what women’s 
community groups could look like without designated patriarchal domination. Though 
women’s leadership in women’s rights groups and resistance is an integral part of the 
movement, Rita Stephan puts forward the possibility of men and family having a part in 
the struggle in Couple's activism in Lebanon- The legacy of Laure Moghaizel. She uses 
Laure Moghaizel’s marriage and partnership with her husband Joseph to illustrate ideas 
of “family feminism”, an opposing form to western feminism, which Stephan sees as 
individualistic and lacking a Middle Eastern core.  
 These three forms of resistance stand alone as interesting prospects in surveying 
current literature, yet their problem lies in that very notion: these struggles stand alone, 
failing to connect those resisting violence to those resisting against the perpetrators of 
violence to the very familial structure that allows violence to exist. Toman’s article on 
women’s Rights academic programs and women’s rights groups does not explicitly draw 
connections between the two, leaving the research with a large gap in information. 
Pande’s research on migrant worker resistance is perhaps the best example for resistance 
in Lebanon, yet it does not connect the disenfranchised women to Lebanese women who 
have the possibility to construct legal frameworks. Stephan also fails to adequately 
describe female relations to males in resistance movements. She propagates second wave 
western feminism as the dominant feminism, constructing feminism as a movement 
without a place for men. Failure to connect these different structures misses the necessary 
interactions to build up a successful women’s rights movement. My research will 
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explicitly connect the different aspects and actors of resistance, illustrating the potential 
for egalitarian activism in terms of class, race, and gender. Moreover, there is no current 
research that extensively traces the network of resistance that effect subjectivity on the 
parts of all participants of a women’s rights movement like KAFA.   
Resistance movements are prevalent across the world, varying in form and size, 
yet firmly situated in the changing history of women’s rights. With research on women’s 
resistance from other areas in the Middle East is steadily increasing in the period 
following the Western-deemed “Arab Spring,” it is necessarily to situate Lebanese 
Women’s Resistance within this growing conversation. The Palestinian women’s 
resistance movements have special relevance to the Lebanese context, as the two groups 
have historically been intertwined through Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. 
Moreover, Lebanese women and Palestinian women experience differing forms of 
feminist subjugation, yet similarly don’t have outright access to governmental structures 
to change current laws. Lebanese women work under against a government that hesitates 
to implement women’s personal status rights due to relations to varying religious 
authorities, and Palestinian women are unable to even access the Israeli government 
ruling over them in occupation. Toman’s article makes this very point as she draws a 
comparative study of women’s rights programs and local women’s rights groups between 
Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and the Balkans. In all three areas, the women’s 
programs and movements were formed out of a need to educate women, both upon their 
reentrance into society after periods of intense physical and emotional violence, and as a 
means to further women’s rights.  
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Domestic Violence is often underreported or altogether ignored during times of 
conflict. Especially during the drawn-out and on-going violence in regards to the 
Palestinian context, it is imperative for women to have options available to seek safety or 
reprieve from violence within the home. In Palestinian Women from Femina Sacra to 
agents of Active Resistance, Ronit Lentin also comments on Palestinian women’s silence 
on domestic violence as another form of resistance to Israeli control.  Palestinian women 
may be resisting the occupier by appearances of unity with Palestinian males, regardless 
of abuse, but they also take active roles of resistance against Israeli occupation. Their 
resistance includes gender resistance, but tends to become embedded within the larger 
Palestinian resistance. Palestinian women resist through every day actions, like wearing 
their clothes to bed to resist house demolitions or continuing to take their children to 
school, but they also partake in larger resistance activities through armed resistance. 
Circumstantially restricted, Palestinian women navigate women’s rights through 
participating in masculine regimented resistance. Though these forms of female 
resistance are perhaps limited due to structure, the women utilize available avenues for 
female empowerment by navigating through culturally available means.  
Bedouin Arab women in Israel face similar constraints through both their double 
minority status as Bedouins and then again as women. In The Activism of Bedouin 
Women, Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder notes that without outside governmental structures to 
appeal to for a legal framework, Bedouin women are relegated to resistance that functions 
within the Bedouin patriarchal system. One form of resistance is through women creating 
goods for sale, which in turn brings money into their households while also benefiting the 
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local community. The women stay within traditional boundaries by remaining within the 
private sphere of the village, yet build up personal status for women through economic 
ventures. These women are also able to create economic and educational opportunities 
through acting in designated female spaces. Similar to the creation of women’s programs 
in Universities or the creation of women’s groups, the Bedouin women work and teach in 
women-only environments. While these activities are still limited because of the 
women’s needs to navigate traditional gender structures, their activities build a 
foundation for future women to use their education and economic success to create a 
space for women’s rights. Women’s resistance in Israel extends to the Israeli women, 
specifically a group that was known as The Women in Black. In Between Resistance and 
Compliance, Feminism and Nationalism: Women in Black in Israel Erella Shadmi 
discusses how their resistance for the Palestinian people placed them in direct odds with 
the Israeli state and public. Yet whereas the Bedouin and Palestinian women resistance 
was forced to work within masculine-dominated structures to create future resistance 
opportunities, the Women in Black instead operated outside the patriarchal structures. 
They utilized their Israeli bodies to move into the public and traditionally masculine 
space, while confronting this space through using their bodies designed to produce Israeli 
warriors to instead protest the warriors’ violence.  
 The literature on resistance movements outside of Lebanon considers placement 
and space that governs the movement of the women actors. This is extremely important, 
especially for a Western woman writing about a Middle Eastern women’s resistance 
group. Though these limitations are important to consider, my research will find its 
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departure from these studies through acknowledging specific restrictions upon women 
within their religious and state communities, yet particularly focusing on ways in which 
these restrictions are navigated outside the patriarchal system. KAFA participates within 
the Lebanese state system, yet it does not become a part of it.  
 Conceptions of space are of immediate importance to themes of resistance. Not 
only limited to a Middle Eastern context, space is divided to give areas specific purpose, 
creating order and meaning. The history of colonialism is rife with examples of 
westernized influence reordering Middle Eastern home and city space. Communal and 
national identity markers are also inscribed into the space and act as signals for who is 
permitted in the space, and the rules that govern it. Middle Eastern countries, and here 
Lebanon in particular, divide space in many different, and often overlapping, ways; the 
literature will focus on three distinct divisions: gender, religion, and class.  
 Lebanon is a country split between its Eastern and Western identities, yet these 
identities rarely exist as strictly separate entities, and they clash just as often as they 
peacefully coincide. Religion is a prime example of a tension between Eastern and 
Western traditions. Though the state claims to have a westernized and democratic 
government, the religious makeup of Lebanon challenges these secular claims and puts 
forth more traditional demands and structures. Cities in Lebanon are evidence of religious 
division of space, with the Lebanese Civil War deepening divides and reinforcing city 
lines. Within each respective confessional town or city, the community members partake 
in the norms of the specific place. For example, Fatima Mernissi in The Meaning of 
Spatial Boundaries discusses Islamic gendering of space that constructs the public sphere 
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as belonging to men and the home life as a place for women. Notably, the home life is for 
women, but it is still ruled by men. As home family life is the realm of the women, so too 
do they serve as sexual boundaries for the family. This idea is reinforced when women 
enter into the public sphere, having to wear veils in certain communities to cover up their 
status as intruder. Suad Joseph also challenges these secular and religious/ western and 
eastern divisions of physical or figurative space in her discussion on citizenship. Though 
religious practices divide physical boundaries in space, they also break the public and 
private barrier. Citizenship in Lebanon comes from a Western context, and its attempts at 
separating the private sphere from the public are undermined due to the kin-based nature 
of the society. This exemplifies women’s difficulties in breaching public space as it is 
still intimately tied to the religious, mirroring the political sphere’s connections to 
religious authorities.  
Women bringing family matters into public space, as opposed to men instituting 
kinship ties, is in itself a form of resistance.  One group that breaks spatial taboos is Heya 
TV, a Lebanese television station that Dina Matar discusses in Heya TV: A Feminist 
Counterpublic for Women? They first challenge the public and private space through 
discussing taboo topics, such as homosexuality or abortion, on a Lebanese (rather than 
Western) channel. Next, they take questions from the street, effectively breaking barriers 
down between the masses and the TV anchors while also connecting the public space to 
the private viewing space in the viewer’s home. Whereas Heya TV is currently a legal 
venue for resistance, Amrita Pande discusses migrant workers’ borderline to outright 
illegal spatial resistance. The women workers take over the balconies in their residences 
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and use them as a type of “meso-resistance,” resistance existing neither fully in public 
nor in private, but as a bridge between both arenas. Meso-resistance is often the first step 
for women to create networks of support and seek further advice from other migrant 
women workers. These women resist in other ways as well, from fleeing abusive work 
places and entering illegal Lebanese space without a visa, to forming women’s 
communities to give legal advice and provide protection.  
 The literature on spatial resistance provides a helpful starting point for 
understanding current roles men and women, religion, and legality play in navigating 
public and private spheres in Lebanon. After connecting these literatures, it is apparent 
that this research does not directly address ways that women’s groups place themselves in 
public places as a way to assert exist and perform agency. KAFA physically moves into 
the public and traditionally masculine space with a feminist and traditionally private 
message. Pushing this conversation further, it would be useful to examine arrest policies 
for KAFA’s resistance, and the women’s legal rights post-arrest compared to migrant 
workers illegally moving through the streets.   
This literature review focused on the fundamental concepts relating women’s 
rights to KAFA, specifically gender, nationalism, and resistance. These categories were 
broken down into further sub-categories in order to illustrate a more in-depth analysis of 
current situations in Lebanon and the wider Middle Eastern region. Current literature on 
the topic varies, but often focuses on ideas of women’s citizenship and personal status 
laws, women’s resistance situated within familial or traditional gendered roles, and 
resistance during times of extended conflicts and war. There is very little literature on 
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female resistance in Lebanon in general, with only one article in this review focusing on a 
particular Lebanese women’s group (LECORVAW). I will begin my research at this 
point, attempting to answer the bigger questions of who is organizing and resisting for 
women and domestic workers’ rights in Lebanon. My research will target certain areas 
within this context to bridge gaps in literature while also continuing conversations with 
academics such as Suad Joseph and Mounira Charrad. 
 I will situation my research within the situation of negative peace in Lebanon, as 
this particular construct is currently unaccounted for, and will address the following 
concepts: binary breakdowns and webs of connection, extensive legal research, and 
resistance groups and forms of communication and visual culture. The first concept 
addresses the need within resistance research to position activist groups within a wider 
social construct and connect them to other forms of resistance. It also calls the breakdown 
of current secular and religious binary social systems within women’s rights in order to 
understand KAFA’s non-confessional stance made up of women from all backgrounds. 
The second concept takes into account the extensive literature written on citizenship and 
puts them in conversation to look more deeply into the relationship between language, 
gender, and space and citizenship rights. It will also address questions of legality 
surrounding KAFA’s performances and resistance, placing it against the often-illegal 
resistance of migrant workers. Finally, information on resistance groups tends to account 
for structural makeup, ideology, and resistance practices, but it neglects how the group 
communicates with the public. Through reading KAFA against the article on Heya TV, I 
will analyze the visual culture and communication used by the group to break boundaries 
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between group members and the wider public, as well as KAFA’s interactions with 
government officials. These concepts will aid my larger research question of how KAFA 
performs agency and enacts bodily subjectivity within the Lebanese state, and what these 
issues entail for gender equality in the greater Middle Eastern region. 
CONCLUSION:   
Despite the near-absence of literature on specific women’s rights organizations in 
Lebanon, and the relatively small amount of research regarding women’s rights in 
Lebanon as a whole, there is adequate theoretical discourse to analyze KAFA effectively. 
This theory will allow me to utilize discussions of women’s resistance and gender-based 
violence from other regions and contexts outside of Lebanon to conceptualize how the 
KAFA organization and its campaigns contribute to a women’s rights movement in 
Lebanon.  
Nancy Frasier’s discussion on what she calls a counter public is particularly 
useful to understand KAFA’s representation of a disenfranchised group functioning in a 
public space, both with other disenfranchised groups and the dominant patriarchal 
majority. She created her term counter public as a pointed critique of Jurgen Habermas’ 
idea of public space as a democratized area for discussion regardless of class. Habermas’ 
conception of a democratized space noticeably left out women, lesbians, gays, bi-sexuals, 
transexuals, and those questioning their sexuality. His idea of a democratized space 
advocated for men to simply put aside their differences in order to engage each other 
without preconceived notions regarding class or education. Frasier discusses the 
impossibility and impracticality of this proposal, while advocating for a sphere that will 
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allow for multiple counter publics to exist at one time in the current age of inequality. Yet 
where Frasier critiques Habermas, I must also critique Frasier for her oversight of class 
and racial inequality within disenfranchised peoples. Just as she argues that Habermas 
fails to understand the impossibility of setting aside class differences between men, so too 
does she fail to account for women reproducing the patriarchal structure within a 
women’s group. Failing to account for such differences would be a huge disservice to the 
women experiencing class and racial prejudice from other women. It also assumes that 
gender is the most important binding identity, and that it overcomes all other forms of 
inequality. In order to account for this oversight in theoretical analysis, I will introduce 
Erella Shadmi’s discussion of the group The Women in Black to utilize her analytical 
critique of maintaining class, and additionally racial, awareness throughout this project.  
 Representations of violence and trauma must remain at the focus of this research, 
and Susan Sontag’s work on voyeurism and the photograph is an essential part of 
approaching imagery depicting scenes of abuse, attempted suicide, and descriptions of 
extreme violence. Sontag notes that, “the photographs are a means of making “real” (or 
more “real”) matters that the privileged and the merely safe might prefer to ignore.”23 
Photographs, and I would argue other forms of visual culture such as short videos, are 
particularly useful for conveying painful moments. Arguably more effective than the 
written word, these visual pieces force the viewer to fully conceptualize the extent of 
violence on a body or place. While it is certainly possible to read accounts of violence 
and form them into distinct picture of events, the reader maintains the option of stopping 
                                                
23 Sontag, 7 
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in the middle of a story, or refusing to place the words into a cohesive picture. Visual 
material, however, cannot be unseen, nor is there is a middle point when viewing a 
picture that would allow for the viewer to stop short of seeing the full image. In this way, 
the benefits of a picture compactly fitting large amounts of information into a single and 
easily accessible image simultaneously function as its danger.  
During my interview with Maya Ammar, she told me that when KAFA began 
using images of parents mourning their daughters who were victims of domestic 
violence, the audience could no longer ignore femicide in Lebanon. These pictures 
shocked an audience into reality, demanding attention and requiring empathy with a pain 
that words alone could not convey. Reflecting on Sontag’s discussion of visual culture, 
images tell stories in different ways, eliciting a visceral response from the viewer that 
may differ from the intellectualized formulation of words into a picture. Often, advocacy 
or human rights groups utilize difficult images specifically because viewers have a more 
difficult experience coming to terms with an image or forgetting it once seen. Despite the 
use of violent imagery to inspire viewers to action, Sontag discusses the problems that 
arise in such an attempt. Voyeurism remains an enemy to meaningful action; Sontag 
notes that with the advent of a highly mobile camera, for the first time, pictures and 
cameras brought the very image of death to an audience in an up-close manner from a 
distant vantage point, “Picture-taking acquired an immediacy and authority greater than 
any verbal account in conveying the horror of mass-produced death.”24 She discusses the 
hunger for such images, noting the vast production of images with Jesus on the cross, 
                                                
24 Sontag, 24 
 52 
tortured, or naked. Creators and distributors of violent imagery often utilize such imagery 
with the intention of educating unaware audiences through exposing them to otherwise 
inaccessible life situations. While this intention may be commendable, an audience with 
no previous exposure to a particular violent situation may simultaneously learn about the 
experience while satisfying a perverse urge to somehow experience the event through the 
pain of others.  
With the advent of the death photograph, viewers possessed the ability to peak 
into the realm of mortality, attaining what many believed was a greater understanding of 
death itself. So too do other pictures of violence allow an audience to have the sensation 
of being another participant in a violent situation through picturing her or himself in the 
image. This type of voyeurism gives the viewer a feeling of gratification. Through 
viewing a grotesque or intensely violent piece of visual culture, the audience believes it 
then has a degree of knowledge of how the violence functions or why it occurs. This 
knowledge is then used as a sort of victory over the violence; to understand violence is to 
have command of it, and therefore the ability to overcome it. There is a difficult balance 
in producing imagery that deeply affects people in a way to motivate them rather than 
either satisfying a craving for the unknowable or driving the viewer to complacency. 
When Sontag notes that, “Perhaps the only people with the right to look at images of 
suffering of this extreme order are those who could do something to alleviate it,” she 
indicates the human tendency of blocking out imagery or situations that appear 
unsolvable. These situations prompt emotional fatigue, leaving the viewer unable to take 
any other action than simply consuming the image.  
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This thesis will attempt to read Susan Sontag’s ideas into KAFA’s use of violent 
imagery within campaign strategies. First, it is of the utmost importance to view the 
following images, videos, and stories as part of KAFA’s mission to humanize. Paying 
witness to the visual culture as stories to be condemned and prevented rather than as 
opportunities to experience someone else’s suffering gives the victims their subjectivity 
when they previously were only the objects of violence. Moreover, many of the images 
themselves present a message of prevention. KAFA’s campaigns embody Sontag’s 
message that a viewer of violent material may shut down and tune out when presented 
with extreme forms of violence without any option for recourse. Instead, KAFA’s visual 
material should be understood as a means to end gender based violence through giving 
voice back to the voiceless, showing the multiple sides of victimhood, offering recourse 
in situations of violence, and encouraging the active participation of the victims and their 
witnesses to both stop violence and prevent it.  
The following three chapters discuss KAFA’s campaign strategies to illustrate its 
methods for broader change in women’s rights within Lebanon. Through employing a 
case study methodology, I situate the organization KAFA within a broader contextual 
argument regarding the current state of women’s rights, keeping questions of nationalism 
and classism at the forefront. Susan Sontag’s discussion of voyeurism and visual culture 
provide a useful structure for presenting the following information, while Nancy Frasier’s 
idea of the counter public along with Erella Shadmi’s critique of class allow for a careful 
criticism of gender and class in Lebanon.  
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Chapter 2: The presence of Women’s Rights in Lebanese History and 
KAFA in the Present 
 
The current situation of political and national disenfranchisement and violence for 
women in Lebanon certainly does not represent the noticeably progressive, and at times 
aggressive, history of women’s rights in the country. By all accounts, the women’s rights 
movements leading up to the bid for freedom from the French Mandate, and the 
subsequent period between Lebanese Independence in 1943 until the onset of the Civil 
War in 1976, steadily gained momentum and very well could have continued to garner 
results had it gone unimpeded. Hala Maksoud notes that the first recorded time of 
Lebanese women’s political activism occurred in 1914 when the Organization of Arab 
Women in Beirut sent a letter to the Arab Congress held in 1923.25 Following the start of 
their political activity, Lebanese women continued to maintain ties with other women’s 
groups throughout the Middle East, taking their hijabs off in 1923 in solidarity with Huda 
Sha’rawi’s historical precedent.26 The women’s movement experienced an incredible 
amount of growth in women’s activities in the early 20th century, including increased 
political participation and the founding of organizations leading to educational and health 
benefits for other women. Yet the fervency of women’s rights was put on hold in order to 
promote the Lebanese nationalist desire to break from French control. When the 
Lebanese gained their independence in 1943, women re-invigorated their efforts to gain 
universal suffrage. Women garnered the right to vote in 1953; however, Mona Chemali 
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26 Ibid. pg. 89 
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Khalaf notes that the intensification of women’s support for nationalist rights while 
decreasing action for women’s rights in particular was the first of several moments that 
disrupted the forward movement of women’s rights in Lebanon.  
The fifteen-year Lebanese Civil War between 1975-1990 again disrupted the 
progression of women’s rights. Though discussions regarding women’s rights did not 
altogether cease, they were rife with sectarian divisions and patriarchal loyalties that 
deterred real and lasting progress. Both Lina Khatib in Gender, Citizenship and Political 
Agency and Evelyn Accad in Sexuality and Sexual Politics note that during times of war 
or negative peace, women’s concerns become subservient to the notion of survival. 
Women focus on working or obtaining provisions in order to keep their family alive, not 
to further their rights. For women to focus on their rights during times of conflict could 
be construed as a betrayal of the larger nationalist cause. During the Lebanese Civil War, 
women came together from varying confessions to move forward an idea of feminism. 
What resulted was intense separation between the political enemies and a refusal to 
criticize men from their own political group. The women were hesitant to discuss 
personal issues with women of other groups, likely coming from a fear of weakening 
their own sectarian position or reprisal from the dominant men in their lives.  
Following the Lebanese Civil War, a stagnant time for progress in women’s 
rights, the Lebanese government took steps intended to improve conditions for women in 
the country. In 1997, the government ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), with the National Committee for 
Lebanese Women’s Affairs being founded in 1998 to promote women’s rights and take 
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responsibility for submitting subsequent reports to the United Nations regarding the 
current state of women in Lebanon. A consistent critique of CEDAW in response to 
NCLW’s reports is a critique that women’s rights organizations in Lebanon take up as an 
anthem: Personal status laws, laws that differ country to country but determine the rights 
of men and women regarding marriage, divorce, child custody and divorce, must be 
changed.  It is difficult to tell whether or not these efforts for equality resulted in real 
changes for women; personal status laws and the vicious Kafala system for domestic 
migrant workers have changed little, if at all, since the ratification of CEDAW.  
 Despite the lack of institutionalized assistance and safeguards for women’s 
rights, Lebanese women radically changed their political activism and organization 
following the Assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. Droves of Lebanese 
citizens from every sectarian background flooded the streets, gathering in Martyr’s 
Square to protest in what was an unparalleled amount of cooperation between 
confessional groups. Women and men commemorated their leader and demanded that 
whoever was responsible for Hariri’s death be held accountable. The Cedar Revolution, 
also known as the Lebanese Spring Revolution, led to the final withdrawal of Syrian 
forces and government involvement in Lebanese affairs that had persisted since the Civil 
War. In her chapter, “Leadership of Lebanese Women in the Cedar Revolution,” Rita 
Stephan argues that the very image of the Lebanese women was transformed through 
their development into politically active citizens in unprecedented levels of visibility.27  
                                                
27 Stephan, “Leadership of Lebanese Women in the Cedar Revolution.” pg. 175 
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The Western press also seized upon this image of the politically engaged woman, 
constructing a narrative of the western-influenced Lebanese woman demanding rights 
through a secular and democratic process. When Newsweek and The Economist covered 
the Cedar Revolution after the Hariri assassination, they used two separate photos of 
women: both on men’s shoulders, both without hijab, and both in western clothing.28 This 
indicated to the Western World that change was coming; a change toward equality for 
women, a change towards the western conception of democracy, and a movement away 
from a conservative society. Despite the blatant Orientalist overtones, these Western 
magazines picked up on the growing sentiment even among the Lebanese that this was a 
defining moment for all of Lebanon, and especially Lebanese women. Women from all 
confessional backgrounds, cutting across all socio-economic positions and political party 
affiliations came together to conduct sit-ins, organize protests, and demonstrate against 
the unknown threat to the foundations of a free Lebanon.  
In this same year of unprecedented political action, KAFA, a group that would 
become a predominant force in the fight for women’s rights, was founded in 2005 in 
Beirut, Lebanon. KAFA, a term meaning “enough” in Arabic, is a feminist, non-
confessional, non-governmental, and secular civil society organization combatting 
violence against women and gender-based violence. In addition to advocating for gender 
reforms, KAFA’s services extend to protection for the family against violence, including 
children, as well as protection of domestic migrant workers from abuses, trafficking, and 
                                                
28 Vlahos, “No Color-Coded Revolution for Afghanistan by Kelley B. Vlahos -- Antiwar.com.”, “Cracking 
The Cedar.” 
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prostitution. KAFA remains a small women’s rights organization, but its profile is 
growing to become one of the most well-known and frequently cited women’s rights 
organizations in Lebanon.  
Without statistical analysis existing on women’s rights organizations in Lebanon 
to bolster this claim, other evidence, including the level of social media outreach, gives a 
hint as to KAFA’s presence throughout the country. At the time of this thesis (3/21/15), 
KAFA currently has 63,106 “likes” on Facebook, while one of the other most prominent 
women’s rights organizations, Nasawiya, has 18, 625 “likes” on Facebook. Additionally, 
KAFA’s Twitter account has nearly double the amount of followers as Nasawiya, with 
13,600 followers compared to 6,233 followers respectively. At the very least, these 
numbers indicate a widespread audience for KAFA’s social media outreach, a necessary 
part of its campaign strategies.  
KAFA’s campaign strategies are vital to the continued progress of the 
organization’s goals and outreach. As Maya Ammar noted in an interview I conducted 
with her in January of 2015, the current infrastructure of the group is extremely limited, 
with very few permanent staff members and a heavy reliance on volunteer help. She 
indicated that the organization is currently receiving more volunteers to help with KAFA 
than the organization placement for these people, with 600+ volunteers offering their 
services in the last year. With a small staff and an overwhelming amount of work to do 
for women’s rights in Lebanon, KAFA’s campaigns garner public interest and support in 
order to create a large base of volunteers and future activists.  
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This chapter will first discuss the organizational structure of KAFA and the roles 
its members play in constructing a women’s rights organization. It will focus on the 
identities of the women involved, specifically their class, educational, and sectarian 
backgrounds. Lebanon is a country renowned for its sectarian-based governmental 
system, with religious affiliation determining a Lebanese citizen’s primary identity. The 
reasons for this system come from a long history of Christian, Druze, Sunni Muslim, 
Shi’a Muslim, and Jewish populations residing in what is currently the modern nation 
state of Lebanon.  
When the country was founded in 1926 following World War I and the breaking 
apart of the Ottoman Empire, the country consisted of a majority Christian population, 
with significant Sunni, Shi’a, and Druze minorities. The government was then 
apportioned between these groups stemming from the only census ever taken in Lebanon. 
A Maronite Christian is always the President, a Sunni Muslim is always the Prime 
Minister and a Shi’a Muslim is always the Speaker of the House. The other minority 
communities, including Greek Orthodox, Druze, and Armenian groups among others, are 
given a designated number of seats in Parliament. Though Maronite Christians almost 
certainly no longer make up the majority of the Lebanese Population, each sectarian 
group resists conducting a census or changing the Constitution from its current state in 
order to prevent a power grab by any one confession. By appearances, this government 
boasts a democratic process and fair holdings, yet Lebanon sits precariously on the ever-
present potential for underlying sectarian grudges to violently erupt. In this atmosphere of 
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negative peace and perpetual discontent, the identity of a women’s rights group claiming 
to represent all women is prioritized.  
This chapter will additionally discuss KAFA’s campaign implementation since its 
founding in 2005. The group has initiated campaigns on all fronts, engaging the state 
structure through their Internal Security Forces Campaign and Name and Shame 
Campaign, engaging the Lebanese public through their Zalfa and Ride Along Campaign, 
and engaging those doubly marginalized by the system through their campaigns against 
Domestic Migrant Worker abuses like Raise Shawwa’s Voice. KAFA constructs each 
campaign for a particular audience, utilizing various visual materials to get its message 
out to the Lebanese public through a multitude of communicative mediums. This chapter 
will explore why KAFA chose to develop certain campaign strategies at the time they 
did, specifically relating to societal concerns and KAFA’s own goals at the time, how 
they implemented these campaigns, and what these campaigns look like.  
 
KAFA’S CAMPAIGNS: ENGAGING THE STATE, ENGAGING THE PUBLIC, AND ENGAGING 
THE KAFALA SYSTEM 
 
Engaging the State Apparatus:  
While KAFA exists first and foremost as a resource for women to seek help and guidance 
to escape from situations of domestic violence, an integral part of its work is the long-
sighted goal to create a state infrastructure that provides protections for women. KAFA 
engages the Lebanese state structure through several of its campaigns, most noteworthy 
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the group’s “Name and Shame” campaign, as well as its campaign to build bridges 
between women and members of the Internal Security Forces, “We Have a Mission. If 
you’re threatened, do not hesitate to call 112.” This second campaign is also a part of the 
larger “White Ribbon Campaign” that KAFA participates in every year in an effort to 
involve more men in the fight against domestic violence. Each campaign is a necessary 
part of addressing the institutionalized violence and permission for violence that 
permeates the Lebanese state.  
 
Name and Shame Campaign:  
In 2007, KAFA began drafting a law that would protect women and children from 
domestic violence. In less than three years, this bill came to fruition and the Lebanese 
cabinet approved the 
draft law on April 6, 
2010. The bill was then 
sent on to an 8-member 
Parliamentary Committee 
to study the draft law in 
2011 and it finalized its 
amendments in 2012. 
While the Committee was 
going over the bill, 
KAFA rightfully feared for the changes that the Committee would make to the bill. One 
Figure: 2.1 
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of the primary concerns was that the Committee would alter the section of the bill 
criminalizing marital rape, including coercion practices. During the period when the 
committee was in session, KAFA lobbied this committee composed of eight Ministers of 
Parliament to leave the bill unchanged and the criminalization of marital rape intact. 
KAFA took up what it called its “Name and Shame” campaign in order to facilitate the 
organization’s lobbying attempts. A brilliant strategy, the concept of naming and shaming 
utilizes the tactic of releasing a well-known figure’s name and/or face into the public 
sphere to encourage, or intimidate, this figure into choosing the action desired by those 
protesting. This campaign worked on two fronts: it released the names and faces of those 
on the eight member committee overseeing this bill and it released the names of the 
Ministers of Parliament who had not yet signed on their support of the bill.  
 KAFA implemented its campaign through a video, also used as a television 
commercial, and a poster showing the pictures of all of the MP’s on the Committee for 
the bill. Figure 2.1 contains the pictures of the eight MP’s charged with amending the 
bill, with the text reading, “Marital Rape is also a crime! The Law is in your image! 
Don’t maim the legislation that protects women from domestic violence!”29 Below the 
photograph are the names of the organizations that signed on to help KAFA develop this 
bill. Online, this particular photograph was picked up and used primarily by Lebanese 
bloggers, as well as various Middle Eastern news sites such as The Daily Star, The Arab 
Digest, and el-Akhbar English. KAFA also took this image to the streets, with Ammar 
noting that these images were plastered inside buses for the public to see. The goal, 
                                                
29 Haddad, “Fighting Domestic Violence in Lebanon.” 
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Ammar said, was to raise Lebanese citizens’ awareness of the committee’s amendments 
to the bill, which opposed the explicit language condemning violence against women as 
well as the categorization of marital rape as rape.  
 In addition to this image that KAFA put up around the city and into the minds of 
consuming citizens, the organization also utilized the video image of these MPs to name 
and shame them. It put up a YouTube video on November 23, 2011 that displays the 
names and faces of every member of the subcommittee. The video, lasting 34 seconds, 
dramatically displays each member for approximately 2-4 seconds, zooming on to the 
seven male faces and one female face, with each name coming up in bold. The eight 
members of the subcommittee included Samir Jisr, Nabil Nicolas, Ghassan Moukheiber, 
Michel Helou, Gilbert Zouein, Ali Ammar, Imad Hout, and Shant Janjanian. In the 
bottom corner of the screen, text reads, “The subcommittee for studying the law 
protecting women from domestic violence.” As each picture moves into the next, there is 
a voiceover stating the names of the subcommittee.  This same video appeared as a 
commercial on most Lebanese stations, although Future TV and the Hariri Channel, took 
it off within a few days.30  The image served as a powerful tool for KAFA; bringing 
public awareness to both the existence of the bill against domestic violence, and the 
names of the members responsible for determining the future of women’s safety in 
Lebanon.  
                                                
30 Ibid. 
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 The second part of KAFA’s 
Name and Shame campaign was more 
informal, and primarily taken up by 
web bloggers. Lists of the MP’s who 
did not sign the petition at the time 
were passed around websites to 
educate the public on those 
unsupportive of the bill. This image 
(see Figure 2.2) is particularly 
interesting as it breaks up 49 MP’s into 
color-coded political groups.31 The 
MP’s are spread across sectarian groups, yet the numbers have higher concentrations in 
the Shi’a parties, Amal Movement and Hezbollah, as well as the Sunni party, the Future 
Movement.  
 KAFA’s Name and Shame campaign relied on public consumption of images and 
videos to expose the names of the Members of Parliament on the subcommittee and those 
within Parliament. The organization spread these images through the press, television 
stations, bloggers, and on media throughout the city to reach a wide and diverse audience. 
The poster and the video put forward a consistent message of accountability through not 
only releasing the names of the public figures, but also displaying their pictures in a 
framing that looks as if they are being captured on a private investigator’s camera. This 
                                                
31 Majed, “Failing to Stand against Domestic Violence.” 
Figure: 2.2 
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framing coincides with Maya’s statement that the public should be monitoring their 
elected officials. Instead of the Parliamentarians taking responsibility for the public good, 
KAFA gave the public the tools to hold the Parliamentarians accountable for their 
actions.  
 
16 Days of Activism: The White Ribbon Campaign and the Internal Security Forces 
Campaign: “We Have a Mission. If you’re threatened, do not hesitate to call 112” 
 
The 16 Days of Activism is an international event that takes places annually 
between November 25, International Day for Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
and December 10, Human Rights Day. The event is a symbolic marriage of the two days, 
illustrating how gender-based violence negates the human right to equality for women. 
KAFA actively participates in the 16 Days of Activism in Lebanon, launching two of its 
most prominent campaigns during the event. KAFA first launched the White Ribbon 
Campaign in 2010 and re-launches it every year on November 25. The White Ribbon 
Campaign specifically targets Lebanese boys and men, inviting them to take an active 
stance against violence towards women. The ISF Campaign was also launched on 
November 25, 2012 with the goal of fostering a better relationship between the police 
force and abused women. Both campaigns go hand in hand as they reach out to traditional 
members and perpetuators of the patriarchal system of violence in the country to take an 
active part in educating themselves and others about all forms of gender-based violence.  
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 The White Ribbon Campaign’s goals primarily seek to educate men on the 
prevalence of violence committed against women, and to garner their commitment to be 
allies to women. KAFA designed the campaign to initiate conversations with men 
regarding gender-based violence with the intention that the men would continue the 
conversations with each other, taking their knowledge to other forums to further the 
discussion. During the 16 Days of Activism, KAFA asks men to commit themselves to a 
life free from violence against women, and to stand with women in various exercises. In 
2011, an example of these exercises included a human chain to show solidarity between 
Lebanese men and women while the bill to protect women and children from domestic 
violence was in Parliament. That same year KAFA took the White Ribbon Campaign to 
various Lebanese University Campuses, setting up booths to conduct community 
outreach. Sports matches and various competitions that traditionally are associated with 
conceptions of masculinity accompanied the informational outlets at the American 
University of Beirut, Balamand University, the Lebanese American University, and 
Haigazian University.32 
 KAFA launched a new White Ribbon Campaign in 2012 acknowledging the 
support of Lebanese celebrities and challenging common conceptions of masculinity. 
During the launch, KAFA presented awards to the two male MPs, Shant Jianjian and 
Nabil Nicolas, who resigned from their posts on the subcommittee that amended KAFA’s 
                                                
32 “The ‘White Ribbon’ Campaign in Universities-Lebanon | Engagingmen.net - A Gender Justice 
Information Network.” 
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bill to protect women and children from domestic violence.33 KAFA also acknowledged 
two celebrities who have vocally supported KAFA, Ziad El Samad and Badih Abou 
Chakra. El Samad is the goalkeeper for the Lebanese national football (soccer) team, as 
well as for El Safa’ SC. He participated in the third season of a show called Celebrity 
Duets, where he pledged to donate his Celebrity Duets award to KAFA.34 Chakra is a 
famous Lebanese actor who appeared in KAFA’s commercial to raise public awareness 
during the 16 Days of Activism. These commercials show Chakra flexing his muscles, 
revealing his possession of a gun, wearing a tattoo with a black tank top, dressed in a suit 
flashing money, and raising his hand poised to slap an imaginary figure. At the end of the 
commercial, which KAFA also posted on their YouTube channel, Chakra bows his head 
in shame. The message is simple and straightforward, yet leaves a significant impact.  
 KAFA’s proposed bill to protect women and children from gender-based violence 
included an important article calling for the creation of a special Internal Security Forces 
(ISF) unit. This unit would include three women and would take steps to understand the 
situation of gender-based violence in Lebanon and appropriate ways to approach 
situations of domestic violence. KAFA proposed this particular article as a result of a 
long-history of mishandling or completely disregarding situations of domestic violence. It 
is no secret in Lebanon that domestic violence cases are often viewed as a private manner 
within the family. Many people are hesitant to report cases of domestic violence, even 
going so far as to deem them appropriate if the wife is perceived as misbehaving. The 
                                                
33 {Citation}Taylor, “Women Rights Campaign Tackles Gender Roles | News , Lebanon News | THE 
DAILY STAR.” 
34 “LBCI | Celebrity Duets Ziad-Al-Samad.” 
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relegation of domestic violence and gender-based violence to the private sphere has 
resulted in the Internal Security Forces ignoring situations of domestic violence, as well 
as not reporting these situations for medical or judiciary documentation. Moreover, up 
until the early 2000’s, women were not allowed to serve in the Internal Security Forces. 
This reinforced patriarchal viewpoints of women being the weaker gender and without 
physical power. Men in the ISF often deferred domestic abuse cases to the local leaders 
in the community, effectively severing any form of recourse for women experiencing 
gender-based violence. Additionally, the masochistic attitudes of an all-male ISF 
prevented women from receiving the help in domestic abuse situations that they so 
desperately needed.  
 KAFA launched their “We have 
a mission; if you’re threatened, do not 
hesitate to call 112” campaign on 
November 25, 2013. The campaign 
seeks to foster trust and communication 
between the Internal Security Forces 
and women in Lebanon. In order for 
the ISF to be a viable option for 
confronting situations of gender-based 
violence, both women and the wider 
public must trust that the ISF will 
adequately and compassionately handle violent situations when they are called for help. 
Figure: 2.3 
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KAFA designed this campaign as public outreach to encourage people’s reliance on the 
ISF in gender-based violence situations. The organization launched this particular 
campaign during their ongoing project called “The Role of the Internal Security Forces in 
Combatting Family Violence.” At the time of the campaign’s launch, KAFA and the ISF 
had already worked to create and implement a teaching manual for gender-based violence 
for the ISF, the General Directorate of the ISF issuing a note on proper ways to deal with 
gender-based violence, the creation of special judiciary units that will undertake reports 
of gender-based violence, the creation of new rooms and utilization of new equipment for 
a medical team to perform exams on women, and the training of 175 ISF members for 
participation in the aforementioned tasks.  
 The visual part of the campaign took shape in two distinct ways: the illustration of 
male ISF members dedicated to compassionately addressing situations of gender-based 
violence, and the newly implemented participation of female ISF members (See Figure 
2.3). On KAFA’s website, their campaign features a poster with a male ISF member 
slightly in front and to the right of a presumably Lebanese women.35 The poster utilizes 
the name of the campaign as a slogan for action, “We have a mission, if you are 
threatened, do not hesitate to call us-112.” With both the ISF member and the woman 
somber-looking in appearance, the poster indicates that the ISF member will be the 
barrier between the victim and the perpetrator. A distinct departure from previous 
conceptions of the ISF, this poster indicates to the viewer that the ISF is prepared to 
insert itself in situations of gender-based violence.  
                                                
35 “KAFA | Launch of the Campaign.” 
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This message is magnified through a short video campaign on KAFA’s YouTube 
channel. Lasting 36 seconds, the video illustrates an intimate home scene that quickly 
escalates from verbal abuse to physical violence. The video shows the parallel situations 
between a husband removing his belt to beat his wife to a ISF member suiting up to go 
into public space, as well as the husband raising his belt to bring down to an ISF member 
handing the wife a glass of water and taking her in to take her statement. The actors in the 
video never speak, dramatic and increasingly intensified music plays over the abusive 
scenes, with a narrator coming in during the last moments to again re-state the mission of 
this campaign. The parallel effect throughout the video indicates the ISF’s preparation to 
respond to each part of the domestic abuse situation, from stopping the violence to 
comforting the victim, and eventually taking her statement to begin the process of judicial 
repercussions. While the ISF member is suiting up, he salutes the camera. An interesting 
addition to the video, this pose indicates that part of the ISF’s duties in serving her or his 
country is to protect the vulnerable members of society. Pairing this pose with the ISF 
member going directly into the women’s home and sitting at her kitchen table with her 
before taking her into a police station for a statement indicates that the ISF believes it is 
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their responsibility and part of their job to directly intervene in formerly private situations 
of gender-based violence. Though this illustration seeks to ameliorate widespread 
perceptions of the male ISF members as potential perpetrators of violence themselves, it 
also puts forward the image that a woman needs a male as a protector. The following 
illustration with a women ISF member taking the place of a male ISF member partially 
remedies this issue, yet the reality is that very few women are in the ISF, meaning that 
most situations of domestic violence will be handled by a male ISF member.  
For this particular campaign, KAFA also created a separate poster with a female 
ISF member (See Figure 2.4).36 This poster mirrors the poster featuring the male ISF 
poster, displaying the female ISF member standing between the hypothetical victim and 
the viewer. Again, both people in the poster are somber in mood, and their physical 
positioning conveys the message that the ISF member will stand in front of the victim for 
protection. This poster promotes the 
cooperation between the ISF and 
Lebanese women in situations of 
gender-based violence, while also 
illustrating the progression of the 
ISF to include female members and 
move toward a system of equality 
even within the police force itself.  
                                                
36 “KAFA | يﻱلﻝخﺥاﺍدﺩلﻝاﺍ نﻥمﻡأﺃلﻝاﺍ ىﻯوﻭقﻕ عﻉمﻡ نﻥوﻭاﺍعﻉتﺕلﻝاﺍبﺏ ’ةﺓمﻡهﻩمﻡ اﺍنﻥاﺍرﺭوﻭ‘ ةﺓلﻝمﻡحﺡ قﻕاﺍلﻝطﻁإﺇ.” 
Figure: 2.4 
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Engaging the Public: 
In addition to creating infrastructure through the state apparatus to assist women in 
situations of gender-based violence, KAFA engages the public sphere through several 
campaigns in order to bring private issues into public space. Though KAFA has taken 
numerous initiatives to instigate this change, two of their campaigns in particular utilize 
interesting communicative practices to reach out to and interact with the public, “Zalfa” 
and the “Driving Change…A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride.” 
 
Driving Change…A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 
KAFA launched their Driving Change…A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride Campaign 
to create a situation where women must either stay silent or confront a situation of abuse. 
KAFA intended to create bonds of solidarity between women as they quite literally went 
along for this abusive ride. Whether or not the women choose to speak up, they are put 
into a situation where they cannot simply walk away or close their eyes and ears to abuse. 
KAFA put up the video documenting these interactions on YouTube on March 16, 2014, 
stating that the experiment was conducted with the permission of Banet Taxis of Beirut to 
utilize their services. The organization’s use of Banet Taxis is an integral part of the 
experiment as these taxis are designed for women’s use only. Painted a distinctly bright 
pink color to apparently indicate the gendered nature of the car, the taxi company markets 
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itself as a safe ride for women.37 Unfortunately for the group of women in this video, 
what was expected to be a safe and quiet ride will turn into a demand for action.  
The video, lasting one minute and 45 seconds, shows the interactions between 
seven women riders, three taxi drivers, and one very irate GPS system. Taking place in 
the busy and congested streets of Beirut, Lebanon, the taxi driver is expected to follow 
the directions of the GPS in order to quickly and efficiently get the taxi rider from their 
pick-up point to final destination. In the video, six of the riders speak in Lebanese Arabic 
and one woman speaks in English, however, the voice of the GPS is distinctly British. 
Typical of KAFA’s videos and documentation, the video is also subtitled in English to 
allow for a wider viewing audience. All of the unsuspecting women of different ages and 
backgrounds appear comfortable before the quick escalation of verbal abuse directed at 
their taxi driver. The video moves from the GPS voice becoming agitated to shouting 
vulgar insults at the driver. All of the riders are visibly uncomfortable at this drastic 
escalation in abuse. At the end of the video, mirroring the end of the taxi ride from hell 
for these women, KAFA sends a text message to the riders with the Arabic and English 
message, “If you witness abuse, don’t sit back and ignore it.” The text message also 
includes the KAFA hotline for help, asking the women to share it with victims of abuse. 
In the YouTube video, the audience views KAFA’s request for a pledge of solidarity with 
abuse victims and the hashtag “#iwillspeakup” to indicate this pledge of solidarity. This 
video is a somber reminder that victims trapped in situations of abuse do not have the 
luxury to get off their own ride from hell. Through encouraging solidarity with abuse 
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victims, KAFA is demanding that change come through a community of women refusing 
to ignore individual situations of abuse within the larger system of patriarchy.  
Zalfa 
KAFA uses another campaign, Zalfa, as an interactive tool to communicate 
information to the wider public regarding Law 293 that the Parliament passed in 2014. 
Launched in November 2014, KAFA introduced the campaign to inform women of their 
rights following Parliament’s passing of Law 293 while also highlighting the failures of 
the law. Primarily an informational campaign, Zalfa aims to protect women from further 
violence and warn them of certain repercussions should they take action against their 
abusers, while also empowering victims of domestic violence to become aware of their 
options and utilize the judicial system to their advantage.  
 On November 14, 2014, KAFA posted a picture with a blurred-out woman on its 
Facebook page with the question, “Who is Zalfa?” This question was the extraordinary 
introduction to an interactive avatar named Zalfa. Zalfa is an animated character created 
by the software company, SoftImpact, but she is the face of a domestic violence survivor 
in Lebanon.38 Zalfa takes form on a variety of front, including a Facebook and Twitter 
Campaign, YouTube videos, which are also shown on news segments on the Lebanese 
Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI), and in informational pamphlets on 
KAFA’s website. Zalfa claims no religious background; only that she is also a Lebanese 
woman who has experienced violence, prejudice, and discrimination because of her 
                                                
38 https://www.facebook.com/kafa.lb/photos/pb.323356544336.-
2207520000.1425750630./10152829002369337/?type=3&theater 
 75 
gender identity. She appears casual, without any particular socio-economic identifiers 
(See Figure 2.5).39 Zalfa is designed to appeal to any woman, providing a safe space for 
difficult questions regarding violence and domestic abuse.  
 The majority of Zalfa’s campaign information derives from KAFA’s website, 
outlining who Zalfa is, her answers to common questions, and loopholes in Law 293 that 
women must consider in abusive situations. KAFA’s goal with Zalfa is to create a 
campaign of awareness and disseminate information, while also engaging women in the 
fight against Parliamentary members’ harmful amendments to the original bill. In 
particular, this campaign addresses the amendments allowing men to claim marital rights 
in cases of marital rape, the issues with protection of children in situations of domestic 
violence dependent on age of custody, and the right of the victim to obtain protection 
orders from public prosecution. On KAFA’s website, the organization created both an 
Arabic and an English version of Zalfa’s 11 questions accompanied by explanations of 
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terms and conditions. These questions are easily accessible, allowing for women to know 
their rights without sacrificing their privacy in certain situations. Additionally, these 
questions are turned into pictures for KAFA’s Facebook and Twitter accounts, and 
adapted into videos for KAFA’s YouTube account. The videos on YouTube are 
particularly helpful because they bring the information to life in an unobtrusive way. In 
fifteen short videos, each approximately 15 seconds in length, Zalfa brings to life 
questions regarding domestic abuse and Law 293, as well as examples of the 
implementation of Law 293. Zalfa’s friendly demeanor, her presentation of information 
regarding domestic violence through written documents, spoken explanations, and 
illustrated examples, and the dissemination of information on various social and news 
mediums illustrate how Zalfa’s message is accessible and welcoming.  
 
Engaging the Kafala System: 
 KAFA’s interest in women’s rights extends beyond concern for those born with a 
Lebanese national identity to include the safety and well being of women within 
Lebanese borders. One of the more controversial systems in Lebanon, the Kafala system 
is based on the premise of employers paying for a domestic migrant worker to come to 
Lebanon from their home country and work for their employer in a situation considered 
to be human trafficking and modern day slavery. Many employers go through an agency 
in order to find the domestic workers, and this agency assists in both paying for the 
worker to come to Lebanon and the subsequent harsh disciplining of the workers if they 
resist their employers. The employer usually holds the domestic worker’s visa, meaning 
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that the worker cannot leave the house without risking arrest from the General Security 
force in Lebanon. These migrant workers usually leave their own countries because they 
are facing financial difficulties and must find a way to support themselves and their 
families. Upon their arrival in Lebanon, they face the possibility of submitting themselves 
to verbal, situational, physical, and sexual abuses in order to support their family in their 
home country. They are often restricted from eating or leaving the homes of their 
employers, and many do not receive a day off of work during the week. They are faced 
with a hostile situation all around as the employer may abuse the worker, the employer 
may ask the original agency that brought the domestic worker in to the country to abuse 
the domestic worker, or if the domestic worker attempts to escape the abuse and leave the 
house without a visa, they risk the General Security force arresting them and subjecting 
them to further physical and sexual abuse. Domestic migrant workers are excluded from 
Lebanon’s Labor Laws and therefore have little recourse to protest their poor treatment 
and abuses.40  
 
Fields of Action 
 From its founding, KAFA’s mission included protecting domestic migrant 
workers from physical and sexual exploitation. Similar to its campaigns against domestic 
violence, KAFA engages both the state structure and the public sphere to instigate lasting 
change and promise for migrant domestic workers. Several of the group’s smaller 
campaigns, including helping to draft an anti-trafficking bill, releasing policy papers to 
                                                
40 Jureidini and Moukarbel, “Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon.” pg. 598 
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raise awareness, and compiling difficult to find information on the suicides of nine 
domestic workers, have led to its newest campaign regarding domestic migrant workers 
called “Raise Shawwa’s Voice.”  
 KAFA considers one of its four “Fields of Action” to be battling the Exploitation 
and Trafficking in Women. Through educating the public on the current situation of 
migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, KAFA hopes to inspire the public to outrage and 
mass movement for the rights of domestic workers in the Kafala system. As a part of this 
campaign, KAFA has released several policy papers and undertaken various studies in 
order to promote education on the topic. On June 24, 2010, the organization released the 
paper on its website, “Servant, Daughter, or Employee? A Pilot Study on the Attitudes of 
Lebanese Employers towards Migrant Domestic Workers,” on April 11, 2001 they 
released two studies, “An Exploratory Study on Social and Psychoanalytic Factors in the 
Abuse of Domestic Migrant Workers by Female Employers in Lebanon,” and, 
“Trafficking of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon: A Legal Analysis, by Kathleen 
Hamill.” In 2012, KAFA undertook the difficulty of suggesting an alternative system for 
the Kafala system through its paper, “Policy Paper for Reforming the “Sponsorship 
System” for Migrant Domestic Workers: Towards an Alternative Governance Scheme,” 
and more recently in 2014 KAFA conducted the study, “DREAMS For Sale: The 
Exploitation of Domestic Workers from Recruitment in Nepal and Bangladesh to 
Working in Lebanon.” KAFA includes on its website additional newsletters and manuals 
highlighting the plight of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon.  
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Accompanying these larger studies, KAFA brings attention to the voice of the 
migrant domestic worker through compiling stories of their lives and deaths. An 
important aspect of KAFA’s campaigning for migrant domestic workers’ rights, these 
compilations move away from an intellectualized exercise to an empathetic peak into the 
horrors migrant domestic workers face in Lebanon. Both of these parts are integral for 
obtaining freedoms for domestic workers and illustrate the need to explore the issue 
through multiple lenses. In 2010, KAFA went to the local newspapers to compile nine 
stories of migrant domestic workers’ suicides between August and September 2010. 
Though little information is given, with three stories even lacking the name of the victim, 
these compilations serve as a memorial mourning the lost lives of those who found no 
justice through the Lebanese judicial system and whose only path to freedom was 
through their own suicides.41 In another small booklet that KAFA printed out with the 
assistance of Anti-Slavery International on May 2, 2014 called, “If Not for the System,” 
19 migrant domestic workers tell their stories through the form of letters. The letters are 
an intimate look inside the lives of migrant domestic workers, predominantly detailing 
their hardships and abuses.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 “KAFA | Silent Deaths.” 
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“Raise Shawwa’s Voice” 
KAFA’s most recent campaign, Raise Shawwa’s Voice, reflects KAFA’s 
increasing use of video and interactive 
public engagement to spread its 
messages. This campaign, launched on 
Facebook on February 6, 2015 and on the 
organization’s website on February 18, 
2015, centers around a video of a woman 
and migrant domestic worker named 
Shawwa (See Figure 2.6).42 Both sites 
provide a link to a page with a video of Shawwa and her story. The website reveals little 
information about Shawwa; the viewer later discovers that she has been working in 
Lebanon for three years. Her location of origin is unknown, yet this fluidity in identity 
allows for her to raise the voice of a more inclusive group of migrant domestic workers. 
It can be reasonably inferred that Showa is in her twenties. Yet what is perhaps most 
interesting about this story is that there is at first no sound. As the website supposedly 
downloads, it prompts the viewer to turn on her or his computer speakers.  
Once the video loads, the Shawwa begins moving her mouth, as if she is trying to 
speak but words cannot quite come out. The side of the website lights up and again there 
is an arrow asking for the viewer to move the slider up the sound bar in order to better 
hear Shawwa speak. Yet Shawwa’s words still do not come; instead, the site brings up a 
                                                
42 “KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation’s... - KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation | Facebook.” 
 Figure: 2.6
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notification saying, “Can’t Hear? That’s because Shawwa, like thousands of domestic 
workers in Lebanon, can’t be heard speaking up for their rights. Raise Shawwa’s Voice. 
By sharing, you will hear Shawwa and help spread her message.” Below this notification 
are the two options of sharing her story on Facebook or Twitter. In order to hear 
Shawwa’s voice, the viewer must participate in its dissemination. The automated 
message following the choice of Facebook or Twitter is: “I helped Shawwa be heard and 
demand serious investigation into the deaths of domestic workers.  #RaiseShawwasVoice  
www.raiseshawwasvoice.org.” Shawwa proceeds to detail the procedure for migrant 
domestic workers trying to escape abuse. Her message is clear; only through those 
willing to help and lift up the voice of the voiceless will these terrible injustices cease. It 
is the responsibility of the viewer not only to educate herself or himself participate on the 
issue, but to educate others as well.  
 
CONCLUSION: 
Together, KAFA’s various campaign strategies form a cohesive and powerful platform 
for combatting gender-based violence on multiple societal levels. This organization 
utilizes social media, news media, as well as event-based media to disseminate its 
message to a vast audience base. Its numerous campaigns engage the state apparatus, 
both the judiciary and the law enforcement system, the public sphere, as well as the 
Kafala system to combat gender-based violence on different fronts. This organization 
targets specific communities and societal constructs through each campaign, yet its 
campaigns are cross-communal projects. In KAFA’s Name and Shame Campaign, it 
 82 
targeted the members of Parliament who were part of an eight-member subcommittee to 
amend the bill for protecting women and families from domestic violence, but it also 
engaged the public through encouraging the public to condemn the MPs. KAFA’s 
campaign for helping migrant domestic workers obtain access and protection under 
Lebanon’s Labor Laws also engages the state apparatus. The ways in which KAFA builds 
support across these campaigns is an integral part of the organization’s campaign 
strategy, and will be discussed further in later parts of this thesis. Particularly, these 
strategies illustrate the necessity of creating an entire system of support against gender-
based violence instead of engaging any one aspect in isolation.  
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Chapter 3: Reactions to KAFA’s Campaigns: Commendations, 
Critiques, and Confrontation 
 
 
The following chapter will discuss the public reaction and results of the campaigns I have 
described in the previous chapter. I primarily draw on news reports and blog posts to 
determine the level of public reaction and involvement with KAFA’s campaigns 
following their implementations. In order to analyze the public reactions further, I use 
Facebook and YouTube to gauge the level of support or negative responses to these 
various campaigns. For YouTube videos, I will analyze the number of “likes” and 
“dislikes” as indicated by the viewer, as well as the overall number of views. I will also 
indicate the number of positive or negative comments on each video if present. For 
Facebook photos, I will analyze the number of “likes,” noting the significant absence of a 
“dislike” button, while also noting the number of user “shares” to their or someone else’s 
wall, and the comments given under each photo. I further break down these comments 
into categories of male and female responses, and indicate whether the responses are 
positive or negative. I also indicate if the response is negative in regards to political 
policy, but positive to KAFA overall, whether the comment was a joke, if the comment 
tags another person and whether the comment is indecipherable. Additionally, to ground 
this chapter, I let the lives of several women affected and destroyed by gender based 
violence illustrate the reality behind KAFA’s campaigns. These campaigns represent the 
lived experiences of Lebanese women, and the stories behind them remind the reader that 
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the attitudes and feelings towards these campaigns have very real and far-reaching 
consequences.  
All of the following statistical analysis was conducted on March 18 and 19, 2015. Any 
additional comments, likes, dislikes, or shares on Facebook and YouTube were not 
accounted for past these dates. To date, KAFA has 62,535 likes on Facebook and 305 
YouTube subscribers. Additionally, please find tables comparatively detailing the 
following statistical analysis in Chapter 4 in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.43  
ENGAGING THE STATE APPARATUS-ROQAYA MOUNZER 
 
In the early morning of March 20, 2014, Mohammed M. murdered Roqaya Mounzer after 
seven years of domestic abuse; she was pregnant with her third child. Similar to many 
cases of domestic violence in Lebanon, the details are jumbled. Immediately following 
Mounzer’s murder, neighbors began whispering tails of suicide, further obfuscating the 
reality of the situation. Despite the rumors and speculation, several pieces of factual 
evidence surfaced following Mounzer’s death that painted a very different picture than 
suicide indeed. Testimony from Mounzer’s family illustrates the long years of abuse 
Mounzer experienced at the hands of her husband. Her father’s testimony included a 
story from before their marriage when he voiced his concern to Mounzer over her future 
husband’s controlling behavior, including an incident where the husband hit Mounzer in 
the face. The sister, Zeina, tells a similar story, providing stories where she witnessed the 
                                                
43 I would like to acknowledge Reem Harb, a Lebanese Citizen and fellow scholar, for her assistance with 
several Arabeezi and Arabic translations to ensure their reliability.  
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aftermath of abuse, bruises and bumps covering Mounzer’s body. The sister noted that 
the husband would slap Mounzer in front of the family, an assertion that the husband 
himself corroborated when he said, “he smacked her on occasion.”44  
 Mounzer’s husband psychologically abused and manipulated her, a crucial part of 
the events leading up to her murder. Zeina, her sister, noted that the husband would lock 
Mounzer in the house when he left, though the husband claims Mounzer had an extra 
key. The husband also stated that Mounzer did not want to see her family in the year 
leading up to her death. Taking this statement into consideration with the rest of 
Mounzer’s abuse, her withdrawal may instead have been a typical sign of her husband’s 
controlling and abusive behavior, restricting her relationships with even her family. Both 
the sister and Maya Ammar from KAFA stated that Mounzer threatened her husband 
with divorce.45 The husband would then pose the counter threat of taking full custody of 
their children. 
 Perhaps the threat of divorce is what drove Mounzer’s husband to shoot his wife 
point blank in the chest when she knelt before him, pleading for her life on the morning 
of March 20, 2014. The husband’s calm demeanor during his court appearance showed 
the confidence of a man with his country’s laws behind him. Additionally, one of the 
husband’s family members indicated that he was protected by his family, and that this 
bigger family was also intimidating Roqaya’s smaller family.46 Typical of domestic 
violence cases in Lebanon, the husband’s family desired the issue to be dealt with in 
                                                
44 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20222 
45 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/19160 
46 http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-court-indictment-indicates-roqaya-mounzer-was-murdered-
her-husband 
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private-for Roqaya’s family to accept their loved one’s death and move on. Roqaya’s 
story has disappeared from public speculation, one more instance of domestic violence 
that demands immediate outrage but burns out quickly. Or, common to many cases of 
domestic violence, this story has been silenced.  
Several pieces of this story point to a structural issue with the political system in 
Lebanon. Roqaya’s proposal of divorce being met with a threat for custody of her 
children, her former husband’s family threatening her family after her death, and the 
desire for silence surrounding the domestic violence are all indicative of issues with 
Lebanese personal status laws. These laws in particular create difficulties for women and 
children in dangerous situations, simultaneously denying women full rights in issues of 
marriage and custody. 
 
The Lebanese Constitution and Personal Status Laws 
Before discussing personal status laws, however, it is necessary to understand the history 
of the Lebanese Constitution, a document permitting the implementation of these 
personal status laws in Lebanon. The Lebanese Constitution was created in 1926, four 
years after the creation of Modern Lebanon. Owing to the unique religious make-up of 
the country, the Lebanese Constitution was created with the need for each religious sect 
to maintain a degree of control over each sect’s members. Article 9 was placed in the 
Constitution in order for local religious leaders to maintain their authority under the 
multi-confessional Lebanese government:  
Article 9 
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There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state in rendering 
homage to the God Almighty shall respect all religions and creeds and 
shall guarantees, under its protection the free exercise of all religious rites 
provided that public order is not disturbed. It shall also guarantees that the 
personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever 
religious sect they belong, shall be respected.47 
 
The authors of the constitution intended this article to provide a means for each 
religious sect to maintain their own religious identities, preserving laws and customs at a 
time when a group of people were forced together under one Lebanese nationality. 
Though the authors of the constitution wrote this article with the hopes of preserving a 
degree of peace at a time of upheaval, these attempts to preserve the religious identity of 
each confession resulted in deep fissures between each religious community. Moreover, 
the religious nature of the Lebanese government and the authority of local religious 
leaders became problematic for those wishing to have an identity outside of religious 
boundaries. In 1936, Lebanon issued Decree 60 L.R. stating that a confessional identity 
was no longer compulsory, allowing for Lebanese citizens to choose their own religious 
identity or opt out of a religious sect altogether. Those who chose to opt out of a religious 
identity would instead be subject to a civil code. Despite this option, Lebanon has yet to 
adopt a Civil Code according to the 1936 Decree’s statement.  
 While each religious group is technically required to submit its personal status 
laws to Lebanese Parliament for review and ratification, only the Christians, Jews, and 
Druze have so far submitted their laws for codification. The Sunni group claimed the law 
infringed on its rights as a religious group and Decree 53 of March 30, 1939 stated that 
                                                
47 “The Lebanese Constitution.” 
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this group no longer was required to submit its laws for Parliamentary review. The Shi’a 
group also refused to submit its personal status laws for ratification. Yet even with 
Parliamentary review for several of Lebanon’s confessional groups’ personal status laws, 
many religious rulings go forward without any judicial oversight. Often, the Lebanese 
government chooses not to interfere in religious court matters in order to avoid 
confrontation with religious leaders. Though the Lebanese government chooses to 
abdicate some degree of power to religious leaders to maintain a delicate balance of 
peace, the most vulnerable and disenfranchised groups in society, women, children, 
migrants, experience severe repercussions as a result.  
 In order to fully understand the level of religious leader’s control in a community, 
and the corresponding need for civil personal status laws, it is necessary to conduct an 
overview of various Lebanese personal status laws. It is difficult to gain access to each 
religious group’s personal status laws in written form, yet Maya Mikdashi has done an 
incredible amount of work to research and compile the various Lebanese status laws for 
her own academic work.48 This paper will give a brief description of each confession’s 
personal status laws that are relevant to my work on domestic violence and KAFA. Yet, 
as Mikdashi also notes in her article, it is necessary to keep in mind while studying these 
laws that their implementation does not always follow the written law. Additionally, 
many of these laws are very complicated and dependent upon other, sometimes religious, 
conditions. For the purpose of this thesis, I will only briefly outline personal status laws 
according to the Lebanese Constitution and Christian, Sunni, Shi’a, and Druze sects:  
                                                
48 Mikdashi, “A Legal Guide to Being a Lebanese Woman (Part 1).” 
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Civil Law 
 Women are discriminated against within their confessional groups, but 
discrimination also exists within Lebanese Civil law. According to Lebanese Civil law, 
only men are able to pass citizenship on to their children. The only two conditions that 
allow for a woman to pass on citizenship is either after the woman has become 
naturalized, she is able to pass on citizenship both to her next husband after the 
naturalization, as well as her children, or if a woman has a baby outside of marriage and 
no one claims paternity for a year’s time. Additionally, women can only be registered 
under the name of their fathers on a census, marital rape is still legalized in Lebanon, and 
if a victim marries her rapist (the language constitutes women as the potential victims 
only), the rapist will not be charged with rape. The woman is able to raise the charges 
against her rapist again if either she or her rapist husband files for divorce. Up until 2011, 
Lebanon allowed for reduced sentences under Article 562 for male family members who 
honor killed a female family member. Additionally, the adultery laws discriminate 
between men and women; unmarried men who commit adultery are subject to one month 
to one year in prison, or three months to two years if married, whereas a women, married 
or unmarried, is subject to three months to two years in prisoned.  
Christian Personal Status Laws for Catholics and Greek Orthodox communities: 
 In regards to Catholic marriage, the legal marriage age for males is 16 with a 
guardian’s permission or 17 without a guardian’s permission; the legal age for females is 
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14 with a guardian’s permission or 15 without permission. The conditions for annulment 
and divorce apply equally for men and women, with annulment approved under certain 
conditions, usually relating to mental status, and divorce being prohibited. Although the 
religious courts consider fathers as the legal guardians of children, the mothers are the 
primary caregivers. This egalitarian view towards custody is likely a result of the 
prohibition against divorce in the Catholic church. Meaning that though the law sounds 
egalitarian, it rarely is implemented, although the church does grant separation under 
certain circumstances.  
 In regards to Greek Orthodox marriage, the male must be of 17 years of age in 
order to marry and a female must be 15 years of age. If either the male or female is 
deemed physically and mentally mature at below these set ages of marriages, they may 
receive permission to marry.  Both the man and woman may ask for an annulment or 
divorce. Conditions for the annulment are the same for men and women, but in the case 
of divorce, men and women must provide different evidence. Additionally, men may 
marry immediately after a divorce but a woman must wait until four months past the 
divorce before she may marry again. In the case of a divorce, men are the default 
guardians of the children unless the court finds reason to give custody to the mother. In 
such a case, the mother would have custody of the children until the boy was 14 years of 
age and the girl was 15 years of age. 
Sunni Personal Status Law: 
 According to Sunni religious law, males may not marry under the age of 18 unless 
they are determined to be of maturity, and males may not have a marriage arranged for 
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them if they are under the age of 17. Females may not marry unless they are 17 years old, 
but may have permission to marry from religious courts if they have reached maturity, 
and may not have a marriage arranged for them if they are under the age of nine. Whereas 
a man may marry a Jewish or Christian woman, a woman may only marry a Muslim man. 
Only the man may initiate a divorce, unless the man has entered a second marriage and 
the woman stipulated the right to divorce in conditions prior to the second marriage. A 
man may also take up to four wives. There are further conditions regarding divorce in 
Sunni religious law, including that the woman forfeits her belated dowry and alimony if 
she asks for a divorce, unless conditions stating otherwise were previously established. In 
cases of divorce, women have custody over their male children until they are seven and 
their female? children until they are nine, when the father may then enact his legal rights 
as guardian of his children unless the court rules otherwise.  
 
Shi’a and Jaafari Personal Status Laws: 
 Under Shi’a personal status laws, there is no required minimum age for marriage 
for either a male or a female, only that both must have reached maturity. Females, 
however, do need the permission of their father or grandfather to marry unless certain 
stipulations apply, and the legal age of consummation for females still remains after the 
age of nine. Men are able to take up to four wives at one time. Women technically need 
the permission of men to leave the house, and going against this technically serves as the 
grounds for divorce. Men and women may obtain an annulment under similar 
circumstances, yet women may only ask for divorce in exchange for her abdication of her 
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legal rights. In cases of divorce, the mother maintain custody of their male children until 
the age of two and their female children until the age of seven, at which time the father 
takes over custody. The mother may lose custody of the children if she is a non-Muslim 
woman or if she re-marries.  
 
Druze Personal Status Law: 
 Under Druze personal status law, Druze males are able to marry at the age of 18; 
if they are between the ages of 16-18, they may receive special permission to marry from 
the religious court. Druze females are able to marry at the age of 17, and may receive 
special permission to marry if they are between the ages of 15-17 if they are able to 
provide medical proof of their maturity. Though females do not need consent of a man to 
marry, the religious court notifies the males of the family of a female’s intent to marry; if 
the males do not provide valid reasons for why the marriage should not take place within 
15 days, the female is permitted to marry. If the female is over the age of 21, the males in 
her family do not need to be notified. Druze men notably may only take one wife, rather 
than the four wives permitted for other Islamic sects. Both men and women must request 
permission for divorce from the presiding sheikh, but women must wait four months to 
re-marry, unless her former husband passes away.  
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Personal Status Laws Conclusion: 
In addition to the legal discrimination against women, women are all discriminated 
against within each confessional group’s religious laws. Though these laws are enacted 
among each religious faith as well as within each sectarian group, there exists a 
consistent line of inequality between Lebanese men and women. Younger marriage ages 
for women than men, the prohibition or difficulties in women obtaining divorce, and 
child custody rights favoring men over women make life increasingly difficult for women 
trapped in violent situations. Women are legally disenfranchised, and additionally 
struggle to see a way out of violent situations due to financial restraints. Civil laws may 
not fully protect women against instances of violence and abuse, but they offer a degree 
of recourse that is currently still constricted for Lebanese women. KAFA drafted Bill 293 
for this very purpose, to provide a means of protection, outside of their religious 
community, to women and children suffering from all forms of domestic violence. 
Though this bill passed after many revisions through amendments, this bill turned newly 
implemented law was an integral part of many of KAFA’s campaigns engaging the state 
apparatus.  
 Civil and religious personal status laws are quite important in understanding the 
reality for Lebanese women fighting against gender-based violence. Through describing 
these laws, I established context surrounding KAFA’s campaigns and shed light on 
KAFA’s specific strategies for engaging women. Additionally, this background 
information is necessary for understanding Lebanese women and men’s reactions to 
KAFA’s campaigns. They are fundamental to understanding the source of gender-based 
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violence, the difficulties in remedying gender-based violence, and providing background 
on the socialization of Lebanese men and women regarding institutionalized inequality.  
 
The Name and Shame Campaign:  
 
Public and mediated reaction 
 Leading up to KAFA’s Name and Shame Campaign, the religious community 
subjected Law 293 to intense backlash over its supposed interference with religious law. 
Both Sunni and Shi’a Islamic Clerics explicitly opposed the Law because it “violated the 
provisions of Islam” and risks, “disintegrating Muslim families in Lebanon and 
preventing children from being raised according to Islam, in addition to causing a conflict 
of competences between the concerned civil and Islamic courts.”49 The Islamic statement 
became a rallying cry for Muslim men in particular throughout Lebanon. In addition to 
these strong statements, the clerics also denounced the criminalization of marital rape, 
saying this concept does not exist in Islam, as well as raised questions regarding the issue 
of domestic violence itself. This backlash resulted in the removal of the article advocating 
for the criminalization of marital rape in Law 293. Hardly novel to Lebanese politics, 
religious leader involvement and the delicate balance of power between secular and 
religious courts prevented the implementation of stronger laws protecting women and 
families from domestic violence.  
                                                
49Aziz, “Islamic Clerics Oppose Lebanese Law Protecting Abused Women - Al-Monitor.” 
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 The Name and Shame Campaign directly addressed the proposed amendment 
changes to draft law 293. KAFA and its supporters immediately recognized the dangers 
in amending the bill because it drastically reduced the amount of protection provided to a 
woman experiencing violence. The original bill also contained several needed articles 
providing protections that are not present in religious law. The Name and Shame 
Campaign came amidst a flurry of other activity, as the co-founder of KAFA noted after 
the passing of the bill with the problematic amendments, “We lobbied, we made a huge 
fuss around it, we staged a name-and-shame campaign.”50 Despite what some might 
consider a failure of the campaign, as it did not bring about the intended results, the 
campaign itself did incite reaction both from the 8MP’s who were part of the sub-
committee as well as contributed to intensified public reaction and protests.  
 The Name and Shame posters and commercials resulted in direct interference 
from the offices of several of the MP’s on the sub-committee for draft law 293. As 
previously described, KAFA placed a short video stating the names and pictures of all 
eight MP’s on Youtube, as well as ran the same video as a commercial on TV. KAFA 
also utilized the pictures and names from the video and created a banner and posters that 
they placed around the city, most notably on the back and inside of public busses. In my 
interview with Maya Ammar, she discussed how the banners were ripped from several 
busses by one or more of the MP’s staff members. She also affirmed that KAFA’s 
commercials were taken off air on several television stations after pressure from one or 
more MP’s, although no names were given, a story that the Al-Akhbar journalist Layal 
                                                
50 Bramley, “Why Does Lebanese Bill on Domestic Violence Fail to Tackle Marital Rape?” 
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Haddad corroborated when she noted, “several members of parliament pressured 
television channels to refrain from running an advertisement promoting the law 
sponsored by KAFA (“enough” in Arabic).[…] Some media sources suggested that MP 
Samir Jisr, who belongs to the Future movement, asked the channel’s management to 
stop broadcasting the advertisement.”51 Although Jisr denied these allegations, both the 
damaged posters and banners on the busses as well as the removal of KAFA’s 
commercial point to interference with the campaign.  
 
Social Media Reaction 
 KAFA put their Name and Shame Campaign video on YouTube on November 23, 
2011. The video was viewed 5,139 times and received 20 “likes” and one “dislike.” 
Unfortunately, there were no comments on the video, whereas the YouTube video did not 
receive any comments, KAFA’s creation of a poster from the names and pictures in the 
YouTube video made three appearances in Facebook photos, all receiving varying 
amounts of attention.  
The first photo appeared on Facebook on November 24, 2011. Though 
unfortunately there is not a “dislike” button, the photo received 56 likes, 25 comments, 
and 35 shares. KAFA contributed four of these comments. The other comments were 
broken down into five positive male comments by four male commentators, five positive 
female comments, and five negative male comments by three male commentators.  
                                                
51 {Citation}Haddad, “Fighting Domestic Violence in Lebanon.” 
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The second photo appeared on Facebook on December 8, 2011. This photo 
showed the eight MPs with their names on a banner appearing on the back of a bus. 
Significant to the picture and its responses, KAFA noted, “We know that 2 posters 
appearing on buses and showing the pictures of the 8 MPs discussing the #protectwomen 
law were torn. And 6 buses were forbidden to circulate unless they removed the 
poster…We had hoped for a more tolerant response that at least would not prevent the 
message from reaching certain regions!!”52 This photo received 28 likes, six comments, 
and two shares. Women made all four of the comments and all were positive in support 
of KAFA, but negative in reaction to the picture and KAFA’s commentary.  
 The last photo appeared on Facebook on July 16, 2012. It is the exact same 
picture that appeared on Facebook on November 24, 2011. This picture received less 
commentary than the first appearance of the photo, but it still received 16 likes, seven 
comments, and 24 shares. Of these comments, there were two positive female comments, 
one negative male comment, one unclear male comment, and two male and one female 
comments appearing to joke about the MPs, though it was in a manner critical of their 
behavior.  
  
 
 
                                                
52 “KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation’s... - KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation | Facebook.” 
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16 Days of Activism: The White Ribbon Campaign and the Internal Security Forces 
Campaign: 
 
Public and Mediated Response 
  Every year since 2010, KAFA has participated in the 16 Days of Activism, with 
many of their campaigns launched during this period aimed at Lebanese men or 
traditionally masculine Lebanese groups. In 2012, KAFA targeted three University 
campuses where they conducted workshops and group activities designed to encourage 
men to pledge their support to stand against domestic violence. The year 2012 was 
important for KAFA with its proposed law against domestic and family violence in the 
process of Parliamentary approval. One of the foci of the campaign that year was to 
collect signatures on a petition supporting the proposed law. On the Haigazian University 
campus, over 100 men and women signed the petition. On the University of Balamand 
campus, over 210 men and women signed the petition. Lastly, on the Lebanese American 
University campus, more than 220 men and women signed the petition, with an 
additional 40 men and women signing the petition later in the day during a two-on-two 
basketball tournament that was part of KAFA’s 16 Days of Activism activities.53  
In addition to the informational sessions KAFA held during the 16 Days of 
Activism in 2012, the group launched campaign ads featuring Badih Abou Chakra. The 
following year, KAFA honored Chakra for these ads while launching its International 
Security Forces Campaign. The ISF Campaign, “We Have a Mission. If you’re 
                                                
53 “The ‘White Ribbon’ Campaign in Universities-Lebanon | Engagingmen.net - A Gender Justice 
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threatened, do not hesitate to call 112,” in particular gained quite a bit of attention. 
During the launch, Lt. Col. Ziad Kayedbey pledged continued dedication to KAFA and 
victims of domestic abuse through the implementation of KAFA’s courses on domestic 
violence, as well as the IDF police wearing white ribbons to show their support.54 This 
campaign produced several interesting results: as of 2013 at the campaign’s launch, 175 
ISF policemen had been trained using KAFA’s curriculum, and according to KAFA’s 
President Zoya Rouhana, that number has increased to 300 trained ISF personnel as of 
March 8, 2015.55 Additionally, KAFA implied through its use of a female ISF 
policewoman in one of its posters for the campaign that the use of female ISF members is 
important and necessary for combatting domestic violence. With the first induction of a 
women ISF member in 2001, and the ISF acceptance of 610 female applicants in 2012, 
Lebanese people are beginning to see the important connection between female ISF 
members and KAFA’s campaigns against domestic violence.56  A blog coming out of 
American University of Beirut that discusses gender issues in Lebanon and the wider 
Middle East notes:  
The female sergeants who are trained to address domestic violence 
represents a sympathizing authority figure of the same gender changing 
the former idea of the ISF as being oblivious and callous towards domestic 
violence. As a matter of fact, KAFA in collaboration with General 
Doctorate of the ISF launched a campaign on the 25th of November 2013 
– International Day to End Violence against Women – titled: “We have a 
mission. If you’re threatened, do not hesitate to call 112” (KAFA, n.p). 
The campaign is part of a program between the ISF and KAFA in order to 
reestablish the trust between the female victims and the ISF who now 
                                                
54 Taylor, “Women Rights Campaign Tackles Gender Roles | News , Lebanon News | THE DAILY 
STAR.” 
55Urabi, “Tackling the Scourge of Domestic Violence in Lebanon.” 
56 Staff, “Meet the First Woman to Join the Lebanese Security Forces.” 
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know how to respond to cases of gender based violence and take the 
necessary precautions to provide protection for the victim. […] Therefore, 
the female integration within the ISF has permitted the ISF to interfere 
within the family and divulge domestic issues as crimes.57 
 
The growing number of ISF members trained by KAFA and the possibility for further 
integration of female ISF personnel into KAFA’s campaign plan illustrate the already 
noticeable growth of the campaign and a future of possibilities.  
  
Social Media Response  
KAFA’s video that they released on November 27, 2012 on YouTube featuring 
Badih Abou Chakra challenges dominant conceptions of masculinity that portray males 
as violent, aggressive, rich, and strong. This video received 1,740 views, 18 likes, and six 
dislikes. There were only two comments on the video, one coming from a male that 
himself challenged the conception of masculinity portrayed in the video and another 
coming from a female KAFA employee.  
 KAFA also released a video on YouTube for their ISF Campaign titled “We Have 
a Mission…” This film was put on YouTube on November 26, 2013 and received 2,254 
views, 22 likes and one dislike. There was only one comment on this video, but the 
comment was positive from a male viewer.  
 On Facebook, KAFA’s photos again received more response regarding its White 
Ribbon Campaigns than on its YouTube channel. For its general White Ribbon 
Campaign Cover photo posted on November 21, 2012, KAFA received 20 likes and four 
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shares. There were only three comments on the photo, with one coming from KAFA, but 
the two comments coming from one male were positive. Notably, his comments ask, “can 
we have more informaiton about this>?” and, “just want to participate and talk about this 
issue.”58  
 For this same campaign, KAFA posted a photo on November 26, 2012 with two 
ISF members signing up to stand against domestic violence. The photo received 352 
likes, 25 comments, and 183 shares. There were 11 positive comments from female 
respondents, one positive female comment that was confusing, one comment with a 
women tagged, three comments from female users that were positive but criticizing the 
government, two confusing comments from males, and one positive male response and 
one negative male response. This same photo was posted again on November 27, 2012 
with ten likes, no shares and no further comments.  
 KAFA put up its poster with the male ISF member standing in front of a woman 
on November 25, 2013. This poster received 502 likes, 38 comments, and 214 shares. Of 
the comments, six were positive female comments made by five respondents. One 
woman commented twice with one negative and one positive comment, with both 
comments regarding government criticism. There were seven female responses given by 
six responders that were positive, but criticized the government. There were two positive 
male responses that were also government critiques, one male response that was unclear, 
and one negative response by a male that was also a government critique. KAFA also 
commented 13 times.  
                                                
58 “KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation’s... - KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation | Facebook.” 
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 KAFA’s poster with the female ISF member standing in front of another woman 
was put up following the male ISF poster on November 27, 2013. This poster received 
994 likes, 36 comments, and 271 Shares. The comments on the poster consisted of one 
comment made by KAFA, 17 female positive comments, two comments made by females 
but were unclear, one positive male comment, four positive comments made by females 
that were also critiquing the government, and two comments made by males that were 
also critiquing the government. When the poster was posted again on December 17, 2013, 
it received 161 likes, three comments, and 35 shares. A female responder made one 
positive comment with the other positive comment coming from a male Facebook user.  
 
ENGAGING THE PUBLIC-ROULA YAACOUB AND MANAL ASSI 
 
Roula Yaacoub and Manal Assi never met each other while they were alive. Leading 
seemingly different lives, their names have only been brought together after each 
woman’s death at the hands of their abusive husbands. Both women were 3359 years old 
at the time of their deaths, both women had all daughters, both women were beaten to 
death by their husbands, and the occurrences surrounding both Roula and Manal’s deaths 
were marked with failure to act by either the state or the public. Roula Yaacoub died on 
July 7, 2013 from undetermined circumstances at the time. To date, Roula’s former 
husband, Karam Bazzi, has been cleared of all involvement in the death of his now-
deceased wife. Yet the circumstances of Roula’s death are anything but clear, and both 
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 103 
KAFA and Roula’s family continued to demand answers even after the court found Bazzi 
not responsible for the death.60 Final coroner reports stated that Roula died from a brain 
aneurism, yet Roula’s family is convinced that her husband’s abuse triggered the 
aneurism. Two months after her death, Roula’s body was finally exhumed for the 
ongoing investigation at that time. The mother had requested the autopsy immediately 
after Roula’s death, but her plea went unanswered. According to the mother and 
neighbors, Roula’s husband regularly beat his wife and five daughters. Though the 
neighbors claimed to have tried to intervene in the abuse on the night of Roula’s death, 
the husband supposedly refused until he asked for help when his wife became 
comatose.61 Roula’s mother and family speculate that certain measures were taken to 
cover up her death, including a forged doctor’s report in addition to the refused autopsy.62 
With the dismissal of charges against Bazzi, Roula’s family is left with little closure and 
fewer answers.  
  On February 4, 2014, Mohammad Nhaily bludgeoned his wife, Manal Assi, to 
death with a pressure cooker. Similar to numerous other instances of domestic abuse in 
Lebanon, the details of Manal’s death are not quite clear. Some neighbors claimed that 
their marriage was a generally happy one until that deadly night, the culmination of 
smaller fights over Nhaily’s new marriage to his second wife. Yet Manal’s two 
daughters, ages 15 and 13, tell a different story. The oldest daughter recounted in an 
interview with The Daily Star newspaper only days after the murder of her mother how 
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the abuse had been ongoing since she was three years old. She affirmed to the newspaper 
that Manal had been beaten this severely before, including having her nose broken.  
On the night of her death, Manal’s husband beat her unconscious, and then 
continued to beat her as she lay bleeding and helpless on the floor. At some point during 
his violent attack upon his wife, Nhaily decided to call Manal’s mother to come to her 
daughter as she lay dying. Though accounts vary, this story only grows more horrific as 
Nhaily locked Manal’s mother and sister in the room with Manal for two hours. He 
refused to let them out for medical help, and blocked neighbors from entering into his 
house with a gun. Some neighbor’s accounts state that they called the ISF during the 
deadly fight, but that the ISF refused to interfere in what they deemed a private matter.63 
Finally, neighbors and relatives of Manal living nearby broke into the house to get to 
Assi, while Nhaily gathered the rest of his family and fled.64 Manal later died at the 
hospital after Nhaily tortured her for hours.  
 
 
Engaging the Public Campaigns: 
 
Current estimates in Lebanon place the death toll of women murdered from 
domestic violence at an average of one death per month.65 This tentative number does not 
take into account the vastly greater number of women affected by physical, 
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64 Ibid. 
65 Qiblawi, “Women Decry Lebanon’s Domestic Violence Law - Al Jazeera English.” 
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psychological, or sexual abuse in the country. These women’s deaths have increasingly 
prompted the Lebanese public to bring to light the details and circumstances surrounding 
the horrible abuses taking place. The deaths like the two women above, Manal and Roula, 
inspired mass public reaction, including marches, protests, and various performances. 
These actions highlight the immediate need for more protections for women.  
Though further protections for women, by way of judiciary intervention, are 
absolutely necessary, KAFA also emphasizes the need for preventative measures. 
Following the death of Roqaya Mounzer, the news website quoted Maya el- Ammar 
saying, “We don’t need any more proof that women are the main victims of domestic 
violence, but we wait until women die to act about it.”66 Although the need for 
preventative measures in Lebanon is not new, recently KAFA has developed several 
interactive campaigns designed to elicit user responses, including both potential victims 
and potential witnesses of domestic violence. One of the campaigns, “A Very Disturbing 
Taxi Ride” was widely noted for its unique, yet quite shocking, approach to a social 
justice advertisement. The other campaign, Zalfa, utilizes an avatar to educate her 
viewers while allowing for further questions and viewer feedback.  
 
“Driving Change…A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride”: 
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Public and Mediated Response 
The public response to this campaign was overwhelmingly positive. Although it 
did not result in protests, the advertisement was widely cited in various blogs, news 
websites, and advertisement databases. Out of 105 possible Google search hits on the 
main search engine and the news search engine, KAFA’s taxi ride campaign was 
mentioned 20 times. The majority of these mentions were on various advertisement 
databases with 12 mentions. These databases predominantly were locations for people to 
connect and share interesting advertisement ideas. Though many of these databases only 
described the campaign, several praised the campaign for its unique approach to social 
justice advertising. Six different blogs mentioned the KAFA Taxi Ride, including a blog 
by the Lebanese Human Rights Center. Additionally, three news websites, albawaba, The 
Daily Star Lebanon, and the Huffington Post wrote stories about the advertisement 
campaign. Though none of the three news websites gave an opinion on the advertisement, 
the Huffington Post article provided contacts for information for help with domestic 
abuse situations.   
 
 
 
Social Media Response 
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 The Social Media 
Response to “A Very 
Disturbing Taxi Ride” 
received predominantly 
positive responses on 
Facebook and YouTube. 
The YouTube video 
posted on March 16, 
2014 reached 6, 987 
views, and received 23 
likes and one dislike. 
Four users responded to 
the video, with two of the 
viewers sharing the 
advertisement on Google+ as well as positively commenting on the video, one viewer 
only sharing the video on Google+, and one viewer only giving a positive comment. Of 
these responders, two were males and two were marketing or consulting groups. On 
Facebook, a link to The Daily Star Lebanon’s article on the taxi ride posted on May 19, 
2014 had 157 likes, and 35 shares. Though Facebook states that it received five 
comments, there are 8 comments visible on the post. The comments on this post are 
extremely interesting, with one person in particular raising questions as to the integrity 
Figure: 3.1 
 
 108 
and authority of the KAFA organization (See Figure 3.1).67 Though these comments will 
be addressed in the following chapter, it is necessary to point out that the negative 
comments were directed at the KAFA organization, but appeared to be in fervent support 
of women standing up against domestic violence. Overall, the link received two male 
comments critiquing KAFA, two positive female comments, two positive male 
comments, two neither negative nor positive comments that asks for more information 
from a male, and two comments from KAFA.  
 KAFA posted links to the taxi ride campaign on three other occasions. On May 
15, 2014, the post received 122 likes, 54 shares and three comments. All three comments 
were positive from female responders. On May 13, 2015, the taxi ride post received 242 
likes, 169 shares, and three comments. One male made a positive comment, three female 
tagged other Facebook users, and three female made a positive comment. The last time 
the video was posted was on August 7, 2014. This post received 108 likes, six comments, 
and 43 shares. Of the comments, four were positive comments from females and one was 
a negative comment from a female. 
 
Zalfa: 
 Leading up to KAFA’s 16 Days of Activism in 2014, the organization released 
several sneak peaks of Zalfa, growing anticipation for its new campaign. On November 
25, KAFA finally posted Zalfa’s introductory picture, simultaneously débuting Zalfa on 
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Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LCBI) during the station’s news 
bulletin.  
In my interview with Maya Ammar, she noted that the KAFA organization is still 
small, unable to even find a place for all of their possible volunteers yet receiving a 
growing amount of calls for help to their organization. In light of the growing demand for 
help among Lebanese women, KAFA created the Zalfa avatar, which she discussed with 
Al Monitor, a news website, saying, “Women are often scared to file a claim, but 
speaking up early limits the risks, […] We hope that this approach will give them tools to 
pull through. Since January, 1,050 women have been supported by KAFA, which is much 
more than usual. We are overburdened, this is too much for a small center like ours.”68 
Again encouraging the active engagement of the public, Zalfa provides tools for both the 
victims of domestic violence and the witnesses to these abuses to begin the process of 
stopping the violence. In addition to giving answers and legal advice to many common 
questions in situations of abuse, the campaign also encourages women to ask further 
questions through a messaging system at the end of Zalfa’s discussions.  
 
Public and Media Response 
 Zalfa’s software literally allows for the avatar to speak for herself, something she 
has done in a variety of media. Perhaps most notably, LBCI introduced Zalfa on 
November 25, 2014 and featured Zalfa during its news bulletin between November 26 
2014-December 10, 2014 (See Table: 3.1). LCBI posted all of these clips on their 
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website, garnering further attention for the domestic violence. This paper will utilize a 
chart to illustrate the days Zalfa appeared on LCBI, the episode number, and the number 
of views the clip received on LCBI’s website: 
 
 
Table: 3.1 Zalfa Appearances on LCBI 
11/26 11/27 11/28 11/29 11/30 12/1 12/2 12/3 12/4 12/5 12/6 12/7 12/8 12/9 12/10 
Ep. 1 Ep. 2 Ep. 3 Ep. 4 Ep. 5 Ep. 6 Ep. 7 Ep. 8 Ep. 9 Ep. 
10 
Ep. 
11 
Ep. 
12 
Ep. 
13 
Ep. 
14 
Ep. 
15 
528 
Views  
379 
Views 
297 
Views 
362 
Views 
344 
Views 
408 
Views 
309 
Views 
275 
Views 
415 
Views 
325 
Views 
227 
Views 
332 
Views 
310 
Views 
312 
Views 
315 
Views 
 
In addition, to date (3/20/15), Zalfa has received mentions or articles from 9 
major Arab news websites, it has been featured on the Women Economic Empowerment 
Portal and the popular Lebanese blog BlogBaladi and the Lebanese Center for Human 
Rights blog, as well as on the previously mentioned Al Monitor news website.  
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Social Media Response 
 KAFA has also featured Zalfa on its YouTube account and Facebook group. In 
the following Table: 3.2 are the dates KAFA posted each episode on YouTube, the 
episode number, and the number of views per each episode:  
Table: 3.2: Zalfa Episodes on YouTube 
12/5 Episode 1 187 Views 
12/5 Episode 2 12 Views 
12/5 Episode 3 9 Views 
12/5 Episode 4 12 Views 
12/5 Episode 5 6 Views 
12/5 Episode 6 16 Views 
12/5 Episode 7 9 Views 
12/5 Episode 8 15 Views 
12/5 Episode 9 6 Views 
12/5 Episode 10 9 Views 
12/5 Episode 11 26 Views 
12/11 Episode 12 16 Views 
12/11 Episode 13 11 Views 
12/11 Episode 14 20 Views 
12/11 Episode 15 16 Views 
 
 
 
From the very first sneak peaks of Zalfa up until the present date (3/20/15) KAFA has 
posted 22 photos of Zalfa to its Facebook page. First, the information regarding these 
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photos will be broken down in Table: 3.3 into the categories of each photo’s date of 
posting, the number of likes, the number of comments, and the number of shares. After 
this information, more detailed information will be given regarding two of these Zalfa 
photos.  
Table: 3.3: Zalfa Photographs on KAFA’s Facebook 
Photo # Date Likes Comments Shares 
Photo 1  11/20/14 388 23 3 
Photo 2 11/24/14 430 16 3 
Photo 3 11/24/14 718 35 136 
Photo 4 11/24/14 147 8 2 
Photo 5 11/24/14 153 - 29 
Photo 6 11/25/14 751 20 88 
Photo 7 11/27/14 104 2 4 
Photo 8 11/28/14 186 6 31 
Photo 9 12/1/14 375 8 107 
Photo 10 12/2/14 127 7 6 
Photo 11 12/3/14 14  1 - 
Photo 12 12/4/14 104 5 7 
Photo 13 12/5/14 210 6 19 
Photo 14 12/5/14 1245 16 89 
Photo 15 12/8/14 101 - 1 
Photo 16 12/9/14 93 - 12 
Photo 17 12/10/14 129 1 12 
Photo 18 12/11/14 122 - 4 
Photo 19 12/12/14 121 - 13 
Photo 20 12/14/14 147 - 12 
Photo 21 12/29/14 4144 36 44 
Photo 22 1/2/15 343 2 2 
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 For the purposes of this thesis, the following information will differentiate the 
gender of authors, and positive or negative reaction of the posts for Photos 3 and 6. These 
two photos were chosen because the Photo 3 is the first appearance of the figure Zalfa 
during her reveal, and Photo 6 is Zalfa introducing herself. As noted, Photo 3 received 
718 likes, 35 comments, and 136 shares. Among these comments, 18 were from female 
respondents with positive feedback, one comment from a female with a positive response 
but critiquing gender-violence, one comment was indecipherable from a female, three 
responses were positive male comments, one comment was from a male user with a 
negative response, and KAFA made three comments. In Photo 6, there were 751 likes, 20 
comments, and 88 shares. Nine of these comments were positive responses from female 
users, three of the comments were indecipherable comments from female responders, two 
of the comments were positive from male respondents, and three male respondents made 
five negative comments.  
 
ENGAGING THE KAFALA SYSTEM-BARCOTAN DUPREE 
 
On November 10, 2014, Barcotan Dupree leapt from her employer’s building, shocking 
the people of Lebanon and demanding further conversation on the Kafala system. An 
onlooker caught the moment of her jump on tape, showing Dupree free falling with arms 
flailing onto the sidewalk. Dupree survived her jump, afterwards receiving care at the 
Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center. This jump that caught the country’s attention came after 
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Dupree’s employer beat her on multiple occasions.69 Dupree had attempted an escape 
prior to her jump, but was forced to return to her employer because she had nowhere else 
to go. Though this moment was particularly shocking because the moment of the 
attempted suicide was caught on tape, Dupree’s jump came amongst a spree of migrant 
domestic workers’ attempted suicides or murders. Unfortunately, the jump became more 
of a spectacle than a demand for immediate policy change in Lebanon.  
 
Engaging the Kafala System Campaigns: 
KAFA’s launched its most recent campaign “Raise Shawwa’s Voice” on February 
9, 2015 as part of its ongoing effort to battle systematic racism in Lebanon and to gain 
rights for Migrant Domestic Workers. This campaign, the newest of the campaigns 
discussed in this thesis, has yet to gain the same mediated traction as KAFA’s other 
campaigns. Yet the events surrounding Raise Shawwa’s Voice are notable for 
exemplifying the spectacle of Dupree’s attempted suicide. The Raise Shawwa’s Voice 
campaign will be discussed below, but I felt that two events, one taking place on March 
16, 2015 and one taking place on March 19, 2015, were integral to the unfolding of 
Shawwa’s campaign and demand attention in this thesis. On March 16, 2015, a domestic 
worker agency sent out an SMS message to several thousand cellphones on Mother’s 
Day; the message advertised a special for Kenyan and Ethiopian nationalities of 
housekeepers. On March 19, 2015 a Bengali migrant domestic worker, Melika Begum, 
was found hanging by her employers. Her suicide followed three days of a hunger strike. 
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The following information will detail the responses on news websites, blogs, and social 
media sites that discuss all three events.  
 
Media and Public Response 
 The campaign Raise Shawwa’s Voice has garnered little media recognition to 
date (3/20/15). Beirut News Network, however, featured the campaign in its discussion of 
the migrant domestic workers’ proposal for a syndicate to protect their rights. This was 
proposed on January 5, 2015, and denied by the Lebanese Labor Ministry on January 27. 
New laws have been proposed and submitted to the Cabinet, awaiting Parliamentary 
approval.70 The connection made between KAFA’s campaign and the organizing of 
migrant domestic workers illustrates the campaign’s ability to take the voice of Shawwa 
and use it to spread the story of the other 200,000 migrant domestic workers in Lebanon. 
Republiqué, an advertising agency, currently features the campaign on their website, 
though it is unclear if the agency itself helped to create the campaign.71 
 
Social Media Response 
KAFA put up Shawwa’s photo twice on Facebook, as well as posting the video 
once. The first photo from February 9, 2015 received 175 likes, 13 shares and 17 
comments. These comments in particular are difficult to categorize because there is an 
indication that several have been erased, and almost all comments enter into a debate 
regarding a case where a migrant domestic worker was accused of being responsible for 
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the death of a child. The second photo was posted on February 18, 2015 and received 289 
likes, 29 comments, and 25 shares. These comments included subcomments, which lead 
to total of 77 documented comments. Of these comments, 46 were negative comments 
made by ten females, 25 positive comments were made by nine females, five positive 
comments were made by males, and one negative comment was made by a male. KAFA 
made two comments, two comments by females were not relevant to the post and one 
female tagged another person. The video was posted on February 6 and received 18,584 
views, 330 likes, 37 comments, and 151 shares. Of these comments, six females made 
positive comments, two females made negative comments, two females made three 
negative comments, and one male gave a negative comment.  
The feedback on Facebook prompted KAFA to issue a response via their website. 
The organization’s response exudes an air of disappointment, noting the 
misunderstanding of human rights principles and the evident racism in the comments. 
KAFA outlines its commentary in four points: 1. Stating the campaign’s goal to be a 
serious inquiry into the number of migrant domestic worker suicides, 2. Questioning the 
commentators directing anger toward individual migrant domestic workers instead of the 
larger Kafala system, 3. Challenging the validity of stories regarding individual migrant 
workers committing crimes that the commentators brought up as an excuse to not give 
these workers human rights, 4. Addressing those who reprimanded KAFA for prioritizing 
migrant domestic worker abuses. KAFA utilizes all four points to challenge accepted 
Lebanese knowledge regarding migrant domestic workers while prompting those 
responding negatively to the campaign to examine inner biases.  
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Little more than a month after KAFA launched its Raise Shawwa’s Voice 
campaign, a short SMS message sent a reminder to the people of Lebanon as to why 
conversations regarding migrant domestic workers rights remain imperative. This 
message of an agency offering a discount on domestic workers depending on their 
nationality went out to several thousand people on Lebanese Mother’s Day. Outrage 
erupted in the country as the SMS message went viral, including a feature on KAFA’s 
Facebook website. 
As the SMS message spread across Lebanon, four news websites discussed the 
SMS message, while I was able to find six blog posts written about the message. All ten 
various websites condemned the message. Several of these sources also noted that the 
Lebanese Labor Minister, Sejaan Azi, stated that the Ministry was searching for the 
agency and that it would be shut down if found. He called the message, “an insult to 
human rights and dignity.”72 The widespread outrage apparently prompted the agency to 
send out an apology message.73  
Many of KAFA’s Facebook viewers stated that the apology was not enough and 
demanded that the agency be shut down, corresponding with the majority of viewers’ 
condemning attitude to KAFA’s Facebook post asking its viewers whether or not this 
SMS was normal. This post, with the photo of the original SMS message, received 383 
likes, 183 comments, and 462 shares. Of these comments, 24 females commented 
positively, zero females commented negatively, five males commented positively with 
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seven comments, two men commented negatively, two men made jokes on the post, three 
males made five posts tagging others on the photo, and one female made a comment 
tagging others on the photo.  
Four days following the widespread Lebanese anger after the migrant worker 
agency sent out its SMS message, another migrant domestic worker tragically committed 
suicide. Her name was Melika Begum, and though the details surrounding the suicide are 
still unclear, currently what is known is that she was from Bangladesh and she was on a 
food strike for three days leading up to her suicide. Melika wanted to go home and see 
her children, a request that was denied her. She committed suicide in the city of Tripoli in 
the home of her employers, a husband and wife with six children.74 Few news websites or 
blogs have given this story attention, with LBCI being the primary source regarding the 
suicide. LBCI’s interview and story appear to have been picked up by approximately 
three other Arabic- speaking news websites in the three days following the suicide. One 
blogger, My Beirut Chronicles, wrote a scathing review of both the events surrounding 
the suicide and the lack of discussion following Melika’s death. The Annahar news 
website also wrote a piece on the suicide on March 19, 2014, which KAFA put up on its 
Facebook group page.  
The following analysis will discuss this news article from Annahar’s website in an 
attempt to place the previous conversation on reactions to migrant domestic worker 
abuses in Lebanon in context. KAFA posted the article on March 21, 2015 and the post 
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received 188 likes, 53 comments and 25 shares within a little more than 24 hours time. 
The majority of the comments indicate that the responders viewed the article as blaming 
the family for the worker’s suicide. Though several of the comments were apologetic in 
nature regarding both sides of the Kafala system, many of the comments simultaneously 
condemned any blame placed on the family while also responding negatively to the 
situation as a whole. Of these comments, 35 females responded negatively in 46 
comments, five females made confusing comments with two of these females 
commenting on another issue off the topic, three females tagged other people, with one of 
those tagged responding with a joke, seven males responded positively in 11 comments, 
and three males responded negatively in six comments.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Though it is possible to analyze KAFA’s campaigns engaging the state apparatus, the 
public, and the Kafala system in an isolationist manner, this chapter attempted to embed 
KAFA’s engagement in real world situations. Utilizing particular characteristics from the 
stories of Roqaya Mounzer, Roula Yaacoub, Manal Assi, Barcotan Dupree, and Melika 
Begum, I constructed this chapter to show the urgency in KAFA’s message. The 
campaigns are designed to be relevant to the viewer, bringing to light deep biases and 
unchallenged thought processes that have real world consequences. Matching these 
stories with KAFA’s various campaign strategies, I attempted to illustrate the discernable 
outcomes of several of KAFA’s campaign platforms. Utilizing news websites, blogs, and 
Facebook and YouTube viewer responses when available, I created a system of analysis 
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that yields a degree of explanatory feedback. Several of the campaigns, primarily those 
engaging the state structure, resulted in real world results and mobilization of bodies. 
Other campaigns primarily incited technologically based feedback, but this type of 
feedback does not preclude mobilization. Though this chapter discusses each campaign 
strategy separately in their own context, it provides results for analysis and cross-
campaign analysis in the following section.  
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Chapter 4: Reactions Across Campaigns: The Good, The Bad, and The 
Ugly 
 
The complications with Lebanese identity most certainly are a factor in women’s rights 
groups, including the KAFA organization. In order to mobilize, KAFA requires collective 
rather than individual strategies for involvement. This would require women to set aside 
political, religious, and socio-economic identifiers in order to prioritize gender identity 
within the group. KAFA in fact describes the organization in such terms, “[KAFA] is a 
feminist, secular, Lebanese, non-profit, non-governmental civil society organization.” 
Though this idea is phenomenal in theory, similar to Frasier’s idea of the counter public, 
it is difficult to integrate into the reality of Lebanese society. On the most basic level, 
women are expected to be loyal to their family, and then to their community. This 
community is often their religious sect, which is also part of a larger countrywide 
confessional group. Because of the current kin-based community structures in Lebanon, 
women are forced to be loyal not only to this group structure, but also to rely on it for 
support. The Lebanese Civil War further engrained these confessional lines into the 
fabric of Lebanon’s society, creating distance between women of different sectarian 
groups. 
Before discussing the implications of identity divisions between KAFA’s 
supporters and how these might affect KAFA’s future goals in the Conclusion of this 
thesis, Chapter 3 will illustrate how identity divisions unfold in the form of responses to 
KAFA’s Campaigns. This chapter will put the previous chapter’s campaign results in 
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conversation with each other, particularly focusing on the ratios of positive to negative 
female and male comments across campaigns. Once this information is established, I will 
place the results in a Lebanese societal context to analyze the reasons for the results. 
Though this information is certainly not definitively conclusive, it offers an interesting 
perspective into documented Lebanese public opinion in a partially public, partially 
private social media space. 
The following chapter utilizes public responses to KAFA’s campaigns, showing 
women’s rights groups’ difficulties in developing a unified identity or platform. The 
construction of Modern Lebanon through its confessional-based system continues to 
dictate many aspects of Lebanese society, in seen and unseen ways. The further 
stratification of society following the Lebanese Civil War intensified the already 
prevalent kin-based community structure that predominates the Middle East. As a result, 
women find their primary identities to belong to a communal system, one that is ever-
changing depending on locality and relation to the other at a given time. This communal 
system is itself funneled through notions of patriarchy. Because the state often hands over 
personal status laws to the varying communities, women are deprived of certain rights 
that go against the communities’ religious norms or sets of beliefs. Without the women’s 
ability to seek recourse outside of communal boundaries, they are forced to rely on 
familial or community members for assistance. Additionally, the state’s reliance on the 
sub-national communities shows the close relation between the two structures, both 
structures trying to maintain mutually beneficial relations. A further breakdown in 
protection for women occurs along similar lines when groups that represent women are 
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doing so at the behest of the state and along political lines. Oftentimes these groups only 
reinforce the current patriarchal structure and primarily appeal to upper class and elite 
groups of women. All of these structures rely upon what Suad Joseph calls 
“Patron/client” relationships that privilege males due to their pool of resources that result 
from existing as heads of family and heads of the political system.75 Women’s needs are 
disregarded when they complicate religious-political relations between groups. Without 
safeguards from the state, women must create their own protective structures through 
women’s rights organizational efforts.  
 Historically in Lebanon, women have forfeited their progress in women’s rights 
when there is an existential threat to their communities’ nationalist or primary 
confessional identity; yet at the same time, many Middle Eastern women press for 
women’s rights advocates to utilize the construct of nationalism as an emancipatory tool. 
To use nationalism as an emancipatory framework for Middle Eastern women 
necessitates a breaking free of the traditional conceptions of citizenship wrapped up with 
patriarchy. It would necessarily mean that women could gain equality in political and 
societal spheres. Moreover, this use of nationalism would stand in confrontation to the 
historical predominance of nationalism before women’s rights. In a region that was 
forced into certain nationalist constructs following the end of World War I and the 
destruction of the Ottoman Empire, women coming together under a Lebanese national 
identity allows for unification atypical of Lebanese sectarian society.  
                                                
75 Joseph, “Gender and Citizenship in Middle Eastern States.” pg. 9 
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Yet for the very reasons that nationalism as an emancipatory framework could be 
a powerful front for Lebanese women, it inherently prioritizes Lebanese females rather 
than all females living in Lebanon. A critique that was not noted in the literature review 
or introductory section of this paper, Lebanese female nationalism poses the dangerous 
threat of reproducing, in both evident and passive forms, patriarchy on other women. 
Unfortunately, there is often a hierarchy of patriarchal reproduction, ranging from 
disparities in socioeconomic stature, educational level, and differences in ethnicity. As 
previously noted, this type of patriarchal reproduction is evidenced through the reports of 
migrant domestic worker abuse predominantly committed by the Madame of the 
household. Reproducing the systematic violence that women experience at the hands of 
men, the Madame physically and psychologically abuses the employee. Fermo-Fontan 
gives an excellent example of this when discussing the head of an “influential women’s 
advocacy organization” responding to the author questioning her employment of a young 
Ethiopian girl. 76  The head of the organization insists that the employment of the 12-15 
year old girl actually benefits the girl because her employment is better in contrast to 
other work the girl could be doing in Lebanon. This warped perspective of determining 
who has access to feminism or equality and and how to approach these issues in 
Lebanese society appears to be a prevalent, rather than isolated, problem throughout the 
country. The woman’s indifference to challenging the modern day slave situation as a 
whole and instead rationalizing her comparatively positive use of a system of human 
                                                
76 Firmo-Fonton, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television: A Case Study of Al-Manar TV and the 
Hezbollah Women’s Association.” pg. 172-173 
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trafficking begs the question of whether or not this woman, and others like her, are 
interested in women’s rights for full equality or only to provide themselves with a certain 
amount of comfort. Moreover, this type of comfortable feminism is problematic because 
it is only possible for the elite or the wealthy with access to resources. 
In addition to both Lebanese men and women raising the question of who 
deserves access to equality and women’s rights, I came across many comments in my 
research that asked the organization KAFA why they even undertook the issue of 
domestic worker’s rights. One notable example illustrated this point with clarity (See: 
Figure 4.1). Commenting on KAFA’s most recent campaign, Raise Shawwa’s Voice, this 
male commentator responded:  
 
 Additionally, the issue of collective identity plays an important part in the 
organizing and supporting of women’s rights. C. Kelly and S. Breinlinger note that a 
motivating factor in who participates in group-action is a person’s social identity, 
meaning her or his belonging to a certain group. A social identity may be achieved 
through two different paths, either individual or collective strategies, individual mobility 
or social change.  Individual mobility relies on the success of the individual through each 
                   Figure: 4.1 
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person’s own unique characteristics and capabilities. This type of strategy would result in 
the individual serving as a role model for future generations to emulate. Social change 
strategies on the other hand necessitate a group response in order to bring structural 
change while relying on identification and solidarity with other women. This theory notes 
that the difference between someone choosing the individual verses the group strategy 
depended on the person’s level of identification with a group: “Individuals who identity 
only weakly with their group might be more likely to engage in individual action in 
trying to improve their personal status.”77 This study found that women’s identification 
with other members of their gender was highly important in determining each woman’s 
level of participation in an activist group. Additionally, women who identified in 
particular as having an activist identity, a sense of being and doing in relation to the 
group, were more likely to continue participating in the long run in group activities.78   
 Lebanese history illustrates the inherent boundary divisions resulting from the 
country’s confessional-based political system, ultimately creating additional obstacles of 
identity divisions for women attempting to build a women’s rights movement. Regardless 
of these differences, Lebanese women have their national identity to rely on to create 
cohesion within such a group as KAFA. Yet the previously stated difficulties with 
national identity prompting racism directed at migrants also problematizes a women’s 
rights movements. Despite the problems KAFA faces for group cohesion, the common 
gender identity may be enough to form lasting bonds, and motivate those who 
                                                
77 Kelly and Breinlinger, “Identity and Injustice.” pg. 54 
78 Ibid. pg. 54 
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characterize themselves with an activist identity to dedicate themselves to lasting and 
meaningful action.  
The following chapter discusses what these identity divisions among KAFA supporters 
look like, specifically breaking down user responses to KAFA’s Campaigns according to 
male and female gender identities. I have additionally compiled this information into data 
tables, listed in the Appendix as Tables 4:1, 4:2, and 4:3. Though religious identity is not 
always clear among these responses, KAFA’s campaign strategies and Lebanese self-
identification also allow for discussion regarding Lebanese nationalist identity and the 
response to the ‘outsider’.  
I would like to acknowledge the limitations that come along with this specific 
type of analysis, particularly the restricted audience accessibility on both YouTube and 
Facebook. Additionally, the comments on both YouTube and Facebook indicate that the 
user actively sought out the group KAFA, likely indicating the user’s strong favor or 
dislike of the group and its campaigns. As evidenced by my information provided in the 
previous chapter, the number of comments the page received and the number of 
comments I analyzed frequently do not match up. It is necessary to note that I analyzed 
all comments that were permitted for public viewing. While I cannot completely discern 
the reason for not having access to view all comments, it is likely a result of Facebook’s 
privacy settings. Also, the numbers of comments may not match up because Facebook 
may only count the main comment in its numbers, and not the subsequent replies to each 
comment. Lastly, this chapter will attempt to understand the theoretical and real world 
positioning of KAFA within Lebanese and the wider Middle Eastern women’s rights 
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conversation, discussing the possibility for the group to create a lasting women’s rights 
movement. 
 
DISCUSSION: 
PUBLIC AND MEDIA RESPONSES 
Overall, KAFA’s strategies of engaging the state apparatus and engaging the public 
incited the most widespread on-the-ground response and coverage. Both the Name and 
Shame Campaign and the ISF Campaigns resulted in intensified public participation by 
women and men alike. It is necessary to note, however, that although these campaigns 
inspired further protests, demonstrations, and petition-signing, both the Internal Security 
Forces campaign and the Name and Shame campaign were part of KAFA’s larger push to 
pass Law 293. More than KAFA’s other campaigns that attempt to raise awareness for 
certain issues, its strategies for engaging the state apparatus had a specific and tangible 
end-goal. This drove the public to participate in a way that allowed them to see the results 
of the participation, while also providing a particular timeline for involvement. I would 
theorize that the structured nature of these campaigns provided a degree of 
encouragement for KAFA’s participants due to the possibility for instant gratification 
(success in the campaign), and inspired those who would not normally participate to take 
more of an active position within the organization.  
 KAFA’s strategies for engaging the public sphere also garnered a large amount of 
media attention. Its A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride campaign received widespread 
coverage in both Arab and English news websites, while several blogs also featured this 
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story. The results of my analysis show that this campaign in isolation did indeed garner 
the most media attention. Though the campaigns in the engaging the public sphere 
section also received quite a bit of media attention, these campaigns were part of KAFA’s 
wider attempts to pass Law 293. The Very Disturbing Taxi Ride campaign was instead 
part of KAFA’s attempts to raise public awareness for domestic violence and challenge 
witnesses to intervene when possible.  
As stated in the name of the campaign, this taxi ride was indeed shocking, and 
every media or public response to the video highlighted this fact. Arguably, it is this 
spectacle of shock that incited much of the attention given to the video. Though this 
video was jarring, it did not contain graphic imagery like several of KAFA’s other 
campaigns. The lack of violent imagery may account for why the video is so popular: 
audiences desire shock value without exposure to disturbing images. Though Sontag 
notes that people do view pictures for their often times grotesque and violent imagery that 
serve as spectacle, she also notes that there is a point where the audience becomes 
fatigued with violent imagery. This would explain the widespread use of KAFA’s 
shocking video that allows the viewer the delicate balance between experiencing the 
violent world of domestic abuse and maintaining distance from some of its most 
disturbing results. As Sontag notes, “Wherever people feel safe-this was her bitter, self-
accusing point-they will be indifferent.”79 Additionally, when audiences are exposed to 
something horrific, but do not have access to recourse to alleviate the horror of the 
situation, they become apathetic. KAFA’s taxi campaign for the viewer presents itself as 
                                                
79 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others. pg. 100 
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a tolerable situation to watch, preventing the viewer from emotionally shutting down in 
fear, while also presenting the viewer with an option of how to actively change the 
situation of domestic violence. In doing so, this campaign presents an opportunity for a 
digestible experience with domestic violence that may create tangible action. Though it is 
debatable whether or not domestic violence should be packaged in a video that an 
audience could view without having a deep fear aroused within them, KAFA offers many 
other campaigns and teaching materials that do not shy away from the realities of gender 
based violence.  
Yet for all the positive possibilities this campaign may produce it is also 
important to challenge the way KAFA created the video. Because the premise of the 
video requires randomness in order to achieve undirected reactions, KAFA had no idea 
whether the women in the cab had previously been exposed or directly experienced 
gender-based violence. If any of these women were victims of violence, this video very 
well may have triggered trauma. This sheds further light on the difficulty in creating 
campaigns against gender-violence; the unfortunate reality of social justice is that it is 
very difficult to mobilize groups to resist oppression. Often, groups find it necessary to 
utilize shock-value and spectacle to garner attention of the masses to produce change. Yet 
at the same time the group finds it necessary to use shock and spectacle, questions are 
raised as to whom these tactics could hurt in the process, and whether the accidental pain 
caused to some is a necessary sacrifice to create lasting safety for others.  
Additionally, the previous chapter noted an interesting comment on the A Very 
Disturbing Taxi Ride’s Facebook post. The comment, accusing KAFA of not doing 
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anything for the commentator’s friend who was in a situation of domestic abuse, 
highlighted the boundaries and difficulties KAFA faces when battling domestic violence. 
The woman discussed apparently was either not able to or not willing to reach out herself 
to KAFA, making it difficult for the organization to take action. Also, other 
commentators pointed out that short of KAFA going in and taking the women out of her 
home, KAFA possessed little ability to intervene in this particular situation. The 
Facebook comment showed the frustration on both ends of the conversation as a witness 
of the violence pleaded for help and KAFA was unable to take further action at the time. 
This situation exemplifies the need for legal structures and intervention programs to step 
in to help victims of abuse when KAFA is limited in its options.  
The Zalfa campaign also received quite a bit of media coverage, mainly due to 
LBCI featuring it on its television channel during the 16 Days of Activism in Lebanon. 
LBCI also put the videos on its website, while KAFA placed the videos on YouTube and 
the pictures of Zalfa’s information on Facebook. It is difficult to tell the number of 
viewers Zalfa reached because this thesis does not have the data for LBCI viewership 
during the campaign period. Yet the compiled analysis illustrates that every Zalfa video 
received at leaves 200 or more views, with some photos on Facebook also reaching up to 
4000+ viewer likes. These numbers also have no way of accounting for the number of 
victims of violence that KAFA’s photos with Zalfa’s information reach through the 
organization’s website, although Maya Ammar noted that Zalfa reached approximately 
500,000 Facebook users. As previously noted, Ammar stated that Zalfa was designed to 
help higher numbers of people than perhaps KAFA is currently equipped to undertake in 
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its office alone; additionally, Zalfa’s ability to communicate with women in a more 
personalized way than text alone, but more private interaction than an interaction with a 
human, offers new possibilities for battling gender-based violence. Though there exists 
little scholarship written on the use of avatars on media acting between the producer of 
the avatar and its audience, this paper found no theoretical basis for the use of avatars in 
social justice or human rights campaigns. Yet for the purpose of this thesis, the study 
“Online Consumer Trust and Live Help Interfaces-The Effects of Text-to-Speech Voice 
technology and Three-Dimensional Avatars” provides a degree of clarity to the possible 
effects of Zalfa on her audience.80  
Hypothetically, consumer interaction with both avatars and/or voice to text speech 
technology increased the consumer’s belief in the competency of the customer service 
representative it was interacting with, as well as the emotional connection with the 
customer service representative. Additionally, “increasing perceived levels of social 
presence, which is defined as the extent to which an individual physiologically perceives 
other people to be physically present when interacting with them (Short et. Al., 1976. 
Gefen and Straub (2003) demonstrated that social presence can affect consumer trust.”81 
The results of the study showed that the subjects did indeed perceive the customer service 
representative assisting them through text to speech voice technology as more 
trustworthy than when the subject simply read the text. Though the study originally 
hypothesized increased trust between the subject and the representative through an avatar 
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81 Ibid. pg. 81 
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giving increased social cues, the study did not find evidence to support this claim. The 
study believes the lack of empirical evidence showing the benefit of avatars can likely be 
attributed to several factors, including the poor quality of the avatars in the experiment. 
Though this study cannot directly correlate trust with experience with the avatar Zalfa, it 
provides hypothetical theories as to her benefits. The study indicates that a voice 
speaking information is trust worthier than text written on a page.  
With Zalfa coming to life in various media, including a full-sized scale of Zalfa 
on LBTI, it is conceivable that Zalfa’s voice interaction with her viewers both enhances 
their trust of this figure while also creating a degree of personal connection not found 
between a person and text. Additionally, it would be beneficial to conduct research on the 
extent of viewer trust regarding the information as well as psychological trust that Zalfa 
may or may not provide. To my knowledge, Zalfa is one of the first of her kind as an 
avatar providing information for a human rights organization. She is an extremely 
interesting figure to study, given the sensitive information she must relay to an audience 
that could be in danger if this audience instead reached out to real humans.  
 Though it is difficult to compare analysis across KAFA’s campaigns concretely, 
to date, Raise Shawwa’s Voice has received the least media and public response, while 
prompting the highest number of negative responses. Across all of the other campaign 
strategies, there were only two negative female responses directed at KAFA or its fight 
against gender based violence. One of these responses was a comment on the poster with 
the male ISF member standing in front of a woman, and the other comment was 
criticizing the A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride for the way it conducted the video. There 
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were 15 other comments that females made that critiqued the government or KAFA but 
supported the idea of the campaign itself, with seven of these comments concentrated 
again on the photo with the male ISF member standing in front of a woman. While these 
comments in general questioned the reality of the ISF helping women, many maintained 
the hope for this idealized photo to become a reality in Lebanon. In sharp contrast, 
KAFA’s Raise Shawwa’s Voice and the two subsequent situations, the SMS messaging 
scandal and the suicide of the migrant domestic worker Melika Bergum, received an 
overwhelming amount of negative feedback from females. KAFA’s article on Melika 
Bergum received zero positive responses from females and 46 negative responses from 
36 female Facebook users. It is interesting to note that Melika’s video prompted the 
highest number of male (seven males commenting 11 times) support of any of KAFA’s 
campaign posts on Facebook. Though it was not the highest number of males 
commenting on a photo proportionally, this post is the only one where more men than 
women showed support for KAFA’s campaign strategies. Additionally, the male 
responses to the three migrant domestic worker campaigns and situations received the 
highest percentages of positive male comments, except for one, among all posts receiving 
5 or more total comments.  
 KAFA’s campaign strategies for raising awareness regarding the devastating 
problems with the Kafala system in Lebanon illustrate an interesting pattern of public 
interest, spectacle, and racism. KAFA released its Raise Shawwa’s Voice campaign in 
February of 2015. This campaign received positive feedback from advertisement 
agencies and forums regarding the form of the campaign and its message. Yet the 
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Lebanese public did not respond so favorably, as the analysis done on KAFA’s Facebook 
page illustrates. While a portion of the Lebanese followers of KAFA’s Facebook page do 
support rights for domestic workers, many demonstrated a false knowledge of migrant 
domestic worker abuses and a disagreement with the campaign. Interestingly, while this 
thesis was being written, two events occurred in Lebanon that gave further insight into 
the negative reception of Shawwa’s campaign. On Lebanese Mother’s Day in March of 
2015, an agency that provides housekeepers in Lebanon sent out an SMS message to 
several thousand Lebanese people via their cellphones. This message advertised a special 
offer of a reduced rate for housekeepers of Ethiopian and Kenyan nationalities. The 
Lebanese public, and KAFA’s Facebook page followers reacted with outrage. KAFA’s 
post on the message received 24 positive female responses, zero negative female 
responses, seven positive responses from five males, and only two negative responses 
from males. Despite what appeared to be a positive turn for KAFA’s campaign against 
migrant domestic worker abuses, another domestic migrant worker’s suicide, Melika 
Begum, four days after the text was sent out proved the positive response to be short 
lived. The day following Melika’s suicide, KAFA posted an article critiquing the Kafala 
system for Melika’s death. KAFA’s followers reacted with outrage, claiming the article 
unfairly blamed the employer family for Melika’s death, with many of the commentators 
again using this post as a chance to voice their grievances with migrant domestic 
workers.  
 These latest sequences of events, beginning with KAFA’s launch of Raise 
Shawwa’s Voice and ending with the suicide of Melika Begum, reveal a deep-seated 
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racism prevalent in Lebanese society. Even many of the people who condemn the modern 
day slavery system in Lebanon cannot resist taking a moment to complain about her or 
his own bad experiences with a migrant domestic worker. The responses to KAFA’s 
Shawwa campaign were so disturbingly egregious that the KAFA organization deemed it 
necessary to post a four-point response on its website condemning the Facebook 
comments and refuting the commentators’ points. Perhaps most notable is KAFA’s final 
point of the four, which responds to the comments asking why KAFA even takes up the 
abuses of domestic migrant workers in the first place. These comments, implying the lack 
of value many Lebanese place on the rights and the very lives of migrant domestic 
workers, prompted KAFA to pose the question of if these workers mean so little, why do 
so many Lebanese pay so much money and rely on the workers so heavily? Despite the 
critique that these workers’ lives should matter despite what they can for their Lebanese 
employers, KAFA challenged those opposing rights for migrant domestic workers to 
analyze her or his own racism.  
 The Lebanese Public’s outrage over the SMS text message gave the appearance 
that perhaps some of the former critics of Shawwa’s campaign may have reevaluated 
their stance, or that there was more anti-racist and human trafficking sentiment within 
Lebanon than previously assumed. Despite these initial hopes, only one blogger among 
all the media and social media feedback that day saw through the façade of empathy. The 
following is an excerpt from Claude el Khal’s piece, “What? There’s Human Trade in 
Lebanon” on the blog My Beirut Chronicles: 
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“Someone took a screenshot and posted it on social media. The photo 
went viral and in a few hours it became the talk of the nation. Lebanon 
woke up to a harsh reality: in this very civilized country of ours, 
housemaids are treated like products.  
 
Shock. Outrage. Ya mama.  
 
Strangely, most of the people that expressed their disbelief on social media 
have a housemaid and know perfectly how this whole business works. 
They know that these women and these girls are not allowed to keep their 
passport. They know how they are treated from the moment they land in 
our beautiful international airport until the moment they leave, if they ever 
do. They know about the racism, the abuse, the suicides.  
 
They know of the companies that make money out of this human trade. 
They had to deal with one them to get their own maid, didn’t they? They 
most probably know about the different websites and Facebook pages that 
advertise these companies’ services, some in the most horrendous way, 
like posting a picture of these workers passports, in complete violation of 
their privacy.  
 
Most of these people were living in Lebanon when, a few years ago, a 
domestic worker called Alem Dechasa killed herself. They expressed the 
same outrage back then. Then forgot all about it.  
 
To be fair, it was on March 14 2012. An eternity by Lebanese standards.  
 
Today, the fair citizens of Lebanon are in shock. Tomorrow they’ll forget. 
Until the next SMS or the next suicide.82 
 
 
 This blog simultaneously pointed out the hypocrisy of many of those claiming 
shock, and the short memory span of the Lebanese people. Many of the comments on 
Shawwa’s campaign boasted of how well she or he treated her or his domestic migrant 
worker. In all of the analysis, I did not come across one comment from a person 
admitting to personally abusing their housekeeper in some way. Yet even these people 
                                                
82 Khal, “My Beirut Chronicles,” March 16, 2015. 
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claiming to treat their housekeepers with kindness, only to be taken advantage of later, 
had to attain the migrant domestic worker from some agency. Choosing to maintain a 
blind eye when it came to personally hiring a migrant worker in a system perpetuating 
modern day slavery, these people instead cry foul when the nature of the Kafala system 
comes to light in a painfully obvious manner.  
 Moreover, the events surrounding the SMS text message came together in a form 
of spectacle. The obvious problems with the text message combined with the shock value 
it entailed, allowed even mildly racist Lebanese to condemn the message as outrageous. 
Additionally, the fury that swept Lebanon on Mother’s Day provided a means of 
garnering attention for those supposedly shocked with the message. The SMS message 
allowed Lebanese to feign outrage over the racism in this message without risking any 
additional action or personal involvement with the situation. Though some Lebanese 
certainly did care and their reaction resulted in the Lebanese Ministry of Labor 
supposedly shutting down the agency that was the original source of the message, many 
others reacted to the SMS as a fad. Melika Begum’s suicide that followed the SMS 
message four days later illustrated the vast difference between support for an attention-
garnering fad and a tragedy that necessitates lasting and dedicated attention. The same 
blogger as previously cited, Claud el Khal, is the only blogger to date that addressed this 
suicide:  
  
There we go again. Another migrant domestic worker committed suicide. 
It happened yesterday, in Tripoli, Lebanon’s largest northern city.  
 
But of course, no one talked about it. Social media’s usual criers didn’t 
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shed a tear. Didn’t make a sound. Didn’t write a word. Why bother? There 
was no shocking SMS advert sent to their phones. The news didn’t create 
the buzz on the net. So in the grand tradition of Lebanese indignation, 
where human misery is used to promote our own ego on social media, this 
suicide story is just another bore. The weekend is coming, and selfies in 
restaurants are far more important.  
 
No buzz no cries.  
 
What’s even more disturbing is that not many Lebanese media outlets 
reported Malika Begum’s suicide. Not even the ones claiming to be the 
champions of Human Rights.” 83 
 
 KAFA’s post about Melika Begum’s death received zero positive female 
comments, and 46 devastatingly negative female comments. These three instances, 
serving as a microcosm for the broader issues with the Lebanese Kafala system, illustrate 
that racism cannot be wiped out by a moment of spectacle, that activism is acceptable 
when it does not require self-analysis, and that even those who claim to support feminist 
principles do not necessarily support equality for everyone, or even all females in 
Lebanon. Reading Nancy Frasier’s idea of a counter public and the necessary correction 
for blind-spots in feminism regarding differences in socio-economic, religious, as well as 
ethnic and nationalist identities, highlights the identity problems that so many feminist or 
women’s rights groups face. Inherent differences in identity among feminists possess the 
potential to derail egalitarian goals for dismantling patriarchy. This illustrates why 
Frasier’s theory that itself confronts the issues with Habermas’ public space is not enough 
given the reality of those participating in women’s rights organizations. KAFA’s 
followers on Facebook likely support women’s rights, though this may not always be the 
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case for a woman joining women’s rights Facebook group. Yet what becomes painfully 
obvious through my analysis is that these women want women’s rights, but only for those 
whom they deem worthy. When women’s rights for domestic migrant workers challenge 
the Lebanese women’s social preconceptions, monetary comfort, or do not obviously or 
directly benefit Lebanese women, then this group of Lebanese women revert to 
perpetuating the patriarchal structure back on migrant domestic workers. KAFA provided 
a necessary and powerful response to both the female and male commentators negatively 
responding to the Shawwa campaign, refusing to let the bigotry go unchecked. While 
KAFA could have posted this response on its Facebook page, the response is a start to 
battling social stratification within the organization. 
 In Lebanon, raising awareness of migrant domestic worker abuses, and even the 
elimination of racism will not be enough to create an egalitarian society; instead, all 
women must stop any association with the current Kafala System. Despite many 
employers’ attempts to justify the use of migrant domestic workers, whether they believe 
they are ‘civilizing’ the worker or providing the worker with a better opportunity than 
could be found elsewhere, any association with the Kafala system is tantamount to 
support for it. Whether or not women employers physically or psychologically abuse 
their worker, they are still participating in the larger Kafala structure that degrades and 
systematically disenfranchises every foreign domestic worker.  
The employment of a migrant domestic worker does not exist in isolation from the 
larger Kafala network. In order for the network to function properly, there must be 
domestic worker agencies, recruitment agencies in these women’s home countries, 
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General Security officers, and detention centers. All of these parts possess a dangerous 
function in addition to the Madame, or the female head of household, who consistently 
proves the biggest threat to migrant domestic workers within the home. The Madame 
may beat the worker, lock her up, overwork her, or starve her. The husband or sons in the 
household, or other male family members or friends of the employers may rape the 
worker.   
Many of these issues, much like domestic violence against Lebanese women, go 
underreported because of the shame it would bring on the employing family and the 
further fear of retribution against the worker. Naifa Niska Dalalti was found hanging in 
her employer’s house, dead at the age of 23.84 She was six months pregnant. This story is 
one of countless stories without a proper ending; English al-Akhbar reported on the story, 
giving no further explanation. Several comments in the comment section of this news 
website posed the question begging to be answered, how did she become pregnant when 
she was locked away in a home of her employers? Why did she commit suicide?  
Many other migrant domestic workers run away from their employers’ home to 
avoid the fate of Naifa. Once they have escaped, they force an entire new set of potential 
abuses. If the worker is able to run away with her visa, she may find another worker with 
a kinder employer. Or, she may be able to return to her real home. If the worker is unable 
to obtain her visa, a very common situation because the employing family usually holds 
its worker’s visa, the General Security may take the woman. Once General Security has a 
woman in its possession, she may be sent to a detention center. These detention centers 
                                                
84 “Pregnant Domestic Worker Hangs Self in Lebanon.” 
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are often “overcrowded cells under poor conditions.”85 According to the Article “Female 
Sri Lankan domestic workers in Lebanon-a case of ‘contract slavery’?” the center in El 
Chebaak was built to hold 200 women, but routinely held around 600 at a time. 
Following detention, migrant domestic workers rarely find justice.  Lebanese courts 
almost never rule in favor of these workers. 
 Migrant domestic workers might be kept prisoner in the home of their employers, 
but, “Workers cannot leave the house for fear they may be caught by the police or 
General Security and arrested or imprisoned because they are not carrying their identity 
papers. There is a tacit expectation that being detailed in Lebanon by the security forces 
will likely be accompanied by some form of physical or even sexual abuse.”86 
Sometimes, the women who are caught by the General Security without papers will 
instead by returned to their employers’ homes or to  domestic worker agencies. Such was 
the case with Alem Dechasa-Desisa, who committed suicide on March 14, 2012. LBCI 
aired a video on March 8, showing the events that occurred on February 24, 2012 leading 
up to Alema’s death. In this chilling video, the brother of the owner of the recruiting 
agency that brought Alema to Lebanon, Ali Mahfouz, with the help of another man drags 
Alema from the street and literally forces her against her will into a car. She is crumpled 
up and stuffed, seemingly a rag-doll, into the men’s car, as on-lookers do nothing to stop 
the abuse. Mahfouz claimed to be returning Alema to her country due to her mental 
health problems. Alema was taken to detention center, and then committed suicide at the 
                                                
85 Jureidini and Moukarbel, “Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon.” pg. 598 
86 Ibid. pg. 598 
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Deir al-Saleeb psychiatric hospital to which she had been transferred.87 By no means an 
outlier case, the recruiters as well as the domestic worker agencies often become involved 
in the disciplining of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, “Some Lebanese employers 
deliberately take their domestic workers to the agency for disciplinary purposes, knowing 
that they will be beaten or threatened.”88  Or, as was the case with an Ethiopian migrant 
worker, Betty, in Kousha, Lebanon, these women may be raped.  
LBCI first showed Betty’s story in March of 2014, which the Migrant-Rights.org 
group picked up and expounded upon. According to Betty’s testimony, her employer of a 
week took her to the recruiting agency to be ‘returned.’ Another dehumanizing aspect of 
this system of contract slavery, employers have the right to return a worker if they are 
dissatisfied, at which point the worker will be exchanged for a new worker. Betty, having 
been exchanged through a process further comodifying her body, then experienced what 
can only be described as the pinnacle of human depravity: 
Upon arrival, the recruitment agency’s young secretary called Betty an 
"animal" and promised "to teach her a lesson." She then summoned in a 
40-year-old Lebanese man, whose job description entails "disciplining 
domestic workers." He proceed to slap Betty and ordered her to strip. 
When she refused, he told her she has been accused of thievery and that he 
must search her. Following the search, he tells the secretary that "she is 
clean" only to start beating Betty with his belt. He then rapes Betty, the 
sound of her screams reaching the secretary who does nothing to 
intervene, and threatens her to keep quiet about the incident.  Medical 
reports later evidenced the abuse to Betty's body, including to her 
genitalia.89 
 
                                                
87 “Lebanon.” 
88 Jureidini and Moukarbel, “Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon.” pg. 598 
89 “Ethiopian Domestic Worker ‘disciplined’ by Rape in Lebanon.” 
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  Betty’s testimony is extremely difficult to watch, as she breaks down in the 
middle of her story crying for a trauma that the Kafala system facilitated. Though this 
paper attempts to avoid an Olympics of suffering, or the privileging of one suffering over 
another, Betty’s story represents the utter depravity of the Lebanese Kafala system, and 
the dangers surrounding it. Betty was recruited into a system that relies on the trade of 
human bodies, permitting certain ethnicities to be “discounted” or “traded in” for a better 
version. Then, a Lebanese female dehumanized Betty. Betty was demeaned, demonized, 
and berated as the male in the recruiting office forced her to take off her clothes and be 
searched. The man then beat her, and proceeded to rape her. The secretary heard the 
woman’s screams and did nothing.  
This story illustrates both how some Lebanese women’s practices of 
dehumanizing migrant domestic workers reproduce the patriarchal system on the migrant 
workers’ bodies, while also showing silence in the face of abuse in its most extreme 
form. Though Betty’s case is unique in that she filed a complaint, hired a lawyer, and is 
currently receiving support from a new employer, the abuse she experienced is likely 
anything but unusual. The answer to the question of why are so many migrant domestic 
workers committing suicide seems painfully obvious, yet many Lebanese continue to 
ignore the pervasive discrimination and near unfathomable abuse that migrant domestic 
workers consistently experience. These stories illustrate how simply treating an employee 
well will never be enough to stop these events. Instead, Lebanese women must demand 
change and no longer participate in the Kafala system.  
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CONCLUSION: 
This chapter begins by outlining the theoretical concept of social identity, showing how 
women are more likely to commit to a social project in the long run if they identity as 
activists and maintain strong personal identification with the activist group. KAFA’s 
rejection of the negative and racist responses on its post for Raise Shawwa’s Voice 
simultaneously strengthened the group’s identity boundaries. Though it likely was not 
enough to deter future comments or the participation of racist women in its movement, it 
set a precedent for condemning social stratification and maintaining group unity as 
women progress towards equal rights in Lebanon.  
 In my interview with Maya Ammar, she revealed that there was not yet a 
women’s movement in Lebanon. She stated that there currently was not wide enough 
support among Lebanese women to successfully undertake such a move towards full 
equality. Despite the current status of women’s rights in Lebanon, KAFA is arguably 
creating a structural base to prepare for a women’s movement. Through its threefold 
strategy of Engaging the State Apparatus, Engaging the Public, and Engaging the Kafala 
System, KAFA undertakes multiple campaigns aimed at reaching all parts of the 
Lebanese Public. By engaging the state apparatus, laws may be created to provide safety 
and legal recourse for women suffering from domestic violence, as well as creating the 
necessary funds to subsidize these activities. KAFA’s engagement of the public brings 
wider support to the organization, inspiring those identifying as activists to take a 
dedicated role in the future movement for women’s rights. Currently, KAFA’s 
engagement of the Kafala system also illustrates the weaknesses in creating a women’s 
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movement. An idealized women’s rights organization that is able to put aside all identity 
markers remains an improbable reality. The violent history of Lebanon, strict sectarian 
boundaries, and lack of full civil personal status laws all contribute to the problems with 
the Kafala system and Lebanese women’s response to it. Yet the active awareness of such 
differences and constant struggle toward suppressing patriarchal tendencies is an 
achievable goal. The outcome in successfully engaging the Kafala system would be an 
indication of KAFA’s preparation of the Lebanese community for a women’s rights 
movement through including all women living in Lebanon in the organization’s 
resistance. 
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Thesis Conclusion 
 
This thesis comes at a time when KAFA finds itself in a unique position within Lebanon 
to both inform and alter society. Many of Lebanon's human rights issues stem from the 
country's violent past and delicate balance between religious and secular politics. Often 
acting as a hindrance to positive change, many political leaders believe this is a price 
worth paying in order to maintain religious peace in the country. Yet this negative peace 
certainly does not foster an open-minded atmosphere in the country, preferring instead to 
cater to the patriarchal religious rulers and influential Lebanese elite. This may be one of 
the more difficult paradoxes that KAFA confronts: ideally, secular civil laws need to be 
established in order to create the possibility for gender equality in Lebanon; yet in order 
for the laws to be created, women need to alter the patriarchal political system thus far 
refusing to upset the relationship with religious leaders. Realistically, the way to achieve 
secular civil status laws without women upending the entire patriarchal system first 
would necessitate a steady building up of both female and male support to spark a 
women’s movement in Lebanon. This type of movement foreseeably would involve 
enough of the Lebanese population protesting and demanding women’s rights making it 
impossible for the Lebanese government not to listen. 
Currently, KAFA does not yet have this large of a base; however, all indications 
show that KAFA’s methods of gaining participants and activists has steadily increased 
and that such a movement may be possible. According to Maya Ammar, KAFA currently 
receives approximately 215 calls a month to KAFA’s helpline, adding up to 2500-2700 
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calls per year. In the month following the Zalfa campaign, KAFA received double the 
amount of cases, 71, than the month before (35). This campaign also reached 500,000 
people on Facebook. Additionally, public interest continues to grow in the group, with 
600 college-aged youth trying to volunteer with KAFA in 2014 alone. KAFA’s followers 
are growing at a faster pace than the small organization can currently handle. Though this 
will be one of the challenges for KAFA going forward, it is an encouraging sign that the 
younger generation is ready and excited for change. 
KAFA’s founding in 2005 launched a new era for widespread awareness 
regarding gender-based violence and migrant domestic worker’s abuses rights in 
Lebanon. Perhaps this increase in public awareness stems from increased public access to 
information and media resulting from further technological advances. Yet collectively my 
research and anecdotal information lead me to believe that KAFA’s campaigns have 
largely influenced the influx and dissemination of informational material to the masses. 
This is certainly not to say that women’s organizations were not doing major work for 
women in Lebanon. On the contrary, women’s rights organizations assisted in created 
beneficial policies to improve women’s conditions following the end of the 15 year 
Lebanese Civil War in 1990. One of KAFA’s many contributions, however, continues to 
be the way in which they de-privatize formerly discreet family situations while also 
putting specific names and faces to cases of gender-based violence. My interview with 
Maya Ammar reinforces these findings when she noted that KAFA intentionally uses the 
faces of family members and friends and the names of victims of domestic violence so 
that their stories could no longer be ignored. She said that this forced people to think of 
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their own relationships with family members, inspiring motivation for action through 
empathy. This tactic is problematic because it relies on the premise that gender-based 
violence can only be cared about if a person can relate the problem to herself or himself, 
instead of seeing it as a problem because it threatens basic human rights. Despite the 
possible issues with this rhetoric, KAFA currently must utilize every strategy available to 
stop the endemic issue of domestic violence in the region. Additionally, redemption may 
be found in this tactic through its ability to ground information on domestic violence in 
very real tragedies that cannot be simply dismissed as hearsay. 
KAFA carries out its campaigns through a blitzkrieg of informational strategies, 
flooding the Lebanese public with facts from a multitude of mediums and confronting 
gender-based violence from various angles. The effects of this are quite extraordinary; by 
maintaining consistent attention to all campaign angles but alternating its emphasis, it is 
able to build support across campaign platforms. It is possible that if KAFA focused all 
its energy on one aspect of gender-rights for an extended period, that goal could be 
completed faster than is currently the case. What KAFA is doing, however, instead builds 
a lasting platform for women’s rights to achieve long-term success and tackle issues that 
previously have never been addressed, while solidifying the group’s identity through 
demanding its followers to support all human rights. By utilizing a variety of media, such 
as newsprint, online news websites, posters, billboards, pamphlets, commercials, 
television news stations, various websites, and social media, KAFA creates a model for 
an egalitarian approach to women’s rights. Its methods allow for a wider dissemination of 
information than traditional methods. Using a wide array of mediums, KAFA also 
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incorporates burgeoning technology into its campaigns, promoting social progress 
alongside technological progress. In addition to these methods reaching a wide array of 
people from various backgrounds, they allow for better access to the organization’s tools 
and help for situations of gender-based violence and migrant domestic worker abuses. 
KAFA’s campaigns that I discuss in this thesis may be categorized into the following 
strategies: Engaging the State Apparatus, Engaging the Public, and Engaging the Kafala 
System. Through engaging these three distinct yet connected realms, KAFA attacks 
Lebanon’s patriarchal systems of oppression from multiple angles. This will allow them 
to grow as an organization, encouraging activists that participate in one campaign to 
pledge support for others. 
The Engaging the State Apparatus campaign targets aspects of gender-based 
violence that are explicitly affected by state laws and judicial rulings. To date, KAFA’s 
arguably biggest achievement was its creation and lobbying for Law 293, the law to 
protect women and children from domestic violence. Though the law in its current form 
is problematic following its many amendments, including the continued refusal to 
criminalize marital rape, it certainly is a landmark victory for women’s rights in Lebanon. 
Other parts of Engaging the State Apparatus include challenging the personal status laws 
in Lebanon, which continue to discriminate against and among women, and demanding 
change in the Internal Security Force. A common perception among Lebanese women 
persists that the ISF members are as likely to sexually harass women as they are to help 
them in situations of violence. KAFA realizes the necessity to change this reality so that 
women experiencing domestic violence have an option for recourse. 
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The majority of KAFA’s campaigns promote public involvement through various 
protests, teaching clinics, and demonstrations, but the Engaging the Public’s goal is its 
appeal for continued public intervention. The two campaigns within this strategy are the 
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride campaign and the Zalfa campaign. The taxi ride in 
particular questions the public’s ability to intervene in situations of violence. Zalfa 
instead provides an alternative medium for inquisitive audiences and victims of domestic 
violence alike through her form as an avatar. This degree of personalized interaction 
forms emotional connections between the audience and Zalfa. The final campaign 
strategy creates the deepest divisions between KAFA’s followers but also defines the 
organization’s identity. 
The Engaging the Kafala system exists as its own strategy, specifically because so 
many Lebanese view migrant domestic worker’s rights as outside the spectrum of 
Lebanese women’s rights. KAFA has prioritized battling the trafficking of women since 
the organization’s founding, and recently launched its biggest campaign to date 
confronting biases against migrant workers. The Raise Shawwa’s Voice campaign brings 
to light important questions of how so many migrant domestic worker suicides, about one 
per week, could be allowed to occur without intensified public inquiry. Raise Shawwa’s 
Voice prompts users to take an active role in holding the system accountable, similar to 
its Name and Shame campaign in Engaging the State Apparatus. As previously noted, 
KAFA would like to see the destruction of the Kafala system and migrant domestic 
workers’ reception of full rights under Lebanon’s Labor Laws. It is important to note that 
KAFA does not advocate for the complete dissolution of migrant domestic workers’ 
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presence in Lebanon altogether; though the current system is dangerous for the workers, 
many of the women working in Lebanon need the job to survive. Yet it isn’t enough for 
these women to gain work in Lebanon, they must also maintain the right to leave any job, 
have protection under Lebanon’s Labor Laws, and formulate an integral part of the 
women’s rights movement in order to partake in necessary recourse against possible 
violence. 
The analysis in this thesis brings up some interesting, although not wholly 
unexpected, conclusions regarding the state of women’s rights in Lebanon. For most of 
KAFA’s campaigns, females overwhelmingly supported KAFA and its goals. The 
majority of negative feedback came from males, and even still this feedback was in the 
minority. Many comments, especially regarding campaigns for Engaging the State 
Apparatus, are positive towards KAFA but challenge the Lebanese political system. This 
feedback is a sign of an actively engaged audience, praising KAFA’s victories but 
constantly challenging the reality or effectiveness of certain campaigns like those 
involving the ISF. Additionally, KAFA’s statistics regarding the increased number of 
participants and possible volunteers with the organization support my own analysis. 
In addition to my analysis of KAFA’s campaigns and user feedback, this thesis 
begins the much-needed work addressing several holes in academic research regarding 
women’s rights in Lebanon. Much of the current literature on women’s rights revolves 
around political familialism and citizenship laws in Lebanon. To my knowledge, a case 
study focusing on a specific women’s rights group does not exist in this context. I show 
in my thesis how the direction of influence does not only flow from patriarchal structures 
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towards women in society, but that influence also flows outward from women in society 
to affect political structure, and the very fabric of society. Placing women back in the 
designation as subject verses object, I utilize personal stories of women and construct 
analysis where women have a primary role in changing the world around them. 
Finally, my thesis contributes to scholarship on migrant domestic workers in 
Lebanon. Current literature, though still quite limited, primarily focuses on the structure 
of the Kafala system, and the legal discrepancies with it. In contrast, my work prioritizes 
the voice of the migrant domestic workers through allowing their experiences to speak 
through my writing. Amrita Pande’s article, “From “Balcony Talk” and “Practical 
Prayers” to Illegal Collectives: Migrant Domestic Workers and Meso-Level Resistance in 
Lebanon” greatly influenced the framing of my thesis to construct the work of KAFA and 
migrant domestic workers as acts of resistance instead of passive endurance. Pande’s 
work breaks the construct of a one-dimensional worker, to show that not only do migrant 
domestic workers have multi-faceted personalities, but also they are active participants in 
their own struggle for rights. Interesting work begs to be done looking at the webs of 
resistance work formed between groups such as the Migrant Domestic Workers 
Consortium, Lebanon’s Anti-Racism Movement, and KAFA.  I kept this very important 
perspective in mind when focusing my work on Lebanese women’s reactions to KAFA’s 
campaigns and Facebook posts regarding rights for migrant domestic workers. The 
overwhelmingly negative feedback from females associated with KAFA demands further 
attention by both KAFA and other scholarship. Not only is this feedback representative of 
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women activists reproducing patriarchal systems on women perceived as ‘lesser’ but it 
also problematizes the current concept of feminism in Lebanon. 
Undoubtedly, KAFA is one of the most relevant human rights organizations in 
Lebanon today. The organization’s work is unparalleled, though certainly not alone in its 
endeavors. KAFA’s organizational structure and unique engagement of Lebanese society 
at large provides a fascinating case study for Lebanese women’s rights groups. Through 
building a solid base of supporters and activists united in a common goal for equality for 
all women, KAFA is positioned to ignite a powerful resistance movement in Lebanon. 
This paper illustrates the persistent need for socio-economic disparities to be read 
into gender discussions. Nancy Frasier’s framework of the counter public is not enough; 
the existence of patriarchal systems of power results in women reproducing patriarchy 
upon weaker, and often lower class, women. Though those women of middle and higher 
socioeconomic statuses desire more rights as women, these same women often accept 
restricted rights for other women when it benefits them. Due to Lebanon’s history and 
unique sectarian system, class differentiation not only exists among religious groups but 
the religious groups themselves maintain a socioeconomic hierarchy. Nationalism 
remains another integral indicator for class and gender rights, as those outside of 
Lebanese national belonging often are the most vulnerable. This thesis raises the question 
of how does an organization fight against gender-based violence and fight for women’s 
rights when women have different access to power? How will an organization include the 
most vulnerable of society both in its decision-making processes within the group as well 
as the beneficiaries of gender equality? Certainly Lebanese women have different 
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viewpoints and each woman’s background informs her decision making process. Just as 
KAFA promotes the campaign for Shawwa to raise her own voice and the voices of other 
migrant domestic workers, so too must it find a way not just to speak for all women, but 
be the bullhorn for all women to speak through. 
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Appendix 
Table: 4.1 : All Responses to Campaigns  
 
 Likes Shares Comments Comments Analyzed Comments made by 
KAFA 
Name and 
Shame 1 
56 35 26 26 4 
Name and 
Shame 2 
28 2 6 4 0 
Name and 
Shame 3 
16 24 7 7 0 
General White 
Ribbon 
Campaign 
Photo 
20 4 3 3 1 
ISF 2 Males 352 183 25 19 0 
ISF Male 502 214 38 32 13 
ISF Female 994 271 36 27 1 
ISF Female 2 161 35 3 2 0 
A Very 
Disturbing Taxi 
Ride 
157 35 8 5 2 
A Very 
Disturbing Taxi 
Ride 2 
122 54 3 3 0 
A Very 
Disturbing Taxi 
Ride 3 
242 169 3 3 0 
A Very 
Disturbing Taxi 
Ride 4 
108 43 6 5 0 
Zalfa 1 718 136 35 27 1 
Zalfa 2 751 88 20 19 0 
Raise 
Shawwa’s 
Voice*** 
289 25 29 77 2 
SMS Migrant 
Domestic 
Worker 
Message 
383 462 183 41 0 
Melika Begum 188 25 53 (72?) 72 0 
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Table: 4.2 : Information broken down into categorized Female responses  
 
 
 
 Comments 
Analyzed 
Female 
Positive 
Female 
Negative 
Female 
Government 
Critique 
Female 
Indecipherable 
Female 
Tagging 
Female 
Other 
Name and 
Shame 1 
26 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Name and 
Shame 2 
4 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Name and 
Shame 3 
7 2 0 0 0 0 1 
General 
White 
Ribbon 
Campaign 
Photo 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ISF 2 
Males 
19 11 0 3 1 1 0 
ISF Male 32 8 
Comments/ 
7 Females 
1  7 Comments/ 
6 Females 
0 0 0 
ISF Female 27 17 0 4 1 0 0 
ISF Female 
2 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
A Very 
Disturbing 
Taxi Ride 
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 
A Very 
Disturbing 
Taxi Ride 2 
3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
A Very 
Disturbing 
Taxi Ride 3 
3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
A Very 
Disturbing 
Taxi Ride 4 
5 4 1 0 0 0 0 
Zalfa 1 27 18 0 1 1 0 0 
Zalfa 2 19 9 0 0 3 0 0 
Raise 
Shawwa’s 
Voice 
77 16 
Comments/9 
Females 
42 
Comments/ 
10 Females 
0 0 1 2 
SMS 
Migrant 
Domestic 
Worker 
Message 
41 24 0 0 0 1 0 
Melika 
Begum 
72 
0 46 
Comments 
/36 Females 
0 0 3 6 
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Table: 4.3 : Information broken down into categorized Male responses  
 
 Comments 
Analyzed 
Male 
Positive 
 Male 
Negative 
Male 
Government 
Critique 
Male 
Indecipherable 
Male 
Tagging 
Male 
Other 
Name and 
Shame 1 
26 5 
Comments 
/4 Males 
5 
Comments 
/3 Males 
0 0 0 0 
Name and 
Shame 2 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Name and 
Shame 3 
7 0 1 0 1 0 2 
General 
White 
Ribbon 
Campaign 
Photo 
3 2 
Comments/ 
1 Male 
0 0 0 0 0 
ISF 2 
Males 
19 1 1 0 2 0 0 
ISF Male 32 0 1 2 1 0 0 
ISF Female 27 1 0 2 0 0 0 
ISF Female 
2 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
A Very 
Disturbing 
Taxi Ride 
5 1 2 0 0 0 1 
A Very 
Disturbing 
Taxi Ride 2 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A Very 
Disturbing 
Taxi Ride 3 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
A Very 
Disturbing 
Taxi Ride 4 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zalfa 1 27 3 1 0 0 0 0 
Zalfa 2 19 2 5 comments 
/3 Males 
0 0 0 0 
Raise 
Shawwa’s 
Voice 
77 5 1 0 0 0 0 
SMS 
Migrant 
Domestic 
Worker 
Message 
41 7 comments 
/5 Males 
2 0 0 5 
Comments/ 
3 Males 
2 
Melika 
Begum 
72 11 
Comments 
/7 Males 
6 
Comments 
/3 Males 
0 0 0 0 
 
 159 
References 
Abou Jaoude, Rayane. “Body of Domestic Violence Victim Exhumed | News , Lebanon 
News | THE DAILY STAR,” September 30, 2013. 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Sep-30/233010-body-of-
domestic-violence-victim-exhumed.ashx. 
Ayoub, Joey. “Suicide Attempt Highlights Plight of Lebanese Migrant Workers - Al-
Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East.” Al-Monitor, November 19, 2014. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/lebanon-migrant-workers-
suicide-treatment.html. 
Aziz, Jean. “Islamic Clerics Oppose Lebanese Law Protecting Abused Women - Al-
Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East.” Al-Monitor, July 24, 2013. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2013/07/womens-rights-activists-
lebanon-domestic-violence-law.html. 
“Banet Taxi  :: Beirut.com  :: Beirut City Guide.” Accessed May 2, 2015. 
http://www.beirut.com/l/1830. 
Benoist, Chloé. “Roqaya Mounzer, Lebanon’s Latest Victim of Domestic Violence.” Al 
Akhbar English, March 26, 2014. http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/roqaya-
mounzer-lebanon%E2%80%99s-latest-victim-domestic-violence. 
Bramley, Ellie Violet. “Why Does Lebanese Bill on Domestic Violence Fail to Tackle 
Marital Rape? | Ellie Violet Bramley.” The Guardian, April 9, 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/09/lebanese-bill-
domestic-violence-marital-rape. 
“Cracking The Cedar: How Hezbollah Re-Envisioned The Democracy Movement (And 
The West Hardly Noticed) — BagNews,” December 14, 2006. 
http://www.bagnewsnotes.com/2006/12/cracking-the-cedar-how-hezbollah-re-
envisioned-the-democracy-movement-and-the-west-hardly-noticed/. 
“Ethiopian Domestic Worker ‘disciplined’ by Rape in Lebanon.” Migrant-Rights.org, 
April 5, 2014. http://www.migrant-rights.org/2014/04/ethiopian-domestic-worker-
disciplined-by-rape-in-lebanon/. 
Firmo-Fonton, Victoria. “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television: A Case Study of Al-
Manar TV and the Hezbollah Women’s Association.” In Women and Media in the 
Middle East: Power through Self-Expression, edited by Naomi Sakr, 162–79. 
Library of Modern Middle East Studies 41. London  ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 
2004. 
Galtung, Johan. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6, 
no. 3 (January 1, 1969): 167–91. 
Green, Dominic. “Here’s What Domestic Violence Ads Look Like In The Middle East.” 
Business Insider, March 26, 2013. http://www.businessinsider.com/lebanese-anti-
domestic-violence-ads-2013-3. 
Haddad, Layal. “Fighting Domestic Violence in Lebanon: Silenced by Media and the 
State.” Al Akhbar English, January 3, 2012. http://english.al-
 160 
akhbar.com/content/fighting-domestic-violence-lebanon-silenced-media-and-
state. 
Joseph, Suad. “Gender and Citizenship in Middle Eastern States.” Middle East Report, 
no. 198 (January 1, 1996): 4–10. doi:10.2307/3012867. 
JOSEPH, SUAD. “Political Familism in Lebanon.” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 636 (July 1, 2011): 150–63. 
Jureidini, Ray, and Nayla Moukarbel. “Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in 
Lebanon: A Case of ‘Contract Slavery’?.” Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies 
30, no. 4 (July 2004): 581–607. doi:10.1080/13691830410001699478. 
“KAFA | Launch of the Campaign: ‘We Have a Mission’ ‘If You’re Threatened, Do Not 
Hesitate to Call 112.’” Accessed May 2, 2015. http://www.kafa.org.lb/kafa-
news/68/launch-of-the-campaign-we-have-a-mission-if-youre. 
“KAFA | Silent Deaths.” Accessed May 2, 2015. http://www.kafa.org.lb/kafa-
news/13/silent-deaths. 
“KAFA | قﻕاﺍلﻝطﻁإﺇ ةﺓلﻝمﻡحﺡ ‘اﺍنﻥاﺍرﺭوﻭ ةﺓمﻡهﻩمﻡ’ نﻥوﻭاﺍعﻉتﺕلﻝاﺍبﺏ عﻉمﻡ ىﻯوﻭقﻕ نﻥمﻡأﺃلﻝاﺍ يﻱلﻝخﺥاﺍدﺩلﻝاﺍ.” Accessed May 2, 2015. 
http://www.kafa.org.lb/kafa-
news/67/%D8%A5%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-
%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-
%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7-
%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-
%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-
%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84. 
“KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation’s... - KAFA (enough) Violence & 
Exploitation | Facebook.” Accessed May 2, 2015. 
https://www.facebook.com/kafa.lb/photos/pb.323356544336.-
2207520000.1425750630./10152829002369337/?type=3&theater. 
“KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation’s... - KAFA (enough) Violence & 
Exploitation | Facebook.” Accessed May 2, 2015. 
https://www.facebook.com/kafa.lb/photos/pb.323356544336.-
2207520000.1425773666./10153033094544337/?type=3&theater. 
“KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation’s... - KAFA (enough) Violence & 
Exploitation | Facebook.” Accessed May 2, 2015. 
https://www.facebook.com/kafa.lb/photos/pb.323356544336.-
2207520000.1426791830./10150447990389337/?type=3&theater. 
“KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation’s... - KAFA (enough) Violence & 
Exploitation | Facebook.” Accessed May 2, 2015. 
https://www.facebook.com/kafa.lb/photos/pb.323356544336.-
2207520000.1426791824./10151247497669337/?type=3&theater. 
Kelly, Caroline, and Sara Breinlinger. “Identity and Injustice: Exploring Women’s 
Participation in Collective Action.” Journal of Community & Applied Social 
Psychology 5, no. 1 (February 1995): 41–57. 
 161 
Khal, Claude El. “My Beirut Chronicles: What? There’s Human Trade in Lebanon?” My 
Beirut Chronicles, March 16, 2015. 
http://claudeelkhal.blogspot.com/2015/03/what-theres-human-trade-in-
lebanon.html. 
———. “My Beirut Chronicles: Yet Another Domestic Worker Commits Suicide in 
Lebanon.” My Beirut Chronicles, March 20, 2015. 
http://claudeelkhal.blogspot.com/2015/03/yet-another-domestic-worker-
commits.html. 
“LBCI | Celebrity Duets Ziad-Al-Samad.” Accessed May 2, 2015. 
http://www.lbcgroup.tv/celebrity-duets-en/ziad-al-samad. 
“Lebanese Ad: For Mother’s Day, Indulge Her with a Maid of Color.” Al Bawaba, March 
18, 2015. http://www.albawaba.com/editorchoice/lebanese-ad-mothers-day-
indulge-her-maid-color-670546. 
“Lebanese Woman Beaten to Death by Husband  :: Beirut.com  :: Beirut City Guide.” 
Accessed May 2, 2015. http://www.beirut.com/l/26538. 
“Lebanon: Stop Abuse of Domestic Workers | Human Rights Watch.” Accessed May 2, 
2015. http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/23/lebanon-stop-abuse-domestic-
workers. 
Lentin, Ronit. “Palestinian Women from Femina Sacra to Agents of Active Resistance.” 
Women’s Studies International Forum 34, no. 3 (May 2011): 165–70. 
doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2011.02.001. 
Lingyun QiuBenbasat, Izak. “Online Consumer Trust and Live Help Interfaces: The 
Effects of Text-to-Speech Voice and Three-Dimensional Avatars.” International 
Journal of Human-Computer Interaction 19, no. 1 (September 2005): 75–94. 
doi:10.1207/s15327590ijhc1901_6. 
Majed, Rayan. “Failing to Stand against Domestic Violence,” March 28, 2014. 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/541140-failing-to-stand-against-
domestic-violence. 
Maksoud, Hala. “The Case of Lebanon.” In Arab Women: Between Defiance and 
Restraint, edited by Suha Sabbagh, 89–94. New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996. 
Massena, Florence. “Lebanese Women Not Safe despite Domestic Violence Law - Al-
Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East.” Al-Monitor, December 31, 2014. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/lebanon-law-domestic-
violence-women.html. 
Mikdashi, Maya. “A Legal Guide to Being a Lebanese Woman (Part 1),” December 3, 
2010. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/376/a-legal-guide-to-being-a-
lebanese-woman-(part-1). 
Nehme, Dahlia. “Teacher ‘beaten to Death’ by Her Husband | News , Lebanon News | 
THE DAILY STAR,” February 6, 2014. 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Feb-06/246514-teacher-
beaten-to-death-by-her-husband.ashx. 
“North Lebanon Maid Was on Hunger Strike before Suicide: Ministry | News , Lebanon 
News | THE DAILY STAR,” March 20, 2015. 
 162 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Mar-20/291578-north-
lebanon-maid-was-on-hunger-strike-before-suicide-ministry.ashx. 
“Pour La Fête Des Mères, Offrez-Lui... Une Bonne.” L’Orient-Le Jour, March 16, 2015. 
http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/916006/pour-la-fete-des-meres-offrez-lui-
une-bonne.html. 
“Pregnant Domestic Worker Hangs Self in Lebanon.” Al Akhbar English, June 13, 2013. 
http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/pregnant-domestic-worker-hangs-self-
lebanon. 
Qiblawi, Tamara. “Women Decry Lebanon’s Domestic Violence Law - Al Jazeera 
English,” April 15, 2014. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/women-decry-lebanon-
domestic-violence-law-2014327115352486894.html. 
“Raise Shawwa’s Voice - Kafa.” République. Accessed May 2, 2015. 
http://www.republiquebeirut.com/raiseshawwasvoice/. 
Rebeiz, Maria J., and Charles Harb. “Perceptions of Rape and Attitudes Toward Women 
in a Sample of Lebanese Students.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 25, no. 4 
(April 1, 2010): 735–52. doi:10.1177/0886260509334410. 
Seifeddine, Ghada. “Women Across the Barrier by Muhieddine Labban.” ON GENDER 
IN LEBANON, May 20, 2014. 
https://genderlebanon.wordpress.com/2014/05/20/women-across-the-barrier-by-
muhieddine-labban/. 
Sontag, Susan. Regarding the Pain of Others. 1. ed. New York, N.Y: Picador, 2003. 
Staff, Lebanese Examiner. “Meet the First Woman to Join the Lebanese Security Forces.” 
Lebanese Examiner, February 5, 2015. 
http://www.lebaneseexaminer.com/2015/02/05/meet-first-woman-join-lebanese-
security-forces/. 
S, Tamara. “Shawwa: A Voice for the Voiceless | Beirut News Network,” February 13, 
2015. http://beirutnewsnetwork.com/tamaras/2015/02/13/shawaa-a-voice-for-the-
voiceless/. 
Stephan, Rita. “Leadership of Lebanese Women in the Cedar Revolution.” In Muslim 
Women in War and Crisis: Representation and Reality, edited by Faegheh 
Shirazi, 175–97. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010. 
Taylor, Alex. “Women Rights Campaign Tackles Gender Roles | News , Lebanon News | 
THE DAILY STAR.” The Daily Star Lebanon, November 27, 2012. 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2012/Nov-27/196218-women-
rights-campaign-tackles-gender-roles.ashx. 
““The Idea Is Simple: The More Solidarity... - KAFA (enough) Violence & 
Exploitation.” Accessed May 2, 2015. 
https://www.facebook.com/kafa.lb/posts/10152394907489337. 
“The Lebanese Constitution.” Arab Law Quarterly 12, no. 2 (January 1, 1997): 224–61. 
“The ‘White Ribbon’ Campaign in Universities-Lebanon | Engagingmen.net - A Gender 
Justice Information Network.” Engagingmen.net. Accessed May 2, 2015. 
http://www.engagingmen.net/news/white-ribbon-campaign-universities-lebanon. 
 163 
Urabi, Abdel Rahman. “Tackling the Scourge of Domestic Violence in Lebanon.” 
Alaraby, March 9, 2015. http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/777f5936-
9960-444f-be07-7445d4f7ce8b. 
Usta, Jinan, Jo Ann M. Farver, and Nora Pashayan. “Domestic Violence: The Lebanese 
Experience.” Public Health 121, no. 3 (March 2007): 208–19. 
doi:10.1016/j.puhe.2006.09.014. 
Usta, Jinan, Jo Ann M. Farver, and Lama Zein. “Women, War, and Violence: Surviving 
the Experience.” Journal of Women’s Health 17, no. 5 (June 1, 2008): 793–804. 
doi:10.1089/jwh.2007.0602. 
Vlahos, Kelley B. “No Color-Coded Revolution for Afghanistan by Kelley B. Vlahos -- 
Antiwar.com.” AntiWar.com, August 11, 2009. 
http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2009/08/10/no-color-coded-revolution/. 
 
 
